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The Story of Christianity in the Japanese Empire

RICHARD TERRILL BAKER

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DARKNESS OF THE SUN

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PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

to the memory of my friend

R. N. K.

PREFACE

THE FLAG of Japan is a large white banner with a red ball in the center. The ordinary Japanese schoolboy will tell you that the ball is a symbol of peculiar cosmological significance to him and his fellow countrymen. One morning I stood with a Japanese schoolboy on the eastern coast of Japan and watched the horizon lighten with the dawn's early light and the cone of Mount Fuji toss back the first bright rays of the day. "Now you see why Japan is called the Land of the Rising Sun," he said.

For centuries Japan has watched the huge red ball come up out of the Pacific void and bathe its land in light. Queen of the skies, the sun has been good to Japan. Regular and faithful, it has ascended into the heavens each day, and just so it has ascended into the pantheon of deities which guide and guard the country. Into the archaic legends of Japan was woven the story of the sun. Primitive, animistic imagination called the blood-red orb a goddess—Amaterasu-omikami—mother of the race, divine progenitor of the Japanese imperial line.

With this sun upon its banners and the goddess' divine blessing upon its purposes, Japan struck out in 1931 to spread the light of its sun across the Orient. But where the banner flew came not light but darkness. The darkness of dungeons, where Korean patriots died for their love of liberty. The darkness of imperialistic exploitation, of savage military aggression, of bombing open cities, of rape and torture, of bayonet and sword. The darkness of a nation at home, its mind clouded by the skillful manipulations of propagandists and their police escorts.

To millions of Orientals in the past fifteen years the sun has not been a symbol of light but a symbol of horror and darkness, the mystic symbol which drove the Japanese with irrational, religious fervor to the fulfillment of their empire-building dreams upon the soil of East Asia.

When the sun-goddess was enlisted in the cause of Japanese empire building, that cause became a crusade. Challengers were more than dissenters in the hurly-burly of the day's politics; they were offenders against the faith which was synonymous with Japan, and they were obstructing the way of the gods.

Cloaking their political schemes in such a religious dress, the leaders of Japan were certain to run head on into a clash with prophetic Christianity. This was just what happened. Inside Japan they found the Christian church a continuing objector to their religious pretensions and they pounded it relentlessly to bring it into line with their beliefs and practices. Not all their efforts were without success. In Korea, in China, in the Philippines, and elsewhere in the path of invading armies, the Japanese empire-builders found the Christian church a thorn in their way. The significance of this religious conflict in the political history of the Orient over the past fifteen years should never be obscured. It is to draw attention to the role which prophetic Christianity played in the contest with a false ideology, and the political consequences of that resistance, that this book has been written.

In the pages which follow the reader will find evidence of numerous occasions in which Japanese Christians bent to the yoke which the state forced upon them. It is impossible to write the story of the Christians' struggle against the Shintoistic Japanese state without noting these compromises of the church's prophetic voice. Where shall the blame be laid? An effort has been made in these pages to treat the facts without placing blame. No one of us is in a position to call the other a defector from true, prophetic Christianity.

A prophetic religion always occupies a nervous position between heaven and earth. It cannot be completely esoteric and out of this world. Nor can it be entirely of this world. It has to walk the earth without getting its feet muddy. The history of religion, particularly in the Hebrew-Christian tradition, is a continuing story of struggle between the involvement of religion in the cultural surroundings where it has to live and the prophetic judgment of religion upon that culture. A prophetic religion is tugged upward to the revelation of God, and tugged downward into the historical processes of men, where it must be known and meet the existential situation.

A result of this tendency of a prophetic religion to make its voice heard in the affairs of men is an equally pronounced tendency to switch the cart before the horse. The culture comes to be bulwarked by religion rather than judged by it. This was the story of the Israelites in Canaan, repeatedly submerging their Jahweh worship into the sociological milieu and repeatedly being snatched back again before the tabernacle of the Most High by the great prophets of Israel.

Certainly in wartime Japan the Christian community made at least tentative marriages with the general culture. Some of them seemed to be gross defections from the religion of a universal God and a Prince of Peace. But the Christians of Japan were not the first in history to find their God behind the state's leadership rather than leading.

It is easy enough for Americans to see this kind of defection. We have a long tradition of separation of church and state behind us. But before any of us is too quick in blaming the Japanese church for its submergence into the general pattern of its nation at war, it is well for us to consider the ways in which our own Christianity takes on the color of the cultural milieu in which it moves. It is not so easy for us, for instance, to distinguish between Christian virtues and the virtues of our mercantile civilization. We are as prone to use God as a blessing rather than judge of our business success and material prosperity as the Japanese were to harness God to their empire-building machine. The God of American Christians is also discolored by our own sociological mores, our accepted business practices, our race relations, our materialism, and our own brand of nationalism. Let us not be blind to our own peculiar compromises of prophetic Christianity, nor too hasty in condemning those of others.

Once we admit there is guilt in all of us for failure to practice true Christianity, there are lessons for all of us to learn in the experience of the church in wartime Japan and its empire. To point out these lessons is another reason for this book.

The author wishes to thank *World Outlook* and the Methodist Board of Missions for granting him the leave of absence which permitted three years of study of the Oriental scene and made possible his spending the winter of 1945-46 in Japan as *World Outlook* correspondent; the Bureau of Public Relations of the United States Army and its functionaries in Tokyo, Seoul, Shanghai, and Manila for their courtesies; his wife for assistance in indexing this volume; Miss Florence J. Mitchell for typing the manuscript; and his old friend and Union Theological Seminary classmate Nobu Tajima, who worked with him as interpreter and colleague in assembling the information concerning the church in Japan. More than thanks are due the dozens of sincere Christians throughout the Orient who helped fill the notebooks from which this volume has come, thanks and a lively hope that by their strength, wisdom, and faith they will realize the new church they dream about and the better world they deserve.

RICHARD TERRILL BAKER

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I . . . . IT WAS A BATTLE OF THE GODS

TWENTY days before Japanese bombs rained on Pearl Harbor, a special delivery registered letter was delivered to Masatake "Johnny" Fujita at his home in Tokyo. "You are called into your country's service," the letter said. "Come and see us."

The appointed time was 8 A.M., November 20, 1941. Fujita appeared. Between four and five hundred other Japanese appeared with him. It was a motley assortment of young Japanese professionals. There were radio performers and announcers, writers, newsmen, novelists, artists, photographers, actors, and singers. In addition, there was a group of twenty-six men, including Johnny Fujita, who had seldom before been singled out by official Tokyo for recognition by the government. They were Christian clergymen—thirteen Catholics and thirteen Protestants.

Individually, the recruits were interviewed by the Japanese army officers.

"You have studied in America and speak English?" Fujita was asked.

"Yes," he replied.

"You will tell no one about this interview. You will appear in two days at Shiba Park, with clothing for the tropics. You will continue your regular work, and you can bring what equipment you need for it. Probably you will need a Bible," the army official said. "It may also be helpful to equip yourself with a Spanish conversation book."

"Do I have any choice?" Fujita asked.

"You do not," the officer answered, and Fujita affixed his seal to the contract.

Two days later the recruits were assembled in Shiba Park, Tokyo, outfitted with mess gear, a combat hat, and boots. Speculation was running wild.

Just before leaving Tokyo on the afternoon train, November 22, Johnny Fujita learned what his designation was. He and his twenty-five fellow Christians were members of the religious section of the propaganda corps attached to the military administration of the Philippine Islands. At 5:40 P.M. the propagandists left Tokyo. In Nagoya they got their first taste of life in a propaganda corps. It was army life. In Hiroshima they were issued soldiers' uniforms. On November 26 they set sail through the Inland Sea and landed in Formosa two days later. There they were given a pistol ("for your protection," the officer said), a helmet, and rations for the tropics. The corps was then attached for training to a military unit poised on a neighboring island. The commanding officer was Lieutenant General Masaharu Homma. For ten days the propagandists marched, drilled, saluted, and learned the details of Japanese army discipline.

On December 17 the corps set sail for an unknown destination, still unaware of the events that were shaking the world, still believing that a peaceful invasion of the Philippines was under way.

On the day before Christmas, 1941, Johnny Fujita and his fellow corpsmen knew that something was amiss. The soft green coast of the Lingayen Gulf was before them. The smell of gunpowder was in the air. There was a final briefing. The United States and Japan were at war. The Lingayen beachhead was secure. The propagandists could go ashore.

"Spread out among the people," they were told. "Tell everyone that Japan is not invading the Philippine Islands, that we are not fighting the Filipinos but the Americans."

To the religious section the propaganda chiefs issued specific orders: "The Filipinos are intensely religious. They are Christian. You are also Christian leaders. Go among them. See that their property is not disturbed, that their services go on. Undermine all confidence in America. Meet church leaders, even missionaries."

The Christian missionaries from Japan, dressed in army uniforms, tumbled shoreward with the troops. The march of the Japanese Empire was on the double-quick, and Tokyo was not overlooking the part that Christians might play in furthering the imperial designs. The sons of heaven were working out their divine destiny. The banner of the blood-red sun was flying.

It was no accident that twenty days before Pearl Harbor the war lords of Japan signed up the Christians. It was no accident that in the Philippines, in the Netherlands East Indies, British Malaya, Korea, and China, as well as in the homeland of Japan itself, Christians found themselves behind the sword. Japan's military strategists planned it that way. For years they had carefully prescribed the circle within which the Christian church could exercise its conscience and its functions, and at last in Japan at war there was no way for Christians to break that tether upon their faith and works short of outright martyrdom.

The church of Japan did not choose martyrdom. It accepted the circumscription put upon it by the warring state. At times it moved uneasily along the perimeter of the circle and tugged at the restraints put upon it. Now and then its devotion to God and his laws produced individual Christians who risked their lives to save their consciences. But in general the church in wartime Japan was forced into a position from which it could not judge the state. Christianity became a secondary faith to the religious claim of the nation and its symbols upon the believers' life.

The dynamic of faith that drove the Japanese war machine was not Christian. The god that sanctified the sword at the gates of Nanking and Manila, and outward to the farthest reaches of Japanese aggression, was not the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. It was the god—"kami," the Japanese would say—of the Kamikaze, the god of the divine wind, which blew its favor upon the sons of heaven and its wrath upon their enemies.

This faith has been called Shinto. Actually that is a misnomer. Stripped to its bare essentials, it was a faith of the nation, contrived by militarists to sanctify their purposes.

Christians have a specific mandate in the presence of such tampering with their faith: "Thou shalt have no other gods before me." Christianity's universal monotheism leaves no room for option and choice where rivals for the soul are concerned. The Christian's God is a jealous God, forever antagonistic to any other claimant which reaches out to possess the primary religious allegiance of a man or a people.

The Japanese church never quite saw clearly this fundamental religious conflict in the nation. It was a young church. Like other churches in non-Christian lands, it was accustomed to being a minority. What it believed had never been the norm of faith for the nation as a whole. It did not and could not expect the society around it to know the finality and uniqueness of the Christian revelation.

Japanese Christians, therefore, found themselves with two gods. No observer from outside those tight little isles can ever fully appreciate the dilemma which Japanese Christians faced with increasing confusion as the war progressed. He can read in the official publications of the churches in Japan, both Catholic and Protestant, that after 1936 it was lawful for believers to engage in the "civil" ceremonies at the national shrines, and he can see the Christian school children with all their classmates going through the full Shinto ritual at the shrines. He can hear the prayers to the sun-goddess of Christian delegations at the Grand Shrine at Ise, can see Christian church leaders reporting to Ise on their movement, and petitioning for favor from the ancestral deities enshrined there. He can listen to the order of the Japanese government requiring a five-minute obeisance to the emperor at the beginning of every Christian service of worship, and he can see the heads bowed down. He can see copies of the wartime hymnal of the Christian congregations of Japan, where every reference to God's royalty and supremacy is erased. He can listen still to the debates which divide the house of Christians in Japan over a creedal expression which asserts God's universality and primacy above the symbols of Japan's particular faith. He can see the missionaries in army uniforms following the aggressions of their armies.

All these things are on the record. An observer can notice them and conclude that Japanese Christians apostated from the true faith during the war years in Japan inasmuch as they gave up their supreme devotion to God and countenanced the lifting of a lesser god into the position of authority in their lives. This is the simple conclusion.

To understand the full story of Christianity in Japan and its empire is unfortunately not so simple. It is the purpose of this volume to tell the story of what happened to Christianity in Japan and its occupied territories during the years that it was cut off by the iron curtain of war from contact with the worldwide fellowship of Christendom, to list the facts and the experiences, to show what Japanese Christians lost in essential faith and what they gained through suffering and sacrifice, and to show what the future of Christian development in Japan will probably be.

There are two interpretations of Japanese Christianity currently being discussed. One group of observers has studied the wartime record and has concluded most optimistically and enthusiastically that there was no defection from true Christianity in Japan during the war years. The other group of observers, more sanguine and political in their judgments, declare that Japan's wartime Christianity was a hypocrisy and a pose that carefully obscured the fascist nature of Japanese life and defected a long way from what true Christianity ought to be.

The truth lies somewhere between these two extremes. A respected scholar on the staff of General MacArthur's religious investigators told me one day, in summing up the church's wartime record in Japan, that he felt the Christians had lived through the war years there in about the same way Christians in all other countries of the world and at all times in history had gone through periods of war in their national life. That is, they had regretted the injustices and brutalities of war, they had squirmed a bit uneasily at the religious pretensions of the warring Japanese state, but they had not risked their obliteration in a pitched battle with their nation at war. History books are not full of stories of the resistance of churches to their own nations when those nations are at war. By his followers, curiously tainted with sentimental attachments to themselves, God has generally been maneuvered into blessing the historical decisions they make. There was a great deal of this in Japan.

By assuming divine prerogatives the Japanese state threw down the gauntlet to the Japanese church. But the church refused to do battle. Deep in its conscience it sensed the religious dilemma of wartime Japan. But it did not try to resolve that dilemma with a clear-cut struggle between the gods of Baal and its own true God. It chose to keep what it could of its own religious devotion, to yield unto Caesar those things which are Caesar's, and to avoid the showdown with powerful forces which would have wiped it out quickly if the Christians had set up their God in defiance to the state's prescribed religion.

In doing this, Japanese Christians were like most others in history. The compromise they made had its effect on the spiritual life of Christian believers. The Christian church in Japan grew progressively weaker through the war years. A pious veteran of the church told me in Tokyo that he refused to attend church during the war years in protest against the weakness of its message. The Japanese people were sick and tired of being governed, he said, and the official church was simply another instrument of the government. Church attendance fell off. Many congregations ceased meeting at all.

Miss Michi Kawai, one of Japan's most sensitive Christians, said to me concerning the wartime church in Japan, "We could do nothing at all." She meant that the church's task was so restricted and hampered that it spent all its time fighting off limitations on its life and could do nothing with forward-moving expressions of the Christian gospel.

Christians in all lands have had these same experiences and have watched their essential faith seep away into the sea of commonplace secular opinion. Therefore, it is not the purpose of this volume to come to judge the wartime record of Japanese Christianity, except insofar as judgments are made to include all the rest of us at the same time and on the same charges. It is the purpose here to state the record. And part of that record is most certainly that the Christian church in Japan came through the war with its organization intact, and its faith sufficiently vital to give it today a tremendous rebirth of enthusiasm and hope for postwar development.

Part of the record is Fujita and his fellow propagandists who were paid by the Japanese army to do its work in the Philippines. They went under compulsion, but they were Christian clergymen running errands for Baal. Some Christians in the Philippines have never forgiven the Japanese church for allowing its ordained ministers to identify themselves so closely with what was, to the Filipinos, a cruel aggression.

At the same time, and also part of the record, is the fact that the Christian propaganda program was largely a failure, most of its personnel was withdrawn after a year, and in the Philippines are many Christians who admit that, though the original premise was wrong, the presence of the Christian pastors with the invading army was a safeguard and a blessing to many Filipinos.

There were cases where schoolmen dropped all their Christian principles and swung their institutions squarely into line behind the militarists' parade. But there was also Tadao Yanaihara, schoolman, professor at the Tokyo Imperial University, who left his classes at the university in protest against the government's increasing coercion of his conscience, and went to his own home to conduct small classes for study and worship.

Part of the record is the refusal of the United Church of Christ to clear its mind on such basic tenets of the Christian faith as God, the maker of heaven and earth, and God, the judge of history. But also in the record is the case of 250 Holiness pastors who went to jail precisely because they would not yield those tenets of their faith. Also in the record is the case of the Rev. Rinzo Onomura, of Sapporo, who was taken by the police for lecturing that the Japanese deity Amaterasu-omikami was subordinate to the Christian God. And the case of Monsignor Tatewaki Toda, administrator of the apostolic vicariate of Hokkaido, who had the same trouble for the same insistence that God's sovereignty was above that of Japanese deities.

In other words, the church bent to the yoke the Japanese state forced upon it, but it did not break. It went along offering up its gifts to Caesar, but it carried within it sufficient uneasiness of conscience, sufficient memory of a truer Christianity, sufficient martyrdom to seed the new earth when spring came.

II................THE CHURCH THAT YIELDED

ALL AMERICAN Protestants have a traditional appreciation of the meaning of the separation of church and state. To them, the state is something quite distinct from society as a whole. Rather than immediately identifying the state with the people, most Americans are inclined to be suspicious of the state for its interference with the people's life.

The Japanese do not have this tradition. The state and society are one. They are locked together into one indivisible family framework stretching from the emperor down to the lowliest plebian. The Japanese is schooled from birth to fit himself into this family and order his life around it. It is a breach of his training, of morality, of etiquette, for the individual Japanese to set himself in any way apart from the total community. It thinks as one, it believes as one, it acts as one.

It was this uniformity of thought and conviction that gave the Japanese such fanatical performances of loyalty on the battlefield, on the sea, and in the air. The individual Japanese has no ground upon which to stand to judge the morality of his nation as a whole, because that would presume moral principles beyond the family-nation, and in Japan there are none.

The American assumes the rights of individual moral conscience. Conscientious objectors to war were legally recognized in the United States, even though they held their beliefs under strong social disapproval. In Japan I was told that there were conscientious objectors to war and actual cases in which young men refused to appear for military service. But I could find no evidence of such cases after considerable searching, and it is my conclusion that if they existed at all they were treated as a mild form of lunacy.

It is important for Americans to understand this difference between their tradition and that of the Japanese. We can easily criticize the individual Japanese for his inability to see the injustices perpetrated by his nation, and our indignation against the Christian church of Japan for its co-operation with that nation's barbaric policy in the Orient is enormous. We forget that we are asking of the Japanese individual and the Japanese church something quite foreign to their culture and temperament.

When members of the American occupation forces in Japan today express their pleasure over the people's discipline, orderliness, and industry, the phenomenon they are seeing and appreciating is exactly this tradition of order within the family authority. When they felt the sting of suicide planes against their ships off Okinawa, they were not so appreciative. But it was the same tradition of authority and discipline at work.

Two Japanese may disagree with each other. They meet not in the accepted American way of laying their cards on the table and threshing out a solution to their difference. They meet in polite harmony, without mentioning their difference, and proceed on the basis of subtleties to reach a compromise that cuts off some of the nose of both but does not destroy either's face.

All of these qualities of the Japanese culture and temperament have been sketched here briefly as background to an understanding of the way the Christian church acted in Japan when it reached a crisis in its relations to the state. It could not oppose the state head on. To wrench itself out of the total life of the Japanese community would have been too utterly unthinkable. When fundamental differences arose between the leadership of the Christian church and Japanese officialdom, the habits of compromise were those to which the two parties turned to ease their differences.

Of course there were people in Japan who questioned the war and the policies of the army clique which precipitated it. But even these people—most of them—followed the traditional pattern and conformed in varying degrees to what the total society was doing. It is difficult in present-day Japan to find people who are completely free of war guilt. One of General MacArthur's chief difficulties in finding public servants to take posts in the government of postwar Japan is occasioned by this record of the Japanese in having compromised their precepts in order to conform to their community. The Marxists were the one solid bloc of opinion in Japan which did not so conform. They were opposed to the fascist ruling clique and got jail and execution for their pains.

There were other groups in Japan which disagreed with wartime policies. One was a certain clique of liberal intelligentsia, largely centered in the highest seat of learning in the land, the Imperial University in Tokyo. They were men who, for philosophical reasons (sometimes religious, as a few of them were Christians) and arguments from intellectual liberty, opposed the pretensions of the ruling clique. They too were successfully hounded into submission. Another group was the internationalist set, people who did not share the war lord's concern over medieval and fanatical nationalism. These people had seen the world and were conversant with its problems. They knew the strength of the West and argued that Japan's only line of advance was in co-operation with other nations of the world. This group included traders, manufacturers whose markets were ruined by Japanese isolation, businessmen who felt the pinch of fascist controls on the economic life in Japan, navy men, a considerable number of foreign office officials, who argued until the day of Pearl Harbor that Japan's foreign policy should get off the Axis beam and into an Anglo-American alliance, and most of the Christian church.

It would not be accurate to say that a nation of ninety million people was entirely single-minded in support of Hideki Tojo. But it is accurate to say that for practical purposes a single mind was achieved, rebellion was restrained, and the lukewarm supporters of the war were gradually compromised into positions of acquiescence to Japan's war policies.

All of this helps to explain what happened to the church in Japan during the war years. I know of no Christians who wanted war. Between 1937 and 1941 the best leaders of the church in Japan were sickened and humiliated by their nation's performance in China and openly apologetic for it. Christians were brought up with international contacts. Many of the church's leaders were trained in Europe and the United States. It was the unusual Christian leader in Japan who did not know some American, Canadian, or Briton as a personal friend. I do not think that a spontaneous "Banzai!" came from the throats of Japanese Christians when the word of the Pearl Harbor attack came home to them. That was not their first response. They were saddened at something gone out of their lives.

In other words, the Christian church in Japan was never a warmongering church. But it was a patriotic church and a proud church, and its numbers were drawn from the responsible ranks of good citizens. It felt its obligations to the state and tried to perform them.

There is very little record of bitterness toward the enemy in the attitudes of Christians in Japan during the war. When the first repatriates landed in New York in 1942 with stories from inside Japan, practically no one spoke of hostility shown him by his fellow Christians there.

Christian after Christian in Japan told me, "We were never sold on the war." That is apparently the fact. But it is a long distance from an attitude of not being sold on the war to a policy of active opposition to it. And it is equally a fact that the Christian church as an institution never pitted itself against the machines of war in Japan. It is also a long distance from an attitude of not being sold on the war to one that is resigned to the war policy of the nation and uses the presuppositions of a society at war as its own. The Christian church in Japan, the evidence makes clear, was part of a society at war, shared its convictions and ideologies, and played second violin to the state's tune.

Working with a translator, I read back copies of publications of the United Church of Christ in Japan in an effort to ascertain what the church was telling its people during the war years. The war was on almost every page. Service to the country was glamorized and sanctified. The slogans of war were made into short homilies with scriptural support. The catchwords "victory," "loyalty," "sacrifice," and the like, were picked up by church writers and given a spiritual dimension. The tone is not one of flag-waving, but of using the current war emphases for heartening the people and stirring them to moral and spiritual concerns. There is frequent moral condemnation of black marketeers—"Our boys are giving their lives for their country. What is your sacrifice—you who cheat your fellow countrymen and break the ration line?"

Here is a precis of an article, written by the Rev. Tsunetoku Takase and printed in the *Sunday School Teachers' Magazine* of the Board of Sunday Schools of the United Church of Christ in Japan at the end of 1944:

> God is drafting [the same word as used for military conscription] all people, young and old, men and women, because he needs employment in his vineyards. Our vineyard is this country. There are various kinds of work and various fields in the vineyard. Similarly, in this country we have many needs, as production of weapons, production of food, research in science, and discovery of new weapons. And now, my younger generation, in which field will you work? Many soldiers who are sent off at the railway stations with banzai on the lips of the crowd are young people like you. They are rushing into the recruiting offices and asking for permission to join the army. Many kamikaze special-attack corps members are following as a cloud. Therefore, you young people should obey and serve our country by the order of the emperor to do as much as your fellow youth and follow in their steps.

> That would be the most wonderful service to your country, to forget yourselves, to sacrifice and do your best for the nation.

In an article "Obey the Imperial Rescript" this line appears: "If we obey the imperial rescript and do our service to the emperor, we are at the same time obeying and serving our God." My translator told me that the article contained a page of exhortation on serving the emperor, and two lines at the end, the gist of which was, "We also have to obey Christ."

No one could read these papers without feeling the strong flavor of patriotism and support of the nation which fills the articles. But for contrast, here is a brief of articles which appeared in the same Sunday-school journal in September, 1945: Our weakness was that we didn't believe in Christ and the cross; through preaching Christ we can make for true repentance; let us have prayer meetings all through the country; our enemy-mind and our envy-mind must go away, must be changed to a mind of understanding and co-operation for the establishment of world peace in common with other nations; our defeat was due to our lack of morality; we ask all Christians to restore Japan morally.

Another postwar issue of the same periodical carries this kind of article:

> Freedom comes only from Christ. This war was wrong from the beginning, not only that it troubled our material life but our spiritual lives as well. Our eyes were all closed to truth and reality, and we were forced into world conflict in the name of a holy war. Many leaders, militarists, and officialdom, used this name of a holy war to issue laws and regulations to protect themselves and their war. They misguided our country. In the church also we had such laws and regulations issued to misguide the people in the name of our holy war. This we cannot deny. The church is an organization of freedom; it cannot be coerced by the state or by force. Inasmuch as we were ourselves misguided, we have now to fight for real freedom in the church, and we

have to ask the resignation of those leaders who misguided us.[1] The Sunday school has the responsibility today of showing what is the church's true freedom. All Christians in Japan now should appreciate and understand their new freedom, should repent for the war and protect the younger generation from the burden of oppressive regulations and force and guide them to follow Christ in whom is real freedom.

The contrast is striking between these two types of articles written a year apart. They are printed here to give evidence of the kind of mentality which possessed the Japanese church during the war years. Their tone was not bitter, belligerent, harsh. They quite correctly sounded moral warnings and pointed up spiritual truths. But they were far from opposing war or criticizing the fascist state. They accepted the state's decisions and proceeded on the same presuppositions.

The desperate efforts of Christians to align their beliefs alongside the reigning Shinto doctrines were already being made before 1940, when most Christian activities in the country fell behind a curtain of isolation from the rest of Christendom. In 1940 a committee on emergency of the National Christian Council of Japan issued a series of pamphlets for general distribution that are now well-known abroad. Their purpose was to state the official Protestant attitudes on the current policies and programs of the state, and they clearly threw the weight of Christian support behind those policies.

"New Christian apologetics to meet the newly arising national sentiment had to be introduced to the churches in Japan confronted by a crisis. As a consequence, the whole tone of writings and lectures of our Japanese leaders of late has been along this line of producing new apologetics for our new age and surroundings," said the secretary of the National Christian Council in a statement covering the publication of the pamphlets. He certainly spoke the truth so far as the Japanizing of Christianity was concerned, for the whole burden of the publications was to assure the Japanese state that Christianity offered it no opposition, taught a way of life that was "one with Bushido in promoting the welfare of the nation and love of country," and provided the one real spiritual motivation that would ensure the success of Japan's imperial schemes.

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[1] Notice that this was written in an official publication of the United Church of Christ in Japan.

Here are two quotations from these official pamphlets:

> We love our nation; we love our fatherland; and if ever our fatherland is in danger, we immediately arise and place ourselves on guard. We are not among those who love war. When, however, the fight is against an unrighteousness that is trampling righteousness under foot, when the fight is for the establishment of true peace, we count it glory to enter the field of battle and stand as a shield against iniquity. "Think not that I came to send peace on the earth: I came not to send peace, but a sword!"
>
> It is our mission to protect the Chinese people from having their whole body cast into Gehenna, even though their right eye must be plucked out. With love in our hearts we have resolved on the completion of the holy war. With tears in our hearts we have raised aloft the whips of love, and the time may yet come when these will bring the people of China to perceive their error. We hope and believe and pray that on that day when the peace of the Far East opens before their eyes, their time of thanksgiving will come.[2]

In the *Nippon Times* of October 13, 1943, appears this brief note:

> In line with various wartime activities, ministers of the Japan Christian Church Federation are offering their labor, working at the Nippon Metal Casting Industrial Company in Tsurumi for a period of one month. Their presence has greatly encouraged the workers there, which fact is greatly appreciated by the staff members of the company.

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[2] The author of these two statements was the Rev. Saburo Imai, a Methodist pastor attached to Aoyama Gakuin in Tokyo.

One Tokyo clergyman said this about the state of the wartime pulpit in Japan: "On the whole our preaching was very weak and bewildered. We were sad about the war, about the rupture from world Christendom, but we were resigned. There were men who were brave and outspoken in their pulpits and got away with it. But on the whole we were weak and confused."

As is always the case in countries at war, some Christian pastors in Japan went all the way with the state's prescribed ideology. They accepted the idea of a holy war and became more jingoistic than the war lords themselves. One of these was a certain Gengo Imaizumi, once the pastor of the Nakashibuya Presbyterian Church in Tokyo. As the war progressed he became more and more nationalistic, built his sermons around the Japanese classics, and endorsed the holy crusade. The church split on the issue of his orthodoxy, and Imaizumi took part of the congregation to a new site in Kamakura, where his services lost all their Christian tone, became meetings built around lectures on Japanese nationalism and tradition. Imaizumi also wrote magazine articles strongly critical of Christianity.

I know of no Christian school in Japan which did not have to give up in greater or less degree, by compulsion or voluntarily, a measure of its Christian character during the war. The loyal Hiroshima Girls' School, where girls were singing hymns in a Christian chapel service when the atom bomb dropped on August 6, 1945, was forced to yield the word "Christian" from its charter and constitution, remove the name and monument of Miss Nannie B. Gaines, its missionary-founder, from its premises, and erect a shrine to the emperor within its gate. Schools were controlled directly by the Ministry of Education and its prefectural suborganizations and it was their definite policy to remove all Christian influences from them. Other schools, like

St. Paul's University in Tokyo, Kwassui Gakuin in Nagasaki, and Toogijuku in Hirosaki, went even farther in voluntarily giving up their Christian character. Almost all Christian boys' schools in Japan converted their curricula to technological subjects related to the war effort. On many girls' campuses small factories were installed to manufacture radar parts, gunpowder sacks, buttons, and other items necessary for the war effort.

An even more striking identification of Christianity with the prevailing Shinto ideology is seen in the following statement from Akira Ebisawa, executive secretary of the highest Protestant council in Japan:

> What is then the plan for the long-term reconstruction of East Asia? Its purpose is that of realizing the vision emblazoned on the banner, "The world one family"; and that purpose, we must recognize afresh, coincides spontaneously with the fundamental faith of Christianity. The policy of extending even to the continent our family principle, which finds its center in an imperial house, so that all may bathe in its holy benevolence, this policy—can we not see?—is none other than the concrete realization on earth of the spiritual family principle of Christianity, which looks up to God as the Father of mankind and regards all men as brethren. This is the Christian conception of the Kingdom of God. The basis of the Japanese spirit also consists in this; and thus, wonderful to relate, it is one with Christianity. Nay, this must indeed be the Great Way of heaven and earth . . .
>
> Herein is the reason why we, in this emergency, must make it our supreme and immediate duty to serve the country by preaching the gospel of Christ. To store up spiritual strength to regulate the various dislocations that the "incident" produces within the nation itself; to help the people to make that progress in both physique and character which will fit them for the fulfillment of their mission; to enable them to burn with the ideal of the establishment of a new East Asia; and to stand firm in the assurance that it will be accomplished; thus to make us as a nation, face to face as we are with unprecedented difficulties, ready to sacrifice gladly for the development of the life of the ancestral

country. . . . This, we believe, can be the work only of those who share the faith and life of Christianity.

On numerous occasions the United Church of Christ in Japan was guilty of handing down direct governmental orders to its local churches. One of these cases had to do with the officially prescribed five-minute ceremony of bowing to the emperor and praying for the war heroes just preceding every Christian service of worship. It was a compulsory ritual, and if for any reason it was ever neglected the pastor was immediately taken by the police for questioning.

In most Christian services the five-minute ritual was awkward and somewhat offensive. Many church-goers purposely tried to be from three to five minutes late to avoid it. Sometimes the ceremony was observed in the churchyard outside the sanctuary; sometimes it was a five-minute preliminary ritual inside the church, with the call to worship and musical prelude following. Sometimes it was part of the worship itself. Most of my informants on the subject of this little ritual agreed that it looked like a Shinto desecration of the house of God, but actually in the way it was handled by individual pastors it was not unchristian. The bow was a tribute to the national community, the prayer was a true facing of God in silence and for whatever heartfelt petitions the worshiper wished to place before him. In postwar Japan no churches observe it.

Another errand which the church ran for the government was the publication of a new "special wartime hymnal," an expurgated collection of hymns which clearly showed the church's willingness to yield to the state on a vital matter of Christian practice. The traditional word in Japanese Christian literature which is used to translate the idea of Jesus as king is "o-gimi." This word in Japanese is also used for the emperor; in fact, it is his special word. Therefore, out it went from all Christian hymns. Any such reference to Jesus or God as "King of Kings" was a Shinto sacrilege, and the Christians gave up their usage of the term. "Onward, Christian Soldiers," was dropped in the revised hymnal, and while antifascist Norwegian Christians were singing in fields, streets, cottages, and chapels the stirring affirmations of faith in Luther's "A Mighty Fortress Is Our God," Japanese Christians were prohibited its use.

Under pressure of the times the government abolished all holidays. Sunday was no more than any other day. The Christian church did nothing to protect the sanctity of the Sabbath or secure an official safeguard for a time of common worship. Consequently congregations melted away and practically disappeared. The weekly schedule was the state's, not theirs.

The church tried to keep Sunday schools going, but it was a losing struggle, and the church never brought the issue into the open in a clear-cut demand to the state that the church should keep its right to supervise the spiritual nurture of its children. Sunday schools also were virtually nonexistent when the war ended.

The church made no demands of the state for the protection of its clergy. Pastors were subject to conscription. Many of them took part-time jobs outside the church for much-needed remuneration. Both Catholics and Protestants had a difficult time recruiting seminarians because of the many other demands of a warring society upon the time of young men.

Christian publishing fell off, particularly of those magazines and books which represented critical thought and individual exploration of live social and philosophical issues. Everywhere the church trimmed its sails to the "divine winds" of the Japanese national gods.

The church accepted policing of Christian meetings, held services only by official permission, and only as regularly as the government allowed. When dissenting groups of Christians got into trouble with the Ministry of Education's official edicts, the organized church obliged the state by banning the dissenters from fellowship in the body of Christ, the church.

Although in most cases their intentions were sincere, Japanese churchmen were on exceedingly shaky ground in permitting their official representatives to follow Japan's invading armies into the occupied areas of the Nipponese empire. Japanese Catholics seized upon their country's occupation of the Philippines as an opportunity for close collaboration between the two national churches.

On December 28, 1942, the *Nippon Times* carried the following item, indicative of the part the church was playing in Japan's imperialistic plans:

> Catholics in the Philippines are collaborating freely and willingly in the reconstruction of their motherland, it was revealed here recently in a letter from Bishop Yoshigoro Taguchi, who is now in Manila entrusted with the task of aiding spiritual guidance to the Filipinos, states Domei. . . . Bishop Taguchi's conviction that the Catholics in the Philippines are supporting earnestly and freely the Japanese military administration was reaffirmed when he addressed on November 14 a group of Filipino public officers who were then enrolled in a school established for retraining them in the discharge of their duties.

When the Philippines were "freed" and their independent government launched, Catholics in both Japan and the Philippines celebrated with services and public orations marking the event. In the October 15, 1943, issue of the *Nippon Times* appeared an article describing a service held in Tokyo, with the Rev. Shoji Tsukamoto taking part to celebrate the independence of the Philippines. Father Tsukamoto had been one of the Japanese religious mission to the Philippines.

Protestants likewise had their representatives in the overseas outposts of the empire. To the Philippines they went as ordained clergymen in the pay of the Japanese military administration. Bishop Yoshimune Abe and his staff in Shanghai were never in the pay of the government but were sent to China by the Church of Christ in Japan as its official missionaries. Bishop Abe's task, however, was to serve with Japanese officialdom in specific reference to Christians and church groups. Other deputations went out from Japan from time to time to work to further more harmonious relations between the Japanese and Christians in the occupied areas. In all these cases the service which the Christians performed was to soften the blow of the Japanese invasion, but never to question the fundamental justice of the military aggression itself.

By far the most flagrant case of the Christian church's yielding its prerogatives to the state was the dictation which the churches accepted concerning their polity and creed. The United Church of Christ in Japan, after it started the wheels of organization moving in 1940, found itself in lock step with the wishes of the Ministry of Education in all matters of polity and creed. The constitution of the United Church parallels the Religious Bodies Law of 1940 and is completely harmonious with it. That law stipulates at every essential point that the church or religious body can do nothing without "approval of the competent minister." The minister in every case was the government's minister of education. Article 20 of chapter III in the United Church constitution says: "A man who is elected by the general assembly and is approved by the minister of education will become the United Church torisha (chief executive officer)."

The powers possessed by the torisha were completely one with the vertical, authoritarian pattern of Japanese governmental life. He was its chief executive officer, its representative vis-à-vis the government, and it was he who held constitutional authority to decide all questions of doctrine, polity, and personnel. Inside the organization of the United Church itself, the power of the torisha in overseeing every department and bureau was constitutionally safeguarded and made supreme. All of these dictatorial powers heaped upon the torisha irked the rank and file of Japanese Christians but pleased the government.

At an executive committee meeting of the United Church, held in December, 1945, four months after the end of the war, the Rev. Mitsuru Tomita, torisha, reported that the matter of writing a creed for the church was still stalled because "the last catechism submitted by the church failed to meet the requirements of the government."

These are samples of the way the church in Japan, the bride of Christ, became handmaiden to the state. These are the facts. No judgment needs to be made upon them. Perhaps the church was coerced. Perhaps the habits of compromise were so entrenched in the Japanese nature that the church could do no other. Perhaps a minority religious group like the Christians was powerless to act otherwise. The truth is as you see it.

III. . . . . THE STATE MEETS THE CHURCH

IF THE record shows a compromising, yielding attitude on the part of the church toward the state in wartime Japan, much of the reason for it becomes apparent if one examines in detail the attitude of the state toward the Christian church. The state went through the motions of granting the church sufficient independence and protection to convince all Christians that the Japanese government meant to treat them justly. Once the Christians were satisfied that the state was governed by an enlightened and fair policy towards them, the state and community at large let loose a pressure of anti-Christian coercions which were crippling, restrictive, and uncompromising.

If the Christians never saw clearly their fundamental conflict with the warring Japanese state, the same thing cannot be said of the Japanese militarists and nationalists who were Japan's wartime government. They saw clearly and sharply the fundamental antagonism of Christianity to all the structure of ideology and practice which bulwarked their regime, and they confronted the church accordingly.

The Japanese state had two attitudes toward the Christian church: legal and actual. The legal relationship between church and state was codified in the Religious Bodies Law of 1940 and administered through the Religious Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Education. The law provided official state recognition of the Christian church, gave it some rudimentary legal safeguards, but was for the most part a snare and a delusion. On occasions during the war the law was of great benefit to the church, as, for example, in the case of Sophia University. The German embassy recommended to the government that Sophia be made into a Japanese-German cultural society headquarters. By recourse to the legal provisions for its incorporation under the Religious

Bodies Law, Sophia was able to save itself as the leading Catholic university of the country.

But in its total effect, the law served to mollify the churches while the official pressures against the Christians went unchecked. In exchange for official recognition and property rights which the law gave the churches, the Christians yielded their own sovereign authority over creed and polity and subjected themselves to many other capricious judgments which the government made at its own discretion under authorization of the Religious Bodies Law.

A great many close observers of Japanese church development have spoken in glowing terms of the Religious Bodies Law. "You cannot imagine how unprecedented in Japanese history it is for the state itself to recognize Christianity as one of the official religions of Japan on the same footing as Shinto and Buddhism," they say. True, it was unprecedented. True, a Christian house of worship had as much legal right to exemption from taxation as a Shinto shrine or a Buddhist temple. But implicit in all this argument in favor of the Religious Bodies Law was the tacit recognition on the part of churchmen that Christian life had something to gain from the state's recognition. They fail to remember that if Christianity had waited to become "official" in its beliefs and practices, it would have stopped in the manger at Bethlehem.

The law went into effect in the year just preceding the outbreak of the Pacific war. It was drafted by Koichi Yoshida, head of the Religious Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Education, a typical bureaucrat who did what he was told. The chief burden of the law, on the surface, is the identification of churches and denominations or sects as juristic persons with rights and privileges before the law. It entitled them to hold property under legal protection and exempted them from taxation. The law was scrupulously impartial in its benefits upon Christians, Shintoists, and Buddhists alike.

The three chief hooks in the Religious Bodies Law were (1) its reservation to the executive branch of the goverment of the right to determine what religious groups held beliefs which did not endanger the state and were thus entitled to recognition; (2) a clause, repeated throughout the statute, which subjects churches', shrines', and temples' registrations, appointments, and organization to approval by the government's minister of education; and (3) the extralegal discretionary powers which the Ministry of Education assumed on the basis of the law and which were used to bring the religious bodies into line with the state's desires for them.

The first of these hooks gave the government sufficient power to coerce or punish any belief or item of creed which displeased it. No sect had the right to argue its case in court or in any other way restrain the arbitrary action of the ministry.

It was this provision of the law which the ministry acted upon in its interference with essential beliefs of religious bodies in Japan. There are two Shinto sects in the country, for example—Tenrikyo and Omotokyo—which have been popular among the people but definitely heretical according to the official schools of Shinto theology. The law made it very easy for the executive branch of the government to ban these sects.

The ministry did assert its authority over two prominent items in the Christian creed. One was the belief in God as creator of the world. The other was the belief in a final, divine judgment of all history. These beliefs "endangered" the state in that they challenged the Shinto story of the creation of the world from the sun and the sun-goddess, and the final judgment tenet gave God and Jesus at his right hand an ultimate authority over the Japanese "tenno" (heavenly emperor).

When I asked a member of the staff of the United Church of Christ in Japan why it had never written a creed, he replied, "The Mombusho (Ministry of Education) kept objecting to certain passages as being alien to Japanese thought. We kept trying to draft something to satisfy the ministry, but we were eventually stalled completely."

To the time of this writing the United Church of Christ in Japan has no stated creed. It does have a brief statement of belief, which it calls a catechism, and is as orthodox as the Nicene Fathers. The wording of this catechism is a sample of the way the church juggled words and compromised with the government, satisfying themselves with a brief statement of thoroughly orthodox belief, and at the same time satisfying the government by not using the more direct words of the Apostles' Creed, "Maker of heaven and earth," and "From whence he shall come to judge the quick and the dead."

"Approval by the competent minister"—this phrase, which appears in article after article of the Religious Bodies Law, was the second legal right which the government reserved for itself in exchange for recognition of the bodies. This provision gave the minister of education veto powers over the entire polity of a religious organization. Unless he approved the appointments, elections, registrations, and changes of personnel within a recognized body, none of them was effective. By virtue of this power, the government's representative could have blocked every executive officer the religious bodies elected from holding office until one was chosen to do the government's bidding.

The third hook in the government's interpretation of the Religious Bodies Law was one which the religious organizations could scarcely have anticipated. It had to do with interpretations of the law and minor rulings for its execution, made at the discretion of the Ministry of Education, which had far-reaching consequences in the law's end effect. The most notorious of these discretionary rulings was one which stipulated that no recognitions at all would be given to religious bodies which fell below a certain numerical strength.

When I queried the Religious Affairs Bureau about this extralegal proviso concerning the size of church bodies and sects, a spokesman told me: "Under the law it was necessary to get the minister of education's permission to become a religious body, and the recognition of the state was rather difficult to obtain. It was possible only for large bodies."

I asked him: "But there was no provision governing size of religious organizations in the law, was there?"

"There were no regulations concerning size," he replied. "But the minister of education had choice in the matter and decided that the state would not recognize anything too small. If a sect hadn't sufficient churches and members compared with the regular sects, it was not fair to recognize it on the same basis as the larger bodies."

"What was the standard set by the ministry for declaring a religious organization sufficiently large to merit recognition by the state?"

"There was never any standard formally established," the spokesman went on. "But the private judgment of the minister was that a religious body should have at least fifty churches in its connection and five thousand believers."

Nothing more sweeping in its effect on the life of the Christian church in Japan in modern times ever took place than this unofficial private ruling of the Ministry of Education. For in this ruling the United Church of Christ in Japan was born. When the ministry decided that no organization with fewer than 5,000 members would be recognized, many denominations in Japan were out in the cold. Only the larger established denominations, like the Episcopalians, Presbyterians, and Methodists, had sufficient numerical strength to qualify under the minister's ruling. The logical answer to the government's qualification was to combine and gain sufficient strength to leave no religious body unrecognized. Union was the course agreed upon in 1940 by the Protestant denominations of Japan.[1]

There was nothing in the Religious Bodies Law which gave the government power to demand and enforce a union of Protestants in Japan. Apologists of the United Church in Japan today take pleasure in pointing out that the union arose spontaneously and could not have been coerced by the government because there was nothing in the Religious Bodies Law which specified it. They are right. What they do not tell is that the minister of education, in interpreting the law, read stipulations into the statute which forced the churches into union or dissolution.

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[1] See Chapter V for the history of the United Church.

When the Rev. Mitsuru Tomita, the United Church torisha, went before the executive committee meeting of the church in December, 1945, he began his report with these words: "I must take up the question of the abolition of the Religious Bodies Law, which took place on October 2, according to the Potsdam declaration. *As the United Church was built upon this law,* it is, I hope, fitting to take up this subject for your deliberation." The italicized words show that the head of the United Church clearly recognized that the organization was built upon the Religious Bodies Law of 1940.

Another evidence of the minister's private interpretation of the law was the story of what happened to the Episcopal Church in Japan after 1940. The Episcopalians opposed the union of all Protestant denominations, but in their own connection had sufficient numerical strength to satisfy "the private judgment of the minister." Why, then, did they not press for recognition on their own and obtain it? I asked this question of the chief of the Religious Affairs Bureau in the Ministry of Education, and his reply indicated that the minister refused to recognize the Episcopalians in their own separate connection because, he said, they had once agreed to join the United Church and later backed out, and because they were divided among themselves. One can search through the Religious Bodies Law until he is blue in the face and never find any such right as this explicitly given the government. But that was the way the Ministry of Education interpreted the law, and the Episcopalians were dissolved as a denomination.

To sum it all up, the Religious Bodies Law represented the legal relationship between the Christian church (along with all other religious organizations in Japan) and the government. The law gave official state recognition to Christianity as one of the legal religions of Japan. It made churches and denominations juristic persons and exempted their property from taxation. It also made them toe the official line in matters of belief and creed. It gave the minister of education the final approval of church officials and organization, and, by virtue of the minister's "private judgment," it resulted in the formation of the now famous United Church of Christ in Japan.

One should not fail to observe the direction which all the government's moves took in relation to its regimentation of the church. Matters of belief had to be straightened out according to the Shinto yardstick. In all matters touching organization of the churches, the state's desire was to streamline all democracy out of the organization and delegate responsibility to one church and one torisha only, which could be easily controlled and through a vertical line of authority hand down the state's commands. This was the sum purpose of the Religious Bodies Law of 1940.

The analysis of the Religious Bodies Law which has just been made is in its way too stark and unqualified. It is my conviction that the law was written to bring religious bodies, and particularly Christian churches, into the government's sphere of operations. That was its intention. But even holding this conviction, I am forced to recognize that in human hands the law did a great deal less than it might have toward coercing the churches.

In numerous cases where church property was about to be seized contrary to the law, the representatives of the Ministry of Education strongly defended the church's ownership. When the confiscator was the army or navy, however, as in the case of Ferris School and Doremus School in Yokohama, the Ministry of Education's defense was useless. The army and navy took what they wanted.

I know of no case in which the minister of education used his veto power to disapprove of an elected church official. The fact that the war ended with the church officials and the ministry officials still trying to reach a compromise on a creed, shows that the ministry was not anxious to issue punitive orders or clear-cut prohibitions, but was more inclined to meet the church in trading sessions and try to work out a satisfactory solution for all parties.

"The Religious Bodies Law, while a government measure and a restraining influence, was also a safeguard to a minority religion like Christianity," the Rev. Tokuzo Hiraga, first postwar general affairs section head of the United Church, said to me in his office one day. "The law gave position and some freedom to Christians that they would not have had without it. It was something to fall back on for the church when the church was subjected to pressure from the Shintoist clique."

Tomita, head of the United Church, told me that he was convinced that it was never the government's policy to oppress the church but simply to regulate it. What this meant was that the government stipulated the boundaries of freedom within which the church could act, and once inside those boundaries there was legal protection and no further trouble. Tomita did say that the militarists and police followed a different policy from that of the civil government. They caused some oppression of the church outside the law, and Tomita felt that the Ministry of Education was as keen on defending the churches as he was.

Father Josef Roggendorf, a German Jesuit, repeated the same testimony, that it was not the official line of the government to oppress Christians. In fact there was fairly satisfactory protection under the law. But it was rather the police, both civil and military, who caused the trouble.

Enough for the legal relationship between the Christian church and the state in wartime Japan. It was a fairly stable, steady relationship, in which the state was clearly the ascendant power and wielded its regulatory authority over the church. But once having accepted those regulations, the church was comparatively free to perform its essential functions.

As has been apparent throughout all this analysis, there was more to Japan's relationship to the church than what the law said. That is why I suggested at the beginning of this chapter that there were two aspects of the church-state relationship in Japan during the war, the legal and the actual. The actual attitude of the state and general community toward the church was one of suspicion, hatred, misunderstanding, disrespect, and eventually terror and persecution.

To understand this it is necessary once more to look to the origins of some of Japan's central attitudes. The general level of Japanese society considers a Christian as one who has broken the organic community which is true Japan. He does not quite totally belong to the "we" group. He is something of a social outsider, lacking position in the community. He is considered somewhat as we in America might consider a fanatic, giving him half an ear but never quite accepting him as a final judge of our fundamental values. There is in Japan a deep and underlying social disapproval of Christianity. It is the reason to this day that fathers disinherit their children who are converted to Christianity. The faith is an offense to the Japanese tradition.

The ordinary Japanese is like most people with a prejudice. It is simpler to go along with his prejudice than it is to study the subject of his forejudgment and make a more reasoned decision about it. In other words, the ordinary Japanese knows very little about Christianity. He would not be able to tell you what its primary beliefs are, he is absolutely nonconversant with its vocabulary, as was shown over and over again during the war when police officers, whose arrogance outran their intelligence, called in Christians for utterances on peace, sin, divine judgment, love, and the like.

The most the ordinary Japanese knows about Christianity in its favor is that Christians have a strict and high ethical standard (which most of them believe is too puritanical for them) and that they do more charitable good works than the other religious groups of Japan.

Blend these two attitudes together—one, a fundamental prejudice against the faith for its offense against the Japanese we-community, and two, a rather distant respect for Christians for their integrity and their good works—and you have a rough idea of the general public attitude toward Christianity in Japan in recent years. It was the kind of attitude that would tolerate Christians but never quite admit them to the inner circle.

This curiously blended attitude explains many things that happened to Christians in Japan during the war. The prejudice brought out a virtual reign of terror where Christians were concerned. The respect always saved them just this side of outright persecution. Christian converts in Japan have generally been drawn from the professional, middle, and upper-middle classes. Therefore when the rabble began to lift its voice for persecution of Christians, there was almost always someone around in a sufficiently high position to soften the blow and still the rabble's cry.

The Salvation Army had difficulties early in the war, because of its use of military symbols in its organization and because of its tie to head offices in Britain. The military clique threw the Salvation Army head into prison on suspicion of antiwar propaganda. It was an order from the imperial household itself which released the suspect, and the emperor promptly sent him a gift of ten thousand yen as a public denial that the Salvation Army was in any way disgraced.

These friends at court helped get Christians out of trouble. But with all their prestige and position, it seems that they were not able to check the power of the public prejudice against Christianity. I found no one in Japan, even among those most sympathetic toward their government and community in general, who did not admit that the pressure against Christians and the organized church had been tremendous.

In the first place, Christianity in Japan is considered "imported" and foreign. It is not an indigenous faith in a country where things Japanese have first claim upon the loyalty of the people. The Japanese saw Christianity as a white man's religion, as it always came with the missionary, and Japanese Christians were customarily thought of as "running dogs" to the foreigners. Non-Japanese had positions of authority in the Christian churches. Many of them were tied to decisions made thousands of miles away in London or New York.

As history decreed, the countries which had been most intimately associated with the missionary development of Christianity in Japan were Britain and the United States, the chief enemies in the war of 1941-1945. This fact made the situation for Christians even more dangerous. Christianity was not only an imported, foreign religion; it was an enemy religion.

So the secret police got the go-signal. Anyone in the Christian church who had been friendly to foreigners, and there were thousands of them, was under suspicion. His thought record had to be checked. Did he have sentimental attachments to the enemy, defeatist attitudes toward his own country, did he think Japan or the enemy would win? In February, 1945, Bishop Paul Shinji Sasaki, presiding bishop of the then-abolished Episcopal Church of Japan, along with two other leaders of the denomination, was taken by the police and kept in confinement in the military police detention quarters. They were charged with having defeatist attitudes toward Japan's war effort, sentimental feelings of respect and affection toward Britain and the United States, with being spies and "peace-thinkers," and, finally, one overt criminal act, of sending letters via China to Britain and the United States, thus having contact with the enemy. There was never any proof of all these charges, and they were finally freed in June, 1945.

The spy charge was general and utterly lacking in the precise legal meaning of espionage. Any Japanese who had a somewhat reserved attitude toward what his country was doing was accused of being a spy. In propaganda films manufactured to stir up the populace to support of the war and to vigilance against the country's enemies, it was not unusual to see a subtle reference to Christians as troublemakers in the nation. The villain in these propaganda films was frequently pictured emerging from a Christian church. The official channels of information in wartime Japan did nothing to hide their distrust and enmity toward the Christian church and to warn the public generally against it.

The propaganda officials went into the schools and warned children and young people about the dangers to the nation of Christianity and terrorized them into not attending church and Sunday school. Teachers advised their students to stay away from the churches. Children who went to Sunday school were jeered at in the public schools on weekdays, and there were even cases of school authorities using their power over a student's enrollment in a government institution as a threat in case the student persisted in his Christian practices.

Watches were set on the gates of every foreign missionary's house in the country to keep a record of Japanese who went in and out. Police then followed them to their homes, asked for a detailed accounting of what had been talked about, and asked why any Japanese would so degrade himself as to consult a foreigner on any subject.

A German Jesuit told me that he had been "inspired to discover after the war the loyalty and attachment of the faithful, at a time when all of them were keeping their Christian professions against terrific pressure." Said he: "I didn't know until the end of the war what some of them suffered in the way of police terrorization of themselves and their families and of social pressures."

The police, civil and military, were an exceedingly busy department of the Japanese government where Christians and churches were concerned. All the stories of Christian pastors and laymen being questioned, detained, tried, and imprisoned on police charges would make a sizable chronicle if it could ever be assembled. Practically every Christian of whom I asked the question in Japan had spent at least hours being questioned by the police. Some spent years on end, others months, others days. "I was questioned by the police so many times that I can't begin to remember the number," Tomita, head of the United Church, told me when I asked about his experiences with the police.

The Rev. Toyozo Abe, of the Holiness Church, was held by the police for 715 days before his trial ever began. They threw the Rev. Masatake Fujita into Sugamo Prison for five months in 1945, the same Fujita of whom I wrote in the first chapter, and who was bound for the Philippines on Pearl Harbor Day.

Toyohiko Kagawa had two sessions with the police during the war, once for a few hours in Kobe, when he tried to break the ban on his appearing in public for a speech late in May, 1943. In November of the same year he was taken for nine days of questioning, from dawn to dark, although he was permitted to go home at night.

Police detention is a somewhat unique form of discipline in Japan. The rights of police to punish offenders were a great deal more numerous in wartime Japan than they are in nations with more dependence upon courts and the law. For instance, the habeas corpus right for a suspect does not come due until one year after he is arrested by the police. In the meantime, all sorts of punishment and coercion can be meted out by the police themselves to discipline an offender. Most of the thought-crime offenders (these included the Christians) were taken by the police and held on their charges only. The police had large quarters under their jurisdiction for the detention of these offenders before their arraignment. These detention houses were simple, crowded rooms, and the detainee could have some access to his family and friends. Japanese make a sharp distinction between these police detention houses and official prisons, although the end-effect was little different in one or the other. The third degree meted out by the police was more apt to take place in the detention quarters than in the prisons.

At a boys' school in Nagasaki it was the custom to write a proverb on the blackboard every morning for meditation throughout the day. One morning early in the war a teacher wrote, "It is harder to storm the heart than to storm the castle." The militarists on the faculty took violent objection to the passage and up went the guilty teacher to the police.

The principal of Hinomoto Jo Gakko, a Baptist girls' school at Himeji, near Kobe, spoke out in a clear-cut fashion against the war. The police summarily removed him, and a non-Christian became head of the school and converted the whole institution along nationalistic lines.

The two cases of Christian clergymen in Sapporo, Hokkaido, which have already been mentioned in an earlier chapter—the Rev. Rinzo Onomura and Monsignor Tatewaki Toda—were further evidences of police action against Christians for harboring and spreading beliefs contrary to the interests of the state. Their crime was the same, preaching and teaching that God was greater than Amaterasu-omikami, the chief Shinto deity.

The police were always exceedingly thorough. Whenever foreign missionaries were taken, and almost all of them were rounded up finally and interned, police searched their homes from top to bottom, took away boxes of papers, sermons, letters, and books. Kagawa's occupation for the nine days of his detention was writing in great detail the content of his thinking.

Many other Christians were required to do the same thing when they were taken. Some questions asked: What was the relation between Christianity and the nation? Which is more important, the imperial rescript on education or the Bible? What are the differences between the gods of Japan and the God of Christianity? Is there any conflict between ancestor worship and Christian worship? These were the kinds of questions the police used to try Christians who were suspected of thought-offenses against the nation's interests.

The Japanese police were as short on comprehension and understanding as they were long on volume. From everyone I heard astonishment at what the Japanese police knew and like amazement that they were so stupid about it. Much of the most offensive police behavior stemmed from this stupidity rather than from any intention. A priest in Aomori was arrested while at mass. The police refused to let him remove his vestments and backed him against a wall at the altar as if he were a common criminal. They then ransacked the altar and disturbed the sacramental elements. The priest who told me this story said: "I don't think they meant any sacrilege. They were just stupid and disgraceful."

Catholic nuns suffered much humiliation and many indignities in their encounters with the police. Rough Japanese gendarmes in no way appreciated the sensitivity of these devout and modest women. They were on many occasions forced to remove their habits and were searched roughly.

In September, 1944, in Kyoto, when the sensitivity of Japanese police to thoughts of peace and possible defeat was at its highest, young student patriots informed on four Christian clergymen of the city. They had mentioned "peace" in their sermons—this was the charge. Not one of them could remember using the word in any other reference than is customary in one of the traditional benedictions of the church, "May the peace of God which passeth all understanding be with you ever and ever.

Amen." For this reference the four pastors—all of them Japanese, one with German Evangelical background, another with Lutheran, another of the Salvation Army, and the fourth the priest of the Catholic cathedral in Kyoto—were taken to jail along with several young men, seminarians and other students, who the police felt were being influenced by the pastors. Most of them were released in November, but some were held until close to the end of the war. They were subjected to rough treatment and torture. They were questioned for hours on end and had to write their beliefs and convictions for days. They were also forced to sign statements that they had been careless, with their guilt implied. "They make you sign," said the Rev. Sennen Kishi, one of the four. They lost weight and their hands showed evidence of bruising and torture when they were released.

A French priest in Kobe was taken by the police and tortured after detectives in his congregation watched him walk to the balcony of his church to give communion to an invalid Frenchman who was seated there. The police assumed that some secret message must have passed in the encounter.

Mrs. Tamaki Uemura, head of the women's section of the United Church and one of Tokyo's most prominent pastors, told me that there were always detectives in her congregation and that this was a usual practice. Christian meetings were almost always under police surveillance.

One French priest named Bousquet perished in prison, and while his colleagues have never been officially informed (a nicety of the law which was not required where the Japanese secret police were concerned), it is assumed that he was tortured to death.

The experience of Kiichi Kanzaki, president of Kwansei Gakuin in Kobe, is representative of schoolmen's encounters with the police and the pressure which the government brought to bear upon Christian schools throughout Japan. The police appeared on Kanzaki's campus after considerable agitation had arisen in his faculty against his policies of retaining Christian services and teachings at the school. The police had been informed, they said, that Kanzaki was not sufficiently nationalistic to be guiding a school of young Japanese, and they wanted to examine him for liberalistic and pacifistic ideas. The specific charges which his opponents on the faculty had planted with the police against him were that he misread the imperial rescript on education and did not properly announce "banzais" for the emperor. Furthermore he was accused of criticizing army policy. All of these were serious charges in wartime Japan. Kanzaki stood his ground steadfastly and refused to alter his position or resign. The police came more often for questioning and rebuke and threatened to seize him. They also spread out among his students and faculty and conducted a lengthy investigation of his record and sayings. Agents of the kempei tai (military police) went to classes, talked to students, and interviewed faculty members. Kanzaki's struggle yielded results, and he was finally freed of charges and not taken for detention or imprisonment. But a shadow hovered over the campus throughout the war years, just as elsewhere among the ranks of Christian schools in Japan. Christian educators knew their every move was being watched, that threats and punishments awaited any demonstration of antagonism on the part of Christianity to the required Japanism of the times.

Even the most obvious moralistic preaching, when it proved offensive to the militarists, resulted in punishment for the offender. Father Haruo Saito, a Catholic priest of Hiroshima, spent four years as a soldier in China. When he returned from service he preached one day on the morals of Japanese soldiers in China. He spoke of what he had seen, and presented facts and figures. He said that many casualties in China were caused by venereal disease and that no soldier who died from so immoral a cause was entitled to enshrinement within the Yasukuni gates. This was too close to the militarists' holy of holies, and Father

Saito was taken, held for a long time, and finally given a three-year probationary sentence.

One of the real heroes of Japanese Christian resistance to the war is Tadao Yanaihara, professor of colonial policy in the faculty of economics at Tokyo Imperial University. Midway in the war Professor Yanaihara had been expressly forbidden to write or publish anything. No magazine in the country would have dared to use his name. He was one of the most notorious on the police blacklist.

Professor Yanaihara told me of another Christian pastor, the Rev. Tenrai Sumiya, whose tangles with the police resulted in severe persecution, suppression of all his activities, including a magazine which he edited, and eventually his death in the year before the end of the war.

The most striking example of police persecution of Christians—the case of the Holiness pastors—needs to be mentioned in this context, although the whole story of the Holiness Church will be treated more fully in a later chapter. It was with these pietistic and fundamentalist Christians that the Japanese police really turned on the heat of their worst third-degree methods. All Holiness pastors—nearly 250—including women, were rounded up and questioned for varying lengths of time. About fifty of them underwent long detention or imprisonment, in a few cases for almost the entire duration of the war. Thirteen were still in prison, serving sentences from one to five years, when General MacArthur issued his directive freeing all political (thought) prisoners.

All of these experiences listed here are but a few of the total. The truth is that Christians in Japan, ever since the mid-1930's, lived under an actual reign of terror set up by the police. While officially the government of Japan gave legal privileges to Christian churches, and while certain officials were sympathetic and even friendly to Christians, the actual situation of the churches and individual Christians was made almost untenable by the constant hounding of the police, which led in case after case to threats and annoyances, persecution and torture, and even death.

What was it that the police had against the Christian church?

First, its foreignism. No historian of Japan ever thinks of Christianity without remembering the names of Hideyoshi and the Tokugawa persecutions of the seventeenth century. The great Spanish missionary Francis Xavier planted Christianity in Kyushu in 1549. It grew rapidly and at least three feudal lords of Kyushu Island embraced the faith and sent emissaries to Rome. It was thus that Christianity came to play a role in the politics of Japan at a time when the country was rocked by civil wars among the multitude of small feudal lords throughout the land. In the sixteenth century a strong national figure arose in the shape of Toyotomi Hideyoshi. He ended the civil wars, brought Japan under unified control, reformed land tenure, taxation, mining, currency, trade, and commerce. Hideyoshi was first of the great rulers of modern Japan, and there is a fairly clearly defined line of continuity from him and his policies straight down into the present day. (It was Hideyoshi, for example, who first planned and negotiated an abortive attempt at overrunning Korea.)

In subjugating Kyushu, Hideyoshi ran into the daimio (feudal barons) with Christian sympathies and attachments to the church abroad. He was advised that Christians were the clever advance agents of Western imperialism, pacifying the country in advance of the powerful Westerners who were then frantically placing their flags wherever they could throughout the Orient. Consequently Hideyoshi officially banned the new religion. After all, it was the faith of his political enemies at home and the chief cultural mark of the advancing empire-builders from the West.

The official ban had been invoked on Christianity in Japan by Hideyoshi, and when he was succeeded by the famous Tokugawa line the policy was not forgotten. Persecutions were common throughout the islands. In 1613 a sharp anti-Christian edict resulted in the imprisonment of sixteen hundred Christians in Edo (the modern Tokyo) and the execution of twenty-seven. Tokugawa Iyemitsu, third of the ruling clan, brought the ban to its final and normative state for over two hundred years. He prohibited the importation of Christian literature, refused to allow Japanese to emigrate from the country and to remigrate if they had once gone away, and closed the country to all contact with the outside world. Thus began the famous Tokugawa isolation which did not end until Commodore Matthew C. Perry's ships threw open the port of Tokyo in 1854.

The memory of this isolation is still strong in the mind and temperament of the Japanese people. That it is so closely tied to the persecution of Christians is a fact not to be overlooked. Japanese think of Christianity as foreign and aggressive and something inimical to their own national life. It was not until 1871 that the anti-Christian bans were repealed.

Foreign attachments have remained strong in the church through the intervening seventy-five years. Missionaries, foreign money, foreign languages, Japanese leaders educated abroad, foreign literature, cultural and ethical norms transported from foreign lands—these alien marks have always characterized the Christian church in Japan in the eyes of the ordinary observer. The stigma of foreignism was the first of the reasons that Japanese officialdom looked with suspicion upon the Christian church in Japan and its followers.

The second reason that the police hounded the path of Christians was their universalism. A nation at war requires its people to believe deeply in that nation alone, its traditions, purposes, and basic integrity. This kind of parochial, divided belief does not square with the Christian belief in a universal God, and the Japanese nationalists knew it.

The Christian child learns very early that God is the Father of all little children, regardless of their color or nationality. That child does not live very long in the Christian community before he is made aware of the world-wide fellowship of Christendom. Japanese Christians were particularly active in the ecumenical church. They had their delegates to the great world conferences of Christianity. Nearly half of Japanese Christians, members of the Roman Catholic Church, were clearly identified with an organization that had its roots in a foreign land. The voice of Japanese Christianity was respected and heard in the councils of the church everywhere. The Riverside Fellowship of Japanese and American Christians, formed in California when a deputation of Japanese Christians visited the United States a few months before the outbreak of the Pacific war, was a true and sincere expression of fellowship on the part of both national groups. It meant much at the time and lived in the memories of the highest leaders of the Japanese church throughout the war years as a reminder of the universality of the Christian faith.

The Japanese nationalists could not tolerate this reservation on the part of Christians of a part of their loyalty to a faith which transcended the Japanese state. They were determined to root it out. It was one more aspect of Christian doctrine that challenged the ground of their beliefs, and they were on the alert to spot it and to check it with the direct use of their power.

A third reason that the Japanese police were suspicious of Christianity and determined to restrain it was its pacifism. Whether or not gospel Christianity is pacifist in the absolute sense of the word was not a detail which Japanese officialdom studiously examined. Sufficient for them was the knowledge that many Christians in Japan and abroad were antimilitarist, antiwar, and peace-loving. Not a small number of foreign missionaries in Japan interpreted their Christian ethic with a strong pacifist emphasis, and many leading Japanese Christians (including Kagawa) considered themselves pacifists. Furthermore the ordinary laymen or outsider knows enough about the New Testament emphasis upon love and the passion of Jesus Christ to interpret them as indications of a generally pacifist emphasis in Christianity. Love is never a central belief of militarists, and Jesus is not exactly the soldiers' guide and teacher.

The Christian church, in the eyes of Japanese officialdom, was an agency of propaganda and training. Its schools touched the lives and thinking of thousands of young people. Its services sealed Christian truths upon the hearts and minds of the worshipers. Therefore the police felt obligated to see that not too much love was talked about in places where Japanese young people and the public might hear, particularly love for one's enemies, forgiving love, and the love that conquers even over the might of armies.

Fourth of the reasons official Japan feared the Christian church and oppressed it was its liberalism, its belief in the essentially free man. The vertical, authoritarian structure of Japanese society is a well-known tradition. Psychologists, sociologists, and educators who are today working to reconstruct Japanese society are finding that this authoritarian pattern is the key to understanding Japan and the one form that must be cracked if there is to be a democratization of the people. An educator high in the ranks of General MacArthur's advisers told me that the Japanese culture nurtures its young by handing them down a body of content which is translated by rote into their minds. This process makes for the highly formalized, stylized quality in Japanese culture. Students are told what is so, and they learn it. The premium is on memorizing, not thinking. Teachers are taught what to teach, and they do it. The teachers' manual in Japanese schools is scripture. They do not depart an iota from its directions. There is no discussion, no independent study, no particular notice of the individual. Japanese school curricula were controlled in every detail by the national government. A regulated school in Japan had every major item of its teaching—not just courses and hours and general emphases—dictated to it by the Ministry of Education. I know of only one school in all

Japan that ever broke this pattern, the so-called Freedom School of Madame Motoko Hani, which is now the bright hope of all liberals in Japan.

One can see that such a formalized, authoritarian upbringing for Japanese youth results in a highly uniform state that thinks as one and is homogeneous to a fault. This is the solid, united Japan that has already been described and is well known. The thinking individual in such a culture is a nonconformist. To question the authority or the content it is handing down is a breach of etiquette and a social offense. All this must be remembered in understanding Japan.

To be sure, the authoritarian structure of society was breaking down in prewar Japan. The country had its share of liberals, men who thought for themselves, men who questioned the presuppositions of society and issued prophetic judgments upon it. Marxism had a vogue in Japan and left an indelible mark on the nation's thinking. Japan had two great liberal monthly magazines, *Reconstruction* and *The Central Review*. The temper of the imperial universities was liberal and thoughtful. Japanese industry was exploratory and quick to adapt itself to new methods, if not particularly inventive.

Then came the war. The ultranationalistic militarists ascended into the high places of government. It was necessary to make the nation conform quickly. Hence into the forms around which the Japanese family society was organized was pumped the content of nationalism and militarism. Freedom of thought was checked in its tracks. People thought as they were told to think. *Reconstruction* and *The Central Review* were closed down early in Premier Tojo's regime. Leftist thinkers were slapped into prison. The weeding out process began in the universities.

The Tohoku schools in Sendai dropped their courses in the humanities and installed an all-inclusive department of technology with an outsider in charge. At the Methodist Aoyama Gakuin in Tokyo the college was dismissed and an aeronautical school moved in. All the thoughtful Christian publications were stopped, and publishing survived in the church only in so far as it dealt with details of administration and support of the war.

The whole spiritual and cultural level of Japan went down. The humanities—literature, morals, sociology, economics, philosophy, religion—became secondary in importance to technology. The mental life of Japan was paralyzed. This was done on purpose. The people were not encouraged to think. They were told to make two plus two equal four and where to place the rivets. Propaganda would do the people's thinking, and any man who presumed to think for himself in such a directed state was an enemy of the people.

Unfortunately for the powers that ruled wartime Japan, Christians had all the habits of thinking for themselves. This fact was another thing which made them suspect to the government and put them on the lists for police scrutiny. Christianity sets great store by the individual man's conscience. Christians are trained to think for themselves, decide for themselves, and satisfy their own consciences as they work their way through the moral struggles of history. Wartime Japan did not want its people so trained and opposed Christianity therefor.

Becoming a Christian in Japan is in itself a selective process. The only man who will become a Christian is one who is sufficiently a rebel against the norms of Japanese culture to assert his own decision against the prevailing winds. By the mere fact of his choosing to become a Christian he develops habits of individual will and decision, the very habits which were frowned upon in wartime Japan. Here is the fourth reason that the militarists eyed Christianity with a watchful, suspicious eye, and jumped upon its followers whenever they felt the unity of the Japanese family was endangered. "The whole climate was against us," the Rev. Chujiro Kawabata, a Congregational pastor in Sendai, told me. "The social sentiment opposed Christianity, and there was no doubt about it."

The truth is that the Japanese state and people approached the Christian church with an initial tolerance and approval written into law. After that the actual attitude of the state and people was free to express itself in hatred and disrespect, suspicion and persecution. These social pressures nearly broke the church. One wonders how much longer the Christian community would have survived beyond 1945 if the war had not ended.

Finally there was a fifth reason that official Japan opposed Christianity, a reason that underlay many of the others and was the real cause of most of the "unofficial official" persecution. That reason was a difference of fundamental faith between the Japanese militarists and the Christians. In short, official Japan in the years after 1935 tightened down the screws on the growing Christian church because the militarists and nationalists knew in their hearts that one and only one faith in their country—Christianity—opposed the faith that they shouted in their throats, a mysterious make-believe by the name of Shinto.

IV . . . . SHINTO

WHEN A highly integrated state adds religious motives plus patriotic motives to the actions of the defenders of the state's power, the result is a campaign of terror which sweeps as holy indignation through a population—the wrath of the gods, no less—and withers and blights all imagination and liberty in its path.

Shinto in wartime Japan was the sanction which made every little police functionary a servant of the gods. Around every political and military decision was a structure of patriotic and divine sanction which gave the force of those decisions the power of heaven itself.

Shinto was a clever device to give Japanese militarism the ultimate protection which no power on earth could penetrate. And by "device" I mean just that. Wartime Shinto in Japan was a manufactured product, a creation of those classes in Japanese society through the past seventy-five years which needed it for the sanctification of their purposes in the Orient and the world. Shinto brooked no rivals. Shinto was manufactured and polished into a complete and orthodox system of belief. Its tenets were driven into the minds and hearts of two generations of Japanese and sealed there as a powerful inward faith.

Stripped to its bare essentials, Shinto was a mythology of the divine origin of the Japanese islands and people, it deified the emperor, and it made service to the state the cardinal ethical virtue. It was a cleverly devised statism, a close cousin to the worst forms of Nazi state-worship.

Where did it come from? Shinto is the indigenous religion of Japan. Like all primitive faiths, it is animistic and explains the mysterious forces of the universe by imparting divinity to them. It has one striking emphasis which sets it somewhat apart from other primitive religions and made it of use in modern times to the neo-Shintoists. That is its spiritualization of death and its belief that ancestral loved ones form a company of heaven and are to be honored and respected while they await their children's coming to join them.

This Shinto of folk belief is generally called Minzoku Shinto, or ethnic Shinto. There is a little of this simple belief in all of us who remember our forebears with appreciation and honor them in death. Rude Shinto had no systematics or theology; it was a clutter of animistic beliefs, unorganized and nonphilosophical.

Ethnic Shinto formed alliances with both Confucianism and Buddhism when they entered Japan. From Confucianism, Shinto adopted a system of ethics built upon the principle of relationships and stressing the virtues of filial piety. This adaptation was an easy step for a primitive religion which already regarded highly the ancestral line. This code of relationships—child to father, wife to husband, student to teacher, subject to emperor, servant to master, and so forth—was firmly rooted in Japanese society and produced an orderliness in the culture that was highly useful to the neo-Shintoists of recent years.

From Buddhism, Shinto learned the ways of meditation and the metaphysical. It was not until after it encountered Buddhism that Shinto began to develop a systematic theology. For this purpose it relied chiefly upon the folk tales of primitive Japan and the old animistic deities of wind, fire, earth, the sun, and creation. This mythology again was used to telling advantage by the latter-day Shinto theologians.

Through the years the mass of Japanese folklore, at first handed down by word of mouth from generation to generation and more recently written into mythological books and dramatized into the leading plays and stories of classical Japanese literature, has been converted into the mythology of Shinto. There are today three books in Japan, the Kojiki, the Nippongi, and the Kogoshui, the bibles of Japanese Shinto.

Modern Shinto had a spurt of development in two fairly distinct branches about midway in the eighteenth century. One was a Shinto which emphasized the mythology and the Confucian ethics to develop a simple piety among the people and was strongest among the country folk. It was a more purely religious Shinto than the other branch which grew up with it. The second was Kokka Shinto. This was a more highly systematized faith and was primarily nationalistic and patriotic.

Students of Shinto today generally list three main types: Minzoku Shinto (the ethnic religion), Shuha Shinto (the sects) and Kokka Shinto (the state religion). There is a great deal of overlapping, and the essential beliefs of all three bear strong resemblance to each other. For purposes of understanding modern Shinto in Japan it is enough to keep in mind the two main developments of the faith, sectarian and nationalistic.

This distinction is somewhat arbitrary, but it was insisted upon by Japanese official interpretation and was always used as a convenient separation by the other religions of the country. The distinction made it possible for Japanese to say that sectarian Shinto was the religion, state Shinto was nonreligious patriotism. The Shinto sects, being religious, came under the supervision of the Bureau of Religions in the Ministry of Education, along with Christianity, Buddhism, and the rest. State Shinto, on the other hand, was supervised through the Ministry of the Interior (which office, incidentally, also supervised the civil branch of the secret police). Rentaro Mizuno was the wartime head of the Department of Buddhist and Shinto Sanctuaries in the Ministry of the Interior, and the man chiefly responsible for the state Shinto cult which gradually became normative for all Japan's religious belief.

In a free market Christianity would have had no trouble with sectarian Shinto. They would have been contesting religions, to be sure, but the struggle would have been uncoerced and would have proceeded on the relative merits of the two faiths. Sectarian Shinto has its shrines (or churches), its venerated teachers and founders, its organizations and rites, and nearly 10,000,000 adherents.

State Shinto was quite another thing. It was the manufactured cult, built on sufficient grounds of ethnic beliefs to give its propaganda a convincing ring, and the required faith of every subject in the Japanese realm.

When, in 1867, the Emperor Meiji ascended his throne to rule after 250 years of the Tokugawa shogunate, there was necessary in the maelstrom of civil strife some steadying word which secured his realm and gave him a hold upon the people. What should come more naturally to his advisers' minds than the age-old respect of all Japanese for their imperial line? This respect, grounded in the folklore of Shinto, was seized upon by the emperor's advisers as the basis of a strong pro-Meiji public opinion. Thus in its earliest intent the emperor-cult was not directed so much against foreign intrusions as against the warring shogun whose following had endured for 250 years and constituted the chief threat to the imperial restoration.

The Japanese have a genius for organization and a political structure which simplifies the execution of governmental policies. Quickly and effectively the cult began to grow around the emperor. The shrines were brought under central control and great numbers of them were taken from the sects and made into national monuments hallowing the emperor and the Japanese way of life. They were graded from the local monuments at the bottom to the Grand Shrine of Ise at the top. The latter was the holy resting place of the imperial mirror, itself a manifestation of the sun-goddess, Amaterasu-omikami, the great mother of the unbroken line of Japanese god-emperors. Priests were brought under governmental control for appointment, support, discipline, and dismissal. Public funds were used to maintain the shrines, and this governmental support was augmented by compulsory gifts from the people. In 1875 the government prescribed the rituals for use in the national shrines, specific and immutable, and their whole purpose was to enlarge the hold of the emperor upon the people and to unite them into a compact, single-minded nation.

The new cult, which began to flower around the charm and beneficence of the Emperor Meiji, rapidly outgrew its usefulness as an instrument against his enemies within Japan. The anti-foreign reaction began to set in, and the men in the seats of power discovered that their strongest ally in the struggle against the outside world was the Nipponistic Shinto cult they had manufactured. I quote from the statement from General MacArthur's headquarters, dated December 15, 1945, amplifying the directive which officially cut all governmental connection with Shinto:

> They took the legend of divine descent of the imperial family from the sun-goddess, Amaterasu-omikami, and through school and other agencies attempted to inculcate into the minds of the Japanese the belief that the emperor, as a direct lineal descendant of the sun-goddess, is an actual living god. As such, he is by divine right entitled to rule all lands and all peoples.
>
> Going still further, they claimed all Japanese are descended from one deity or another and therefore are superior to peoples of other lands and that the islands of Japan themselves were of divine origin and therefore superior to any other lands.
>
> The most important factor in conditioning the people to acceptance of a Shinto-centered state was the education system. Here the Japanese government used a device cleverly calculated to bar all other such teachings from schools.
>
> First, in 1889, it issued an order forbidding the teaching of religion in public or private schools.
>
> Then, with all other religions thus out of the schools, it declared state Shinto was not a religion and made its instruction compulsory in the schools.
>
> Through textbooks, highly indoctrinated teachers, and deeply impressive ceremonies, all the threads of Shinto's nationalistic policies were

woven into the student's mind from the time he entered school until the finish of his formal education.

In this way Shinto was made the principal instrument for inculcating submissiveness, loyalty to the state, and unquestioning acceptance of the official views as to the proper nature of society and of political and social morality.

Just how successful this program proved has been demonstrated by the ease with which the militarists came into power in Japan and led the nation into wars of aggression.

General MacArthur's directive formally abolishing state Shinto was written by Lieutenant William K. Bunce, formerly dean of Otterbein College, Westerville, Ohio, a historian and scholar. In his words, the crux of the Shinto problem in wartime Japan was that the whole power of the state and the force of public opinion made Shinto doctrines "the test of good citizenship," the norms for determining a person's worthiness to belong to the realm. Thus Shinto became a part of the totalitarian pattern of Japanese life.

Japanese officialdom, the leading Shinto scholars, historians of religion, Christian apologists, and not a few missionaries have taken great pains to prove that state Shinto was never a religion but simply a high-powered form of patriotism. But by every test they are wrong. State Shinto was built on a supreme faith, an unquestioned, axiomatic affirmation of the absolute as revealed in the Japanese nation. It had its priests and rites, its objects of devotion, and its devotees. These are the marks of a religion in any culture. That it met Christianity in a head-on opposition proved that its pretensions were the same, that it was undeniably in the contest for men's religious loyalty, that its god and gods were out to overcome the Christian God.

So much for the history of modern Shinto in Japan. It is presented here for background only. The important thing to notice is that in all its fundamental beliefs it opposed Christianity and had the force of the state on its side in the conflict.

The years since 1871, when Christianity began to spread itself again in the Japanese empire, have been marked by a steady building up of Shinto pressure against Christianity, even though officialdom protested that there was no fundamental religious conflict. As early as 1890 wise Christians should certainly have seen the deception in the Shinto affirmation that they had no religious argument with them, for in that year the famous imperial rescript on education was proclaimed and made compulsory and exclusive doctrine in all the schools of the country. It was a completely Shintoistic and nationalistic emphasis, and writers and interpreters immediately pointed out its fundamental difference from Christianity. The rescript drove all Christian instruction from the public schools of Japan, and even some of those owned and supervised by the church itself.

A strong group of Christian apologists formed together to prove the oneness of their faith with the prevailing Shinto ideology. They placed their ethical teachings alongside Shinto teachings and announced that there was no fundamental difference between them. They emphasized all the Pauline writings on paying deference to the powers that be as proof that Christianity had no antipathy to the state. Toward the end Christians were trooping to shrines with the rest of Japan's Shinto devotees, offering prayers, putting up Shinto god-shelves in their homes and schools, enshrining the emperor's portrait in their schools and college campuses, and in virtually everything giving way to the totalitarian religion of warring Japan.

Between the early thirties and the end of the decade, Christian attitudes in Japan, both Catholic and Protestant, had changed from strong opposition to the encroachments of Shinto on their religious life to an almost equally strong effort to syncretize the two faiths. Responsible for this change of heart was the state's strong arm, wielded by the police, the growing militarism which engulfed the country with its call for fanatical loyalty to the state, and the emergence of a unified public opinion, schooled in the tradition for seventy-five years, which believed its Shinto lessons as it had been taught.

Therefore it is safe to conclude that, whatever were its protestations to the contrary, no matter how much religious liberty was proclaimed in the statutes, the official Japanese state was unalterably opposed to Christianity on grounds of belief. General MacArthur's advisers were more than astute in attacking the problem of Shinto early on the agenda of reforms for a reconstructed Japan. Shinto's hold on the life of the Japanese people was basic. Only with its removal is there any opportunity for Japan to share in the democratic life of the world. With Shinto, Japan was eternally divided from the rest of the world. With religious freedom she at least has a chance to base her faith in universal beliefs which will permit her to co-operate with other nations.

The link between the state and Shinto has now been broken in Japan. I talked to a student of the Koku Gakuin, a Shinto school in Tokyo, after the publication of General MacArthur's directive severing Shinto's relationship to the state. He told me that he knew of no one on his campus who was opposed to the directive, or who did not feel that Shinto would gain by a purification of its life that would come with release from the government's spoon-feeding and management of the doctrine. And then he added this interesting comment: For many years, he said, Christianity had been forced to adapt itself to the dictates of Shinto; now Shinto will "probably take on some Christian doctrine."

The struggle between Shinto and Christianity is not yet over, but it has been freed from the state's participation in the conflict. The Christian revelation, to be realized in Japan, must be fulfilled in terms of the culture which is Japan's and which has archaic roots there. Japanese Christians are sensitive to this and will now have free opportunity to make their faith real and vital in Japanese terms without being coerced by propaganda and the sword into a premature marriage with a manufactured Shinto.

I have dwelt at length on the record of official Japanese opposition to Christianity and the reasons for it. A word concerning the result of this tremendous weight of disapproval against the church is now in order. The truth is that Christianity waned in influence and initiative, its central message was tuned to the state's pitch pipe, Christian practices fell off, and the church came perilously close to the edge of losing its whole guardianship of the nurture of its young and the training of its leaders.

"Our congregations were so small toward the end of the war that it was difficult to keep meetings at all," a pastor in Sendai described the wartime situation concerning church attendance. "Only the faithful few remained," he said, "the seventy- and eighty-year-olds. Sunday schools were impossible to maintain here during the war. There were no children to go to them and no teachers to teach."

"Terribly weak," Kagawa answered when I asked him about the strength of Christianity in wartime Japan. He continued: "The government was responsible for this, it dissolved Christian meetings, banned pastors from speaking, summoned them to government services in order to destroy churches and congregations, and in many ways succeeded in taking initiative away from the Christian forces."

When a religion accommodates itself completely to the social milieu in which it moves, it becomes chameleon-like and indistinguishable from the environment which surrounds it. This was the way in which Christianity in wartime Japan sacrificed its message and lost its uniqueness and evangelizing power. The sharpest criticisms I heard of Christianity in Japan did not come from foreigners but from sensitive Japanese themselves, who said that wartime Christianity failed in Japan because it offered the people nothing more than they could get from the government's propaganda. "I am suspicious of Christianity today," one young student told me, "because it spent all its time during the war trying to save its life. The kamikaze pilots may have been wrong in what they tried to do, but at least their motives were unselfish. The Christians may have been right but they worked only to save themselves."

The decline of Christianity showed in the waning importance of Christian worship and practices. I spent one night in Japan in the home of a prominent Christian family and slept in Japanese style on the floor just beneath an imposing god-shelf, which was the most striking piece of furniture in the room. When I questioned my host and hostess about the presence of such a shrine in a Christian household, I was told; "It was wise for every Japanese family to have a kamidana in one's home in case the police should come to examine us for our patriotic loyalty."

Public worship, as has been said, fell away to almost nothing. There were many reasons for this. Worshipers were frightened by the police into believing that Christian churches were linked to the spy system. They were fed on an emotional war hysteria which satisfied their hunger for a spiritual motivation of their lives. Sunday was abolished as a holiday and people were not free to go to church. People, particularly women, had to spend long hours in queues for food, a time-consuming practice which overran all hours for public worship. Many pastors were called from their churches to work in factories or serve with the armed forces. This resulted in doubling up of congregations, in older pastors serving several churches, with a corresponding decline in the efficient conduct of services of worship. A tremendous factor restricting church attendance in the latter months of the war was the fear of air raids and the destruction of communities and churches by bombing. Congregations were dispersed and afraid to assemble, even when common worship was possible, because of the likely occurrence of raids. Furthermore the government regulated all printing and public pronouncements, and it was difficult to make reports, serve notices, or publish tracts. The police also held the power of permission over all public meetings and restricted Christian services at their will.

Many Sunday schools attempted to continue and the religious education bureau of the United Church functioned until the last in an effort to guide the religious instruction of the young. But by 1945 the Sunday-school program in local churches, particularly those of the larger cities, was virtually at a standstill. Children had been evacuated from all the large cities. Teachers were at work in factories or in service.

With the formation of the United Church of Christ in Japan in 1940, the scattered seminaries of the denominations for training clergy were shut down and an all-Protestant seminary superseded them in Tokyo. Seminary students became fewer and fewer, and what instruction they received was so warped by nationalistic dogmas that one leader of the church in Japan told me that graduates of the past four of five years are "now useless as Christian pastors and maybe even dangerous to the life of the church." Seminarians in the Catholic church likewise fell to a point where by no stretch of personnel would it have been possible for leadership to have replenished itself if the war had continued.

Even such a thing as Christian burial fell under the restrictions of the state. In recent months investigators for General MacArthur's headquarters have uncovered numerous instances of Shinto and Buddhist coercion of the families of deceased Christians to bury them according to non-Christian rites in order to bury them at all. In Sendai in 1940 and 1941 Catholic cemeteries were desecrated when hoodlums, fired by patriotic motives, broke the crosses on Christian graves in cemeteries. The Catholics in Sendai appealed to the police for protection of their people's graves; the police countered by ordering the erection of crosses stopped and the marking of every Christian grave with a simple plaque. These attacks upon Christian cemeteries, thought to be done by organized groups of pronationalistic young men, soldiers perhaps, went on throughout the war and were winked at by the police who, by then, were openly sympathetic to them.

One other important evidence of the church's decline in wartime Japan, which will be only mentioned here and treated more fully later, was the loss of control by Christians of their own schools, colleges, and universities. Religious instruction was driven out by law. Many Christian principals and teachers were removed. Many institutions were forced to eliminate all reference to Christianity as the faith upon which the schools were built. In those places where a semblance of Christian influence was maintained in schools, it was done in open defiance of the law and by heroic resistance on the part of teachers and school authorities.

Let us make no mistake of interpretation here. The wartime Shinto state in Japan was irrevocably opposed to Christianity and attacked it from the roots of its belief to the forms and practices it held dear. To an uncomfortably high degree it was successful in undermining the integrity, the influence, and the institutions of the Christian church in Japan.

Here are portions of the text of the directive of the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers, entitled "Abolition of Governmental Sponsorship, Support, Perpetuation, Control, and Dissemination of State Shinto," dated December 15, 1945:

> 1. In order to free the Japanese people from direct or indirect compulsion to believe or profess to believe in a religion or cult officially designated by the state, and
>
> In order to lift from the Japanese people the burden of compulsory financial support of an ideology which has contributed to their war guilt, defeat, suffering, privation, and present deplorable condition, and
>
> In order to prevent a recurrence of the perversion of Shinto theory and beliefs into militaristic and ultra-nationalistic propaganda designed to delude the Japanese people and lead them into wars of aggression, and
>
> In order to assist the Japanese people in a rededication of their national life to building a new Japan based upon ideals of perpetual peace and democracy;
>
> It is hereby directed that:
>
> *a*) The sponsorship, support, perpetuation, control, and dissemina-

tion of Shinto by the Japanese national, prefectural, and local governments, or by public officials, subordinates, and employees acting in their official capacity are prohibited and will cease immediately.

b) All financial support from public funds and all official affiliation with Shinto and Shinto shrines are prohibited and will cease immediately. . . .

c) All propagation and dissemination of militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideology in Shinto doctrines, practices, rites, ceremonies, or observances, as well as in the doctrines, practices, rites, ceremonies, and observances of any other religion, faith, sect, creed, or philosophy, are prohibited and will cease immediately. . . .

e) The Shrine Board (Jingi-in) of the Ministry of Home Affairs will be abolished, and its present functions, duties, and administrative obligations will not be assumed by any other governmental or tax-supported agency.

f) All public educational institutions whose primary function is either the investigation and dissemination of Shinto or the training of a Shinto priesthood will be abolished and their physical properties diverted to other uses. Their present functions, duties, and administrative obligations will not be assumed by any other governmental or tax-supported agency.

g) Private educational institutions for the investigation and dissemination of Shinto and for the training of a priesthood for Shinto will be permitted and will operate with the same privileges and be subject to the same controls and restrictions as any other private educational institution having no affiliation with the government; in no case, however, will they receive support from public funds, and in no case will they propagate and disseminate militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideology.

h) The dissemination of Shinto doctrines in any form and by any means in any educational institution supported wholly or in part by public funds is prohibited and will cease immediately.

(1) All teacher's manuals and textbooks now in use in any educational institution supported wholly or in part by public funds will be censored, and all Shinto doctrine will be deleted. No teacher's manual or textbook which is published in the future for use in such institutions will contain any Shinto doctrine.

(2) No visits to Shinto shrines and no rites, practices, or ceremonies associated with Shinto will be conducted or sponsored by any educational institution supported wholly or in part by public funds. . . .

k) God-shelves (kamidana) and all other physical symbols of state Shinto in any office, school, institution, organization, or structure supported wholly or in part by public funds are prohibited and will be removed immediately.

l) No official, subordinate, employee, student, citizen, or resident of Japan will be discriminated against because of his failure to profess and believe in or participate in any practice, rite, ceremony, or observance of state Shinto or of any other religion.

m) No official of the national, prefectural, or local government, acting in his public capacity, will visit any shrine to report his assumption of office, to report on conditions of government, or to participate as a representative of government in any ceremony or observance.

2. The purpose of this directive is to separate religion from the state, to prevent any misuse of religion for political ends, and to put all religions, faiths, and creeds upon exactly the same legal basis, entitled to precisely the same opportunities and protection. . . .

(1) Sect Shinto will enjoy the same protection as any other religion.

(2) Shrine Shinto, after having been divorced from the state, and divested of its militaristic and ultra-nationalistic elements will be recognized as a religion, if its adherents so desire, and will be granted the same protection as any other religion in so far as it may in fact be the philosophy or religion of Japanese individuals.

f) Militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideology, as used in this directive, embraces those teachings, beliefs, and theories which advocate or justify a mission on the part of Japan to extend its rule over other nations and peoples by reason of:

(1) The doctrine that the Emperor of Japan is superior to the heads of other states because of ancestry, descent, or special origin.

(2) The doctrine that the people of Japan are superior to the people of other lands because of ancestry, descent, or special origin.

(3) The doctrine that the islands of Japan are superior to other lands because of divine or special origin.

V .... NIPPON KIRISUTO KYODAN

FROM THE earliest days of Protestant development in Japan there has been a sizable body of sentiment favoring unification of the churches. The earliest converts, from whom the church of today has grown, were men and women who saw the future of the Protestant movement in Japan as one unified Christian impact upon the nation, unencumbered by the overlapping and confusion of denominations. The oldest Protestant parish in Japan is a nondenominational congregation in Yokohama, dating from 1872.

The machinery of church union has been in operation in Japan for a good many years. The two largest branches of the Calvinist tradition, the Presbyterian and the Dutch Reformed, were united years ago into one organization called the Church of Christ in Japan. The two largest branches of Methodism, those related to the missions of the former Northern and Southern churches in the United States, were also united into one autonomous church in Japan, which also included Canadian Methodists.

The National Christian Council in Japan was one of the most effective federations of Protestant forces anywhere in the world. It began functioning in 1923. As early as 1925 the National Christian Council appointed a committee to deal with the special subject of church union. This committee went so far as to bring forth a Basis of Union in 1929, which was circulated among the churches. It could never be consummated because of differences among church leaders. Kagawa's Kingdom of God movement, which covered Japan with its evangelistic message, was nondenominational, and a great deal of Japanese Christian evangelism never bore the mark of any one church or sect.

All this sentiment toward, and machinery of, church co-operation was current in Japan in the late thirties. The most prominent denominations and the outstanding leaders were known to be sympathetic toward church co-operation and unity. All the leading denominations have resolutions on their records favoring church union. I know of no prominent Protestant in Japan who was a die-hard denominationalist.

Christians are a minority in Japan and needed a union in their ranks to give them voice and position in society. The ordinary Japanese does not understand denominational organization, and evangelism is to him a Christian approach to the culture, not a sectarian one. There are none of the historical reasons for denominationalism existing in Japan as there are in the West. Denominationalism was one of the most distinctly foreign importations of Japanese Christianity. It held its position largely because of the Japanese churches' dependence upon denominations abroad for their missionary support and financial aid.

In 1940 the Bureau of Religions in the Ministry of Education, for reasons of its own and quite different from those existing among churchmen, "advised" the churches to unite. I have already described the way in which this advice was given and the personal discretion of the minister of education in determining a numerical qualification that made church union necessary as an alternative to nonrecognition by the state.

From the moment the Ministry of Education acted until the present day a bitter argument has shaken the church in Japan over just what force produced the union. Some say it was the natural development of the years. Others say it was the creation of the state. There ought to be no argument. Both things are true. The union which finally emerged in 1940 was, of course, the fruit of all the labors toward federation and unity which had taken place since the seventies. But it was a government ruling which broke the shell and produced the chick.

"Many of us believed in union," a pastor in Tokyo said to me, "but we were tied down by organizational strings and did nothing about forming it. The pressure upon us from outside to get together was a Godsend in a way. If we had used the union, or still will use it, in a Christian way, then we shall succeed in forming a truly United Church of Christ in Japan."

After the Religious Bodies Law went into effect in April of 1940 and the government announced its intention of not recognizing religious organizations which failed to qualify as to size (five thousand members and at least fifty churches), the wheels began moving in earnest for church union. Small sects, Shinto as well as Christian, scampered to join others in order to make a total which would satisfy the government. In October of the same year a large mass meeting of Christians was called to give a semblance of constitutionality and a representative plebiscite on what was already a foregone conclusion, the union of Protestant churches. Committees were there appointed to work out the details and the first constitution was drafted in close co-operation with the Ministry of Education, and was submitted to the first constitutional assembly of the new church in June of the following year. There the Nippon Kirisuto Kyodan, or United Church of Christ in Japan, was formally organized, and in November, 1941, the proper government officer recognized it. In the spring of the same year a similar kyodan, or official juristic council, of the Roman Catholic Church in Japan was organized and received its recognition.

The first Protestant kyodan was really an organic federation of eleven blocs which represented the larger denominations of former days with a few additional sects added to each of them. Forty-two churches were brought together in the union. For the first year of the kyodan's existence these denominations were arranged in the following groupings, with their heads forming an advisory council around the torisha of the United Church:

Bloc 1—The Nippon Kirisuto Kyokai (Presbyterian and Reformed).

Bloc 2—The Japan Methodist Church, including several small Methodist-related sects.

Bloc 3—The Japan Congregational Church, the United Brethren, the Evangelical Church, and the Disciples.

Bloc 4—The Japan Baptist Church.

Bloc 5—The Japan Lutheran Church.

Bloc 6—The Nippon Sei Kyokai, which was the largest branch of the so-called Holiness Church, a product of the Oriental Missionary Society.

Bloc 7—A collection of smaller pentecostal denominations, including the Church of Jesus Christ, the Co-operative Christian Church, the Gospel Church, the Army of the Christian Gospel, the Resurrectionist Church, the Pentecostal Church, and the Pure Holiness Church.

Bloc 8—The Free Methodists, the Nazarenes, and the World Gospel League.

Bloc 9—The Free Christian Church.

Bloc 10—The Japan Independent Christian League.

Bloc 11—The Salvation Army.

A year later, at the government's insistence, the eleven blocs were deleted as a part of the constitution of the kyodan, and a genuine union was written into the law. There were no longer any legal designations of denominations in the country.

According to the 1942 constitution, the head of the church had virtually sovereign authority over the entire Protestant community in Japan. If he had been so minded, he could have put favorites into all the leading pulpits of the country, or he could have moved Baptists out to make room for Presbyterians. Actually, however, the Rev. Mitsuru Tomita, head of the kyodan, never carried out the constitutional authority given him in the 1942 regulations, and straight through the war the denominational lines continued as the operating channels for guiding the churches' affairs. All Methodist matters, for example, including the appointment of pastors, were handled by the Rev. Yoriichi Manabe, who was the ranking Methodist in the kyodan setup. Baptist matters fell to the late Rev. Dr. Yugoro Chiba, the elder statesman of the Baptist connection in Japan. This convenience in handling denominational matters was outside the law and served to perpetuate the several connections, despite the avowed organic union.

Why did the government take such pains to step into the organizational matters of the churches? Why did the Ministry of Education pass down its advice to the denominations to unite? I have already mentioned the uneasy position of Christians vis-à-vis the state. A widespread, disorganized body of public opinion, spreading doctrines of universalism, pacifism, and resistance to the militarists and the emperor, was a constant fear to Japan's ruling clique. As the state officials looked at Christian organizations their heads swam. All they could see was disorganization, multitudes of small sovereign units, widespread separation of powers. Such a picture makes a bureaucrat in any country yearn to chop out the underbrush and clean up the forest. Japanese bureaucrats are particularly fond of streamlining on an authoritarian pattern. It was their official ruling that Protestant heterogeneity was a threat to the unification of public opinion and that the churches must form themselves into a more compact, easily governed organization. The state insisted upon a head, or torisha, who would be sovereign authority within the organization and the responsible person for dealings with the government. In short, they wanted the church in a position where they could control it. This was the reason the Protestants were coerced into union in 1940 and 1941.

While the United Church grew out of two parents—the long-time prounion sentiment among Protestants themselves and the government's insistence—the desires for union on the part of these two were quite different. The churches wanted union for a demonstration of the Christian community, for position in society, for co-operation and unified planning, and for their own independence. The state wanted Protestant union to streamline the churches into the government's bureaucratic organization.

The child inherited the dominant characteristics of its parent which wielded the big stick—the state. When Japanese Christians declare that the United Church was a good thing because it fulfilled their own dreams of the years, they need to be asked, "Did it?" Did the kyodan genuinely express the essential oneness of the Christian community? Did it arise from the will of the people and form itself according to their convictions and directions? Or rather was it an organization which followed the state's intention for it rather than the Christians' own dreams and desires?

There is little doubt in the mind of any Christian in Japan, friend or foe of the United Church, that it was too bureaucratic, too authoritarian, more concerned over handing down the state's dictates than it was in the spiritual leadership of the people. Hiroshi Hatanaka, president of Kobe Women's College, generally considered an opponent of the United Church in its present setup, was outspoken in his criticism of it. "You couldn't distinguish it from a government office," he said. "It was born of the government and was their tool. It acted simply as another bureau of the Ministry of Education." Soichi Saito, Japan's Y.M.C.A. secretary and certainly no enemy of the kyodan, rather one of its close advisers, admitted that "the church office became more and more bureaucratic, lacking in spiritual dynamic, and its first impulse concerning every decision was to consult the government first and then speak."

Saito voiced a complaint against the kyodan which I heard echoed in many quarters—laymen were not permitted to play an important part in it. Where in wartime Japan were laymen, or the rank and file of any organization, permitted to voice themselves openly? This complaint is a further indication of how successful the state was in wiping out the church's democracy. It was in the state's interest to check lay expression and vest authority in the top clerics. The result was a development in the church which seems always to accompany its association with a fascist state—clericalism. Many laymen turned away from their own pastors during the war because of their strong resentment against the clericalism of the church.

One of the bureau chiefs of the United Church observed to me that "the officialness of the church was regrettable and the leadership was weakened. Too much was forced by the government. On the other hand, we had no alternative and did everything we could within the law. When the time comes, and if the church desires it, we should be willing to resign."

When I asked a seasoned missionary, now in Japan, to comment upon the wartime leaders of the kyodan, he described them as "sincere pastors, but men who have been so tied up with government regulations, control, and bureaucracy that they seem to have lost sight of the larger vision to a certain extent."

This is the common judgment concerning the 1941 Protestant union. It was produced after a long period of cultivation by union advocates in all denominations and had, therefore, a basis in popular support among the churches. However, it was precipitated into history by government edict and at a time of the most rigid state control of the entire Japanese life. Consequently its character was rigidly authoritarian and scarcely the ideal union Protestants had hoped for in Japan. The war years were no time for the churches to develop "a more perfect union," with the government supervising their every move, but there is hope that the time has now come for a conversion of the 1941 body into a real Christian union with its roots in the people and its leadership expressing their desires.

The problem of church unity in any country of the world is always confronted with certain basic matters of adjustment. These are generally listed as creed, polity, and discipline, the ministry and the sacraments. These problems, stumbling blocks for unity in most areas where it is being attempted today, were quickly overridden in wartime Japan by the state's insistence that the union be accomplished. The fundamental, historical, and creedal differences between Catholicism and Protestantism in Japan were solved by the state's agreement to a continuation of these two lines of Christendom as separate entities.

Once the Catholic-Protestant differences were settled, the chief difficulties centered around the Episcopalians and the Seventh Day Adventists. The Nippon Seikokwai, or Episcopal Church in Japan, is one of the most influential Christian bodies in the country. It is also one of the oldest, having put its missionaries ashore in Kyushu as early as 1859, twelve years before it was legal for Christians to propagate their doctrines in Japan. It has been a mission stressing the church, the school, and the social institution, and it has been manned by some of the strongest personalities of world Anglicanism.

The Episcopalians had always worked in co-operation with other Protestants, but when it came time to face an organic union they hesitated. There is a difference of opinion as to just what took place at this juncture. A bureaucrat in the Ministry of Education told me that the Episcopalians, while protesting, did agree to join the Protestant kyodan. The Episcopalians themselves, however, insist that no such agreement was ever made by them. Since the Episcopalians finally split over the issue, it is quite possible that the Ministry of Education was given to understand that they were agreeable to the union even though the church never officially so agreed.

The Episcopalian objections to the union were that it was forced by the government, that it did not represent the wishes of church people themselves, and that the church could not sacrifice its connections to world-wide Anglicanism and its own peculiar polity and ministry.

The authoritarian bodies of the Seikokwai, the house of bishops and the general synod of the church, voted at last to have nothing to do with the kyodan. They acted not vindictively and wished to continue their co-operative relation to the other churches of Japan. The synod and bishops asked the kyodan in 1941 for permission to have an observer on its staff. "This request was rejected," Bishop Paul Shinji Sasaki told me, "because the pressure against us was too strong, and the presence of the outlawed Episcopalians would have been a source of embarrassment to the kyodan officials."

The result was simple and conclusive. The Seikokwai was unrecognized, dissolved, and legally outlawed, "although," in Bishop Sasaki's words, "we never admitted that we were out of commission ecclesiastically."

The split which came in the Seikokwai centered in Osaka. Most of the churches in the Osaka diocese and the bishop repudiated their own denomination's action and entered the kyodan. A few other individual Episcopal churches did the same. A total of 68 Episcopal churches finally affiliated with the kyodan, and 161 did not.

The Seventh Day Adventists preferred nonrecognition and dissolution to sacrificing their own peculiar character. They never joined the kyodan and went out of existence as a sect.

Considerable speculation has been voiced by investigators of the wartime church situation in Japan as to just what difference it made to a church whether or not it was recognized by the government. How did the Ministry of Education enforce its unification of Protestants? What happened to the Seikokwai and the Seventh Day Adventists because of their refusal to join the kyodan? On the surface it is not easy to see that it made much difference. The local Episcopal congregations went on meeting, and the Seventh Day Adventists were a *de facto* church, if not *de jure,* when the war ended. During the war representatives of the Ministry of Education, along with kyodan leaders, sat in conferences with Seventh Day Adventists to advise them on ways to modify their doctrines in order to avoid entanglement with the police. Strange behavior for a government which did not even recognize the existence of Seventh Day Adventists!

The author of the Religious Bodies Law of 1940 explained to me that Episcopal churches, as local congregations, were recognized and had the protection of the law as independent juristic persons. The Episcopal connection was dissolved, the bishops' supervision, the discipline, the national council, and so forth. In other words, the difficulty for an unrecognized denomination was that its local churches belonged to no religious body and were simply allowed to continue as kessha, informal religious societies. This classification put them under the legal control of the local police rather than the Ministry of Education. Whether the kessha received more severe treatment at the hands of the police than the churches of recognized bodies is debatable. I know that the local Episcopal congregation which met throughout the war in the church at the seat of Bishop Sasaki's residence (the Meijiro church) was watched with hawk-like care. Police came once a week to this church for a report on the topic of the rector's sermon and who attended. According to Bishop Sasaki, the police so frightened the congregation that the people were forced to stay away, and toward the end of the war only a few persons were attending. Reference has already been made to Bishop Sasaki's personal difficulties with the police, when he was held for four months in 1945, along with Bishop Todomu Sugai of the South Tokyo diocese and Rector Nosei. The latter two were flogged with bamboo rods, and one of the charges against their record was the fact that they had opposed Episcopal union with the kyodan.

According to other informants, however, all churches were watched similarly, and the punishment seems to be only somewhat more extreme in the case of churches and leaders which were nonkyodan.

The constitution for a united church which the Protestants of Japan drew up was a close parallel of the Religious Bodies Law. Where the law states: "Each sect and denomination shall have a head who shall manage and represent the sect or denomination. . . . The recognition of the competent minister is necessary for (his) appointment to become effective," the constitution says:

"A man who is elected by the general assembly and is approved by the Minister of Education will become the kyodan torisha."

"With the former Religious Bodies Law," the man who wrote it explained to me, "all the life of the religious bodies, including such activities as the election of officers, creation of the bodies themselves, unification with other bodies came under government approval. Everything had to be 'permitted' by the minister of education. Also doctrine was liable to be restrained in the public interest, with the minister deciding what that interest was. The minister of education had to be consulted and had to approve when a torisha was elected, and other officers also."

This explanation revealed to me just how completely the state's hand gripped the life of the church and just how little initiative was left the church in the drafting of a constitution. The worst features of the constitution lie in its subservience to the Religious Bodies Law, in its regulating that all important elections and actions shall be subject to the approval of the minister of education, in its concentration of power in the torisha and the offices around him, the heads of which were his appointees, and the removal of power from the local churches, in its elevation of the clergy to positions of authority and the submerging of the laity (in everything, a top-down structure), and here and there in the document what I would call a needless catering on the part of Christians to the prevailing Nipponistic ideology.

Some passages in the first constitution of the kyodan are worth examining for an appreciation of its general character. It is a uniquely Japanese document, at times strictly orthodox and at other times swayed by the claims of Japanese nationalistic ideology. Articles 5, 6, and 7 present the catechism and basic principles of the church:

> Article 5—The catechism of this kyodan is as follows: God was revealed in Jesus Christ, according to the Bible, is Father, Son, and Holy

Ghost, the three in one. Through the Son, who became man, died, and was raised again for the salvation of the sin of the whole world, he redeems all believers in him, forgives their sins, justifies and purifies them, and gives them eternal life.

The church is Christ's body, into which people are called by grace for common worship, observance of the sacraments of baptism and the Holy Communion, and for propagation of the gospel, awaiting the coming of our Lord.

Article 6—This kyodan takes the Old and New Testaments as its scripture, trusting in the Apostles' Creed and other confessions of faith.

Article 7—The life principles of this kyodan are as follows:

a) Make your Christian faith stronger by following closely the way of traditional Japanese moral teaching, and thus contribute your share to the future of the Japanese empire.

b) Keep the doctrines faithfully, observe the Sabbath, attend the services of worship, share the sacraments, and fulfill your duties to the church.

c) Make a practice of devotions, purify your home, and strive to improve social morality.

The next chapter of the constitution lists the fourteen ecclesiastical districts into which the United Church was divided. It is noteworthy that the last five of these districts are: Chosen (Korea), Taiwan (Formosa), Manchu Missionary District (Manchuria), Kahoku Missionary District (Mongolia and areas of China north of the Yellow River), and the Kachu Missionary District (regions south of the Yellow River in China). Article 14 says: "Propagation of Christianity outside Japan includes the sending of specially chosen pastors abroad, some of them to remain overseas."

The election and duties of the chief of the church, the torisha, are the burden of Chapter III of the constitution. He was chosen by a carefully prescribed but thoroughly parliamentary voting procedure in the general assembly of the church and "approved by the Minister of Education." It was necessary for him to be a man and an ordained pastor. Here were his duties: to preside over and represent the kyodan, to decide all questions of doctrine in conference with the educational bureau of the church, to convene the general assembly and executive committee, to change the kyodan constitution after approval by the general assembly and the minister of education, to approve the establishment of a local church, any changes in church regulations or the establishment of a local church as a juristic person, to make appointments and dismissals of all pastors, to make punishment, dismissal, and reduction in numbers of pastors, officeholders, as well as employees, to levy assessments on the churches for the expenses of the kyodan, and to manage the estate and properties of the kyodan. Inside the central office of the United Church the torisha was supreme. He appointed the heads of each of the eight functional divisions of the office "from among the pastors," according to Article 56, "although the heads of the bureaus of finance, women's work, and social work may be laymen." Each of these bureaus had a council representing the church at large; it was appointed by the torisha also. Every department worked under his general supervision.

The United Church set itself up in the small, white concrete building in Kanda ward, formerly the headquarters of the National Christian Council, which it supplanted. The building survived the bombings of Kanda-ku and still functions as the chief office of the Nippon Kirisuto Kyodan. In it were the offices of the eight bureaus through which the kyodan functioned. They were the bureaus of general affairs, missions, Sunday schools, education, finance, women's work, social work, and publications.

Elected first torisha of the new church was the Rev. Mitsuru Tomita, pastor of the Shiba Presbyterian Church of Tokyo, who ruled the church with a firm hand through the war years. His bureau heads were:

Bureau of General Affairs—Koji Suzuki, chief; Fumio Iwai, secretary. Suzuki was a prominent Congregational pastor from Kobe.

Bureau of Education—Shiro Murata, chief; Kazuo Suezutsumi, secretary. Murata was once head of the Presbyterian theological seminary in Tokyo.

Bureau of Missions—Takeo Katsube, chief; Bin Kimata, secretary.

Bureau of Sunday Schools—Michio Kozaki, chief; Isamu Chiba, secretary. Kozaki was pastor of the Reinanzaka Congregational Church in Tokyo. Chiba, a son of the ranking Baptist in Japan, was one of the original deputation sent by the Japanese militarists to the Philippine Islands.

Bureau of Finance—Tadaoki Yamamota, chief; Kensaku Inoue, secretary.

Bureau of Social Work—Kitaro Akimoto, chief; Miss Tamiko Yamamuro, secretary.

Bureau of Women's Work—Mrs. Tamaki Uemura, chief. Mrs. Uemura visited the United States in 1946-47.

Bureau of Publications—Zenichi Hidaka, chief; Kenji Ochida, secretary.

All these persons were at their posts at the end of the war, although general affairs chairman Suzuki resigned immediately, and a Congregational pastor from Yokohama, the Rev. Tokuzo Hiraga, took his place. Hiraga resigned early in 1946.

Tomita is a flinty old character whose personality was indelibly imprinted upon the United Church. Despite his years at Princeton University, he has never been known for proforeign sentimentalities and was marked before the war as one of the strongest members of the pronationalist group in the church. He is efficient, responsible, and stubborn. Since they were the formative years of his organization, a good deal of his time during the war years was taken up with the Ministry of Education, and he became closely attached to the government through the Bureau of Religions. "The Ministry of Education was always for the church," he told me, "and tried to protect it. So the church worked with them very co-operatively."

In the interview he granted me it was evident that Tomita felt few restrictions on his freedom during the war and was more uneasy today concerning the church's status than he was then. The reason for this feeling, I am sure, is that inside the tether which Tomita accepted for the church's life in wartime he was secure and free enough to carry out his duties. Things may not have been easy, but he as much as anyone was securely at the top. Now that picture has been changed, and, with the tether snapped, Tomita finds himself in a turbulent clash of forces and is somewhat at sea. During the war Tomita accepted the state's limitation upon the church, the state defended him, and in return he kept the church in line.

One story has come out since the war that serves to illustrate his attitude. On one occasion during the war Tomita was in conference at the Ministry of Education, and among others present was a pastor by the name of Masakazu Tanaguchi. There was some debate at the conference, and in the course of it Tanaguchi expressed himself rather fervently about the pacifist nature of Christianity: "I insisted upon saying that Christianity must stand for peace, and while I, as a Japanese, would follow the emperor's wishes, I was against the war." Tomita rebuked his colleague and later approached him with a sharp reprimand, questioning his ethical philosophy and adding: "I was placed in a most embarrassing situation."

This story was brought out at the executive committee meeting of the United Church in December, 1945, when Tanaguchi used the illustration to argue for Tomita's resignation as torisha. The implication of Tanaguchi's argument was: "If he was embarrassed at a statement concerning Christian pacifism then, should he not now be inadequate for a position of leadership in a time of peace?"

Tomita was cautious and tried hard not to make the kyodan uselessly suspect. When certain elements in the church brought suspicion down upon him and his organization, he was naturally annoyed at the difficulty and tried to hush it up. Instead of stoutly defending the religious convictions of such groups as the Holiness Church, Tomita actually did less for them than the Bureau of Religions itself. Not only was he irked that the Holiness pastors were heaping suspicion on the kyodan, but to him they were unorthodox and fanatic and needed correction. On the other hand, it should be said that Tomita tried to defend his churches and pastors. He traveled from one end of Japan to the other appearing in their behalf when they were in trouble with the police or counseling them on ways to avoid trouble. He went to the Ministry of Justice itself when the final showdown came over the Holiness Church, although the Holiness men told me that he was not of much help.

Inside the kyodan offices Tomita's word was law, and he carried his sense of responsibility for everything that transpired so far that many of his underlings were most impatient with him. This habit of too close supervision of the church's functions was one of the contributing factors to the church's weakness, lack of imagination and initiative.

Tomita has now been replaced as head of the United Church, but most observers in Japan feel that his departure was delayed needlessly long. While he could not be accused of war guilt, he was a symbol of all that constricted the life and doctrine of the church during the war years. Most people argued, therefore, that he should step down of his own initiative to open the way for a renovation of the organization in keeping with the new day in Japan. This he stubbornly refused to do, turned away all advice, hung on by the narrowest votes of confidence in the executive committee, considered insignificant all petitions raised against him, ignored his opposition in appointing committees to revise the church structure, and steadfastly held to his responsibility to keep the church in order.

In all these assertions of his responsibility he pointed out that a general assembly of the church would be convoked in March, 1946, at which time he would resign if the church desired it. Stalwart, sincere, and methodical, Tomita was an ideal torisha for the United Church during the war years in Japan. His prophetic conscience was not troubled by the excesses of state authority, his respect for law and order was enormous, and his Christianity was always conceived of in terms of legal orthodoxy. "You can tell by looking at his face that he's a Presbyterian," his assistant remarked to me one day with a smile. It is certainly true that there is something of the rigidity and integrity of Calvin about him.

What did the kyodan do? A hasty look through its offices in Kanda ward will give part of the answer. Being a time of formation, many hours were spent by kyodan officials in legal matters vis-à-vis the government, registrations, and financial concerns. There are the desks of the general affairs chairman, the Sunday-school board, and the other bureau officials of the eight departments of the kyodan organizations. There are the secretaries, the typists, the calligraphers, the libraries, files, and the flurry of activity customary in church board offices anywhere. The education bureau oversaw the affairs of Protestantism's many schools, colleges, and universities throughout Japan, although most of them had their own boards of trustees and were virtually independent. The organization of theological education was a top responsibility of this department. The Bureau of Sunday Schools tried valiantly in the face of shortages of paper, labor, and all other facilities to keep a stream of teaching materials, inspiration, and guidance going forth to the Sunday schools of the country. The work of this bureau diminished as the war progressed because of the insurmountable obstacles it met. The missions bureau propagated the gospel at home and abroad and supervised the work of some social institutions under Christian auspices outside Japan. Kindergartens, social settlements, relief, women's work, tracts, and other publications—all these fell to the oversight of various departments of the kyodan, and their affairs went forward as well as could be expected in view of the difficult war years.

In some of the accounts which follow it may be felt that there is too much negative criticism of the kyodan. It is not my intention at any moment to discount the yeoman service given by these kyodan officials through the years. Their task was uphill all the way. They worked against crippling shortages and scampered for shelter when the raids came. But they were the church's servants, doing their jobs as well as they knew how, and there is no intention to subtract at all from the record they made.

It is necessary, however, to take a look at some of the other activities in which the kyodan engaged or played a part and which do not reflect credit to the organization. I think, for example, of the case of the Kobe Union Church, the story of which reached me from several unrelated sources. This modern, well-equipped church, built in 1932 and appraised at 200,000 yen, was finally taken away from its owners through a series of maneuvers by the kyodan and given to a Japanese Methodist congregation in Kobe. To consummate this seizure, the kyodan with the government's help declared this enemy property, despite the fact that its legal board had been changed in 1940 from a majority of Britons and Americans to a majority of Germans and neutrals. The government then handed the seized property to the kyodan as warden. The kyodan proceeded to oust the Kobe Union Church congregation in favor of the flock attached to the Rev. Noriyoshi Toku, a Methodist and former California clergyman. Toku, working closely with the Rev. Koji Suzuki, at the time the general affairs chairman of the kyodan, skillfully used the prevailing antiforeign sentiment in Japan to ease his way into possession of the property. The Kobe congregation fought back, and the negotiations continued from early 1942 until 1944, when the church was legally sold by its warden to Toku's congregation for 88,000 yen. The conflict of ownership was heated and acrimonious. One day's negotiations ended in the Kobe police headquarters with the parties to the conflict calling each other names, and sensitive Christians and foreigners in Japan soon began to talk about "the international Christian shame" being perpetrated in Kobe. The record shows that the kyodan engaged with Toku in behind-the-scenes maneuvering to oust the rightful owners, in coercive tactics applied with the state's conspiracy, in reneging on pledges, and in converting a house dedicated to international Protestant worship into an ultranationalistic pulpit.

It was also the kyodan that passed down the government's request for a five-minute ceremony of obeisance to the emperor preceding every Christian service of worship. It was the kyodan which revised the hymnal and the church calendar. This latter effort was a monument of arrogance. During one whole year the kyodan bureaucrats prescribed every Sunday sermon topic, again at the government's insistence, as the themes were required similarly at Shinto and Buddhist services. One year the traditional forty-day Lenten period was cut down to one week. In 1943 they even issued an order that the date of Easter would be changed because the Japanese lunar calendar was somehow different from every other lunar calendar in the world. This order ran into so much objection on the part of local churches that the kyodan finally said, "Celebrate Easter when you please." Throughout the war the church officials played down the fact that Christmas was the birthday of Jesus and played up the fact that it was the anniversary of the death of the late feeble-minded Emperor Taisho, father of the present emperor. The kyodan sent its representatives overseas, a practice which would have been impossible without the closest checking and approval by the Japanese military. It did nothing to retain its schools which fell into non-Christian hands. Its publications were close to, if not inspired by, the official government propaganda line.

All these things comprise the record of the Nippon Kirisuto Kyodan. It had a pioneering voyage to make in hazardous waters. The sailing was rough and the ship did come through. Japanese Christians are grateful to the kyodan and its leaders for that. But, when the war was over, many of them were quick to point out that the price was high, that the compromises sapped the lifeblood of the church, and that the men who made the compromises were without a message for Japan's new day.

Opposition to the kyodan arose early in the months following the surrender. When I arrived in Tokyo in November, I was told immediately of two groups of pastors and churchmen who were petitioning Tomita and his staff to resign and dissolve the wartime union. I was told also of a rising opposition movement to the United Church in the Kobe-Kyoto-Osaka area. When the executive committee met on December 5, 1945, Tomita had to face an argument for his removal from Masakazu Tanaguchi (see page 89) which resulted in a vote of confidence totaling twelve ballots out of over thirty persons attending the meeting. All the rest abstained from voting.

At that meeting Tomita recognized the need for changes in the constitution of the United Church in view of the surrender and SCAP's program of democracy and liberalism in Japan. He especially cited the abrogation of the Religious Bodies Law as a step which made the status of the United Church quite different from its earlier position of having its members coerced into joining. He also pointed out that the church was now free to go ahead with the drafting of its creed without having objections raised, as they had been until the very last, by the Ministry of Education. On December 6 he appointed a committee of seventeen, headed by the Rev. I. Miura, a Lutheran and professor at the Nippon Theological Seminary, with the Rev. K. Tomoi, as secretary, to draft a new constitution. The executive committee itself made suggestions to this committee about ways in which it hoped the constitution would be changed. It wanted a new set of words, less governmental and more ecclesiastical. There was a genuine clamor for greater congregationalism in the body, with less centralized control and more sovereignty resting in the local churches. It wanted a shorter constitution, with all the articles touching upon punishments taken out, with a new emphasis upon laymen, with a clarification of statement on creed, and with an enlarged general assembly representing the local churches and the districts.

Two things of importance showed in the kyodan's program for reforming itself: (1) There was to be no fundamental structural change in the United Church. Many critics had been advocating a looser federation for co-operative activity but sufficient denominational autonomy to respect differences, dissipate the centralized control, and make membership attractive to denominations which would otherwise pull out. This suggestion was given no support whatsoever, and the organic union was not even to be questioned. (2) The kyodan was reforming itself again from the top down. It was appointing its own revision committee, keeping the initiative securely within its own inner circle, and opening the way not at all to the stream of thought, criticism, and suggestion which was sweeping the church at the grass roots. When I saw this, I knew immediately that the most bitter of the kyodan's critics were not going to be satisfied and would simply be strengthened in their resolve to break the kyodan as the only means of getting reform. To them the action of Tomita and the executive committee was further evidence of all they had been opposing—government of the church by a ruling clique at the top and in Tokyo.

None of the criticism of the United Church I encountered in Japan was opposed to union or inspired by extreme denominationalism. The severest critics were all in favor of a united Protestantism, but opposed strenuously to the kyodan as it was set up and its leadership. A small but extremely virile group of Orthodox Presbyterians might be considered an exception to this statement. Generally speaking everyone wanted union and some of the most conscientious critics were opposing the kyodan only because they felt it was defeating its own end, the true unification of Protestantism inside Japan.

A great deal of the kyodan's obstinacy in allowing changes, and slowness to make personnel changes as demanded by critics, came from the Japanese desire to save face. Japanese Christian leaders have been sensitive of criticism at home and abroad which claimed that the kyodan was never a true union but a deal forced by the state. They have maintained that their church was rooted in a long and deep desire for union in Japanese Protestantism, that it was constitutionally voted by every participating denomination and that it was formed in duly constituted ways. *To dissolve the union or alter its constitution just at a time when the state's pressures were being removed would be open admission that it was not a true union and was coerced by the government originally.* They do not want to admit that. Furthermore they feel that it would be a great setback to Protestant unification in Japan not to keep what they have, however they got it, rather than to revert to the prewar status of denominationalism from which it might take them years to extricate themselves.

When an early Protestant deputation to Japan—including Douglas Horton, James C. Baker, Luman J. Shafer, and Walter W. Van Kirk—met with Tomita, he convinced them that it would be unwise to continue appropriations and the sending of missionaries to Japan through denominational channels. The reason for this was obvious. Tomita knew that a restoration of denominational attachments abroad would quickly restore denominationalism in Japan. The deputation agreed to Tomita's suggestion and the Japan Committee of the Foreign Missions Conference of North America has now adopted a policy in line with his request. The policy has been adopted on its own merit and to prove the sincerity of North American mission boards in wishing to further the cause of Protestant unification in Japan.

The chief contention in the church during the first postwar months was the lack of opportunity for Japanese Christians to use Japan's new freedom of discussion to reappraise their whole organizational setup, its relations to the wartime state, its responsibility in aiding and abetting the state's aims, and its usefulness for the future. The critics felt there was no way for them to voice their opinions in ways and places to influence the final result. They were ignored by the kyodan officialdom, and these men went ahead with all their plans of revision through their own committees and channels which obstinately disregarded the voice of the church at large. At the executive committee meeting in December, Tomita ruled that newspapermen would not be admitted, although reports would be gladly given them at the conclusion of the sessions.

This unrest finally boiled over. Spearheading the attack against the kyodan was a group of thirty-five young clergymen from the Tokyo area who met and drew up resolutions favoring the resignation of Tomita and his staff and the speedy election of a new general convention to be the constitutional assembly of a new united church. Copies of this resolution were taken to Tomita, who blew up in the face of it and scolded the petitioners for their rebellion, to Hiraga, the general affairs chairman of the kyodan, who was more friendly to the propositions voiced. They were sent to a thousand pastors all over Japan and were filed with the press. Following the interview between these pastors and Tomita, he conceded that it might be well to have the new constitution (then being drafted by his committee) passed among the churches for discussion prior to the convening of the kyodan's next general assembly.

This assembly was still scheduled for March, and the reformers were eager to impress that body with their resolutions and to insure that its expression of opinion would be free and binding upon the leadership. On February 26-27, Tomita called another executive committee meeting of the kyodan, and its first action was to postpone the March meeting of the general assembly "for lack of funds." Thus every detail of the kyodan's reorganization was further delayed, the old guard remained in control, and the reformers were as far as ever from their goal. At this meeting the new constitution was looked over provisionally, and to prove his good faith Tomita resigned for himself and his whole staff. A vote was called, and out of fifteen ballots cast, six were for accepting Tomita's resignation and nine were for rejecting it. Of the nine, some delegates stipulated, "rejected for the time being." On the basis of this vote Tomita remained in office. There was also criticism by the executive committee of the intramural way the constitution was being revised.

Meanwhile the thirty-five young pastors had increased their numbers, and their campaign for reorganization made the *Nippon Times* headlines on March 20, 1946: "Japanese Christians Are Planning a Purge." The article described the resolution and plans of the committee of thirty-five young clergymen. A meeting of the Tokyo district of the United Church had been held in the week just preceding the publication of the article, and the antikyodan group was in control. They, therefore, used the conference as a sounding board for their ideas and were forthright in demanding widespread resignations and a reconstitution of the church "to aid in the great task of democratizing Japan" and making a strong Christian impact upon the nation.

"We firmly believe that all wartime leaders of the church of Christ in Japan should resign," one of the pastors said. "We are not considering war crimes, but we believe that all wartime officials should relinquish their posts in view of the future destiny of the Christian movement in Japan."

The fat was in the fire, and the sputtering spread. Even among non-Christians and SCAP personnel sympathy moved rapidly toward the young reformers, and devastating charges began to be voiced against the kyodan and its leaders for their fascist control and reaction. The executive committee had postponed the general assembly until November, 1946, but with the mounting criticism the kyodan leaders decided upon an earlier meeting. By this circuitous routing the general assembly of some three hundred delegates—the first since 1943—finally assembled in Tokyo the first week in June, 1946. Tomita was replaced by the Rev. Michio Kozaki, pastor of the Reinanzaka Congregational Church in Tokyo, who had been head of the Bureau of Sunday Schools in the United Church and one of its most prominent voices. Kozaki is a progressive thinker, a pronounced internationalist, and while his record is not that of a radical resister to the war, he was not too involved in it to affect his leadership in peacetime Japan.

The June meeting also considered the revised constitution and adopted it provisionally, with a committee appointed to make further changes subject to ratification later in the year. Before the assembly met it was difficult to ascertain just what revisions Tomita's committee was making in the church's charter. I talked with the chairman of the committee and other members, all of whom were unable to provide me with copies. They spoke in general terms of the fact that it would decentralize authority from the Tokyo headquarters to the districts and local churches, abolish the post of torisha, and try to fix the basis of union so that differences of doctrine and polity might be permitted inside its structure. All nationalistic features of the old constitution would, of course, be removed, and everything provided for in the old Religious Bodies Law would also be voided with the disappearance of that law.

Concurrent with the general assembly in Tokyo in June was a mass evangelistic rally which launched a three-year campaign "Christ for Japan." It appears, therefore, that the United Church has been substantially maintained, reformed, its personnel changed, and that it is at long last freeing its energies from the tangle of organizational matters that held them for nine months, for the forward movements of Christian evangelism in the country.

"We learned many things from each other in the United Church," Kozaki, the new chairman, said to me one day in the quiet of his parsonage adjoining the Reinanzaka Church on the hill above the American embassy. "We became better Christians for the experiences we had in getting along with each other. My church has always emphasized the social gospel in Japan, is liberal, and this-worldly. It did my soul good to meet the Holiness brethren, with their purity, zeal, and piety. From the Calvinists I learned the lessons of biblical orthodoxy and rigid adherence to principle. There were many blessings to us in the kyodan, blessings which I hope will some day come to Christians everywhere, and blessings which I further hope we shall not give up in Japan by a return to prewar denominationalism."

Apparently Kozaki's hopes are coming true, as the Nippon Kirisuto Kyodan reforms itself and sets its shoulder to the task of a united Christian witness in Japan.

VI. . . . . .CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS IN JAPAN

ONE DAY in the autumn of 1937 I found myself in the company of some three thousand hushed Japanese students in a solemn ceremony. They were arrayed on the campus of Aoyama Gakuin in Tokyo, one of the best-known Christian schools of the country. They stood in precise rows, lining the avenues of the campus with their sober black uniforms. A long, black limousine drove up to the gate. Traffic in the street outside stopped. A throaty "Banzai!" filled the air. A dignitary alighted from the car. He carried in his arms a bundle wrapped in white silk. The officials of the school escorted him forward, each garbed in a black morning suit, his features drawn up in a pious stare. As the procession passed through the gate and started down the long corridor of students, the students bent at the hips and bowed at right angles to the entourage. There was not a noise in the compound save the sharp click of the dignitaries' heels as they strode the length of the walk. They rounded the garden in the center of the campus, all heads depressed as they passed, and entered the library beyond. There the messenger from the throne deposited his package in a beautifully appointed receptacle awaiting it.

The portrait of his imperial majesty, the heavenly king, heir of the sun-goddess in succession unbroken through countless ages, had arrived at Aoyama Gakuin and was safely enshrined for the reverence of the students.

I remembered that incident of 1937 in the fall and winter of 1946 when I tramped through the ashes and rubble and the buildings which still stand at Aoyama Gakuin. I had seen the symbol of the emperor come to Aoyama in that autumn four years before Pearl Harbor. In 1946 I saw significant other symbols which had disappeared. The pedestal of a statue still stood in the central park of the campus. I remembered that here was the bronze bust of Bishop Yoichi Honda, celebrated pioneer at Aoyama Gakuin. The bust was gone, the nameplate also. I was told he had disappeared in the scrap metal drive. Inside the library was a fine bronze statue of a father and child. I remembered it also, and recalled the title which was a plain bronze character beneath the sculpture. The character was "Love," and it had disappeared. On a huge rock outside the door of the theological building another inscription had been chiseled from the face of the stone. It too had been a Christian symbol and was replaced with one more fitting to Japan at war.

Aoyama Gakuin was only one of many Christian schools in Japan after 1935 which saw their Christian reminders taken away and the symbols of nationalism brought in in their place. The transition was significant of the shift in emphasis which the wartime state demanded. Aoyama accomplished its change of outward symbols. Its leaders told me it tried to keep a Christian spirit within. But what happened at Aoyama Gakuin was typical. At St. Paul's University I saw a cornerstone, upon which had been written a dedication to God and the education of Japanese youth, faced over with cement. Everywhere I saw the shrines which housed the emperor's portrait.

Nothing was more closely guarded in wartime Japan against hostile, liberal, and nonnationalistic ideas than its educational institutions. Out of the schools have come the people with the well-trained minds, the thoughts which carbon-copied each other, the voices which chorused back the Nipponistic slogans. It was imperative that Japan's schools should be uncontaminated by thoughts alien to the prescribed ideology. The whole force of the state stood ready to enforce its will upon the institutions of the country entrusted with the training of the young.

Christian missions have enterprised some of the pioneering educational ideas and institutions in modern Japan. Christianity is thought of by many Japanese in the same breath with schools.

They have served the Japanese nation well since 1870 in modernizing and developing the culture and drawing it out of its pre-Meiji isolationism and medievalism. But Christian schools in Japan were planted there by foreigners. That undeniable fact has plagued their reputation and brought them in recent years under the strictest surveillance and control by the government's educational authorities.

The process by which the government crept in upon Christian education has been a long, careful, and effective one. The first schools antedated the rescinding of the anti-Christian ordinances and had to be carried on covertly as informal classes. After 1871, when the ordinances were no longer enforced, Christian education enjoyed a brief boom, only to be squelched again in 1889 with Order No. 12 of the Ministry of Education banning all religious instruction from the schools of the country. This was the famous order which permitted Shinto instruction to remain in the schools, since it was not a religion but a form of patriotism. Almost at the same time as Christian teachings were banned from official schools of Japan, there was published the now-famous Imperial Rescript on Education of the Emperor Meiji. Its text:

> Know ye, Our subjects: Our Imperial Ancestors have founded our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue; Our subjects ever united in loyalty and filial piety have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Empire, and herein also lies the source of Our education. Ye, Our subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious, as friends true; bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate arts, and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and

> earth. So shall ye not only be Our good and faithful subjects, but render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers.
>
> The Way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed by Our Imperial Ancestors, to be observed alike by Their Descendants and the subjects, infallible for all ages and true in all places. It is Our wish to lay it to heart in all reverence, in common with you, Our subjects, that We may all thus attain to the same virtue.

This rescript is the sacred scripture of Japanese education. It is read on ceremonial occasions and its formal rhetoric brings tears to the eyes of faithful Japanese. It is a moving document, Confucian in its ethics, archaic in its roots, emotional in its appeal to the subjects, not to mention highly nationalistic. Christians took it for their guide in their schools, as indeed they had to, even though there were certain obvious difficulties for them in the process.

As Hiroyuki Kato, a learned professor of the Imperial University in Tokyo, wrote in 1907:

> The doctrines of Christianity are quite irreconcilable with the Imperial Rescript on Education. In the Imperial Rescript on Education there is not a single word about the Heavenly Father who is the object of absolute love and reverence in Christianity. The rescript speaks only of the Imperial Ancestors. For this reason they (the Christians) cannot have it in their hearts at all to read the rescript acceptably. They must practice deception.

All Christian schools went through a process of nationalizing their leadership and their boards of control. Foreigners (meaning missionaries) were banned from teaching the provocative, thoughtful subjects on the curriculum. A much-prized course in all Japanese schools, made compulsory for everyone, has always been a first-thing-in-the-morning study called "Morals." One would say offhand that would be a good subject for a missionary to teach. Not so. Foreigners were carefully forbidden to set foot on the teacher's platform in a "Morals" class. "Morals" is the generally accepted translation as students speak of this course. Actually it was a combination of etiquette, Japanese customs, civics, history, and philosophy. It was, in short, the formal course which handed down the sacred code and culture of Japan. It has been the breeding ground of ultranationalism in recent years. Foreigners were expected to teach English or small specialties, and technological instruction was always welcome from a Westerner in Japan. Christian schools and universities were permitted to issue no licenses for teachers. All normal schools in the country were state-controlled and hotbeds of anti-Christian sentiment and ultranationalism.

In the early nineteen-thirties considerable pressure was put upon schools to install kamidana—god-shelves—in their buildings. Agitation was particularly strong in the Kwansei area of central Japan, and Doshisha, the strong old Congregational university in Kyoto, yielded to it. Kobe Women's College, also Congregational, refused to yield and got away with it. Doshisha figured in a number of skirmishes with the nationalists, most of which were mentioned in the press at the time and are well known. On one occasion the leading gang in the student body staged a sitdown strike in the university chapel in protest against the continuation of religious services.

Thus the struggle developed with the state's control and ideology creeping in at every point upon the principles and beliefs which had led to the founding of the churches' schools in Japan, and for which hundreds of lives and millions of dollars had been spent. A few opportunities for Bible classes and religious discussions outside school hours, and the influence of Christian teachers, were just about all that Christians received as return on their investment in their schools during the war years.

There are in Japan two types of educational institutions, regulated and nonregulated. The distinction is important. Since 1900 the Japanese government, through its Ministry of Education, has handed out its most important recognition for schools through this process of regulation and its attendant benefits. When a school was regulated, the Ministry of Education took over. It specified exactly what courses should be taught, the details of what those courses should teach, and how the students should be handled. The entire curricula was enforced, and there was no leeway for extra courses on the side. In keeping with Order No. 12 there was no religious instruction in these regulations, and it was impossible to have either religious classes or services in a regulated school. The advantages to being regulated were most tempting. Regulation meant that a school was recognized as first class by the government. Its graduates automatically received preferential treatment in the examinations and entrance to higher schools, particularly the network of imperial universities, the top of the educational system in Japan. Graduates could get licenses to teach and higher rank in the civil service. Another advantage of great importance was that male graduates of regulated schools automatically received officer's rank in the imperial army; graduates of nonregulated schools went in as privates. Because of these privileges, there was always pressure upon schools from faculty, alumni, and students, not to mention the government, to become regulated.

Nonregulated schools kept their freedom of instruction but sacrificed the privileges for their graduates. As a general rule, Christian schools in Japan have been in no hurry to become regulated. Nonregulated schools fulfilled the basic requirements of the government's educational standards, taught the required courses, and then were free to express their own initiative in extra courses, teaching methods, and general emphases. A nonregulated school was legally free to teach Christianity and the Bible and to hold services of worship on its campus. At times it was able to receive privileges for its graduates comparable to those of regulated schools, but they did not come automatically and were obtained by arduous insistence, special inspections, and the unimpeachable quality of the educational work done in the institution.

Some Christian schools in prewar Japan took advantage of the government's policy of regulation, even though they had to sacrifice their own Christian uniqueness in so doing. Sections of St. Paul's University, Doshisha, Kwansei Gakuin, and other schools have been regulated for a number of years.

When the war came, great pressure was brought to bear upon all Christian schools to become regulated. Kiichi Kanzaki, president of Kwansei Gakuin, gave me the story of ways in which this pressure was turned upon a school. When prefectural offices of education offered a school the privileges of regulation and recognition, a principal was put in the position of opposing his government to turn them down. At Kwansei Gakuin army officers teaching military science on the campus demanded that the president register his school as regulated. His faculty and student body became more and more insistent, demanding, threatening, and eventually going so far as to inform on him to the secret police. Kanzaki did not know from one moment to the next just how far the police might go in disciplining him, his family, or the entire school. But he stood his ground and won out. Kwansei Gakuin middle school never was regulated.

The prefectural educational authorities in Kyushu turned the same campaign against Fukuoka Jo Gakko, a Methodist girls' school, but Principal Yoshi Tokunaga's efforts were successful in rejecting the offer and keeping the school comparatively freer than others to hold to its Christian character.

The government's educational officials had no authority to interfere with a nonregulated school's freedom in matters of curriculum and religion. Indeed, under the law the school had a defense against such state interference with its rights. But the government found ingenious ways of circumventing the law. It seized upon minor matters to embroil nonregulated schools in difficulties of all kinds. It worked hardships upon their graduates and denied them privileges. The procedure in a prefectural office of education was to wait for a nonregulated school to come to it over some minor matter, such as registration, school fees, and the like. Then the prefectural officers would try to force regulation in exchange for action on the detail presented by the school. If the school resisted, the government stalled.

Tsuraki Yano, president of Meiji Gakuin in Tokyo, and chairman of the Christian Educators' Association for all Japan, told me of his advice to schoolmen on ways to resist this pressure. It was his opinion that if a school fought a bit, it generally won. He advised schools to stand their ground in conflicts with prefectual offices, whereupon he would submit their case to the top authorities in the Tokyo Ministry of Education, who would then intervene in the local situation and more often than not, since the law was on their side, rule in favor of the schools. The ministry found it difficult to step into educational matters within the prefectures unless a conflict existed over which it could act as arbitrator. That was the reason Yano always advised the schools to make as loud a noise as possible to invite intervention by the ministry. If they submitted or went to the ministry for original jurisdiction, the ministry could not act. Prefectural offices of education were considerably more severe with Christian schools than the ministry in Tokyo.

Misao Nishiyama, principal of the Miyagi Girls' High School in Sendai, found himself in the center of the pressure from the prefectural office to convert Christian schools in Sendai to the regulated pattern. All Sendai schools finally had to submit, he told me, to the regulation. "Most of the Miyagi teachers are Christians, however," Nishiyama said, "and that fact kept the atmosphere good. The morning worship was dropped for the school at large, because it was really against the law, but we kept a service for upper-class girls. When the police objected I said to them, 'But we have abandoned the formal service, and this is just a little quiet time for the older, less impressionable girls.' That was the way we had to quibble. The regulation took away most of our English instruction, music, Bible, religion. We even had to smash our library of American phonograph records."

Another insistent demand on the part of Japanese educational authorities against Christian schools was that they alter their constitutions to remove all reference to Christianity. Some, like Tohoku Gakuin in Sendai, were forced to comply with this demand by a complete erasure of the "Christain clause" in the charter of the school. Tohoku was not permitted to speak of itself as a Christian school, nor to advertise itself as such, nor to state in promotional literature inviting students that it was a Christian school.

Other schools, like Aoyama Gakuin in Tokyo, satisfied the government's demand by juggling words. A constitution might originally read something like this: "The purpose of the school is to educate students within the discipline of the Christian religion." This was changed to "discipline taking the spirit of the Christian religion." Such a revision of wording seemed to satisfy the state educational authorities.

Miss Michi Kawai, principal of Keisen Girls' School in suburban Tokyo, approached the Ministry of Education in 1945 for permission to open the first department of agriculture for girls in Japan. In the charter she had written the words "a school founded on the Christian faith." Five officers of the ministry challenged her concerning this clause in a lengthy conference.

"Can't you take this clause out?" they asked.

"No," Miss Kawai replied. "If you take the faith away, then there is no college at all."

"But some schools have given up the clause," she was told.

"I know," Miss Kawai shot back. "But some have not."

The officials expressed surprise and Miss Kawai referred them to their files. They found that she was right.

"But can't you soften the clause in some way?" they began again.

"How?" Miss Kawai asked.

"Couldn't you substitute 'according to Christian principles' instead of mentioning the Christian faith?"

She agreed that could be done. The only thing she was interested in was keeping the word "Christian." Miss Kawai still is telling the story of the thrill she felt in watching those government officials sweating over the wording of the charter of her school to safeguard the word "Christian" in it.

"It was my victory to see them work at it," she told me. "It did them good!"

Still another source of governmental pressure upon Christian schools was the presence on each and every campus in the country of army and naval officers. They came to teach the courses in military science and to drill the students. Nonacademic and crude, they found themselves with enormous power as the years rolled on, a power which they used to enforce their militaristic and nationalistic ideas on the schools. Much of the difficulty encountered by Christian school administrators was directly traceable to the military officers on the campuses. They formed cliques to divide the faculties, they called in support from the army and navy and their powerful police networks, they seized power completely and took over operation of the schools.

At Tohoku Gakuin in Sendai the government ordered an aeronautical technical school installed and set up its own man as dean. This man, Dr. O. Miyagi, used his government backing to push the president of Tohoku into the background, and Miyagi became virtual head of the school.

Whenever intramural conflicts existed within faculties or administrations of schools, the military officers made capital of the situation to divide and rule. What school anywhere does not have factionalism within its staff, cliques and divisions of opinion? It was easy for militarists to fan these fires of division and then step in and take control when an open rupture resulted.

The militarists were exceedingly strong on all Japanese campuses, particularly those of boys' schools. Military tactics were taught in the classroom, and every male student was expected to take regular drill. In some instances, although this appears not to have been a governmental requirement, drill was effected for girls also. Miyagi High School in Sendai and Kwassui Gakuin in Nagasaki, two Christian schools for girls, had military drill for their students.

The almost shattering blow to all educational institutions in Japan came rather late in the war in the shape of the Student Mobilization Ordinance. Male students were already becoming scarce because of military conscription. The Student Mobilization Ordinance got the rest. Through this act the government mobilized all of Japan's youth to work in munitions factories. They were expected to travel in school units to the big concentrations of factories in the Tokyo-Yokohama, the Osaka, and the Moji areas, where they were kept in dormitories with approximately one teacher to every fifty students. Most of them were girls because boys had more manly military arts to pursue.

When the students did not go to the factories, the factories came to the students. At the end of the war many schools in Japan were housing some of the key industries of the nation's wartime economy. It was in 1944 that the government ordered all schools, which by that time were cut down to only a fraction of their size, to make available to the army and navy all unused buildings and equipment. As President Kanzaki of Kwansei Gakuin told me: "It was a request impossible to refuse. My student body of 3,500 was cut down to 250 full-time students, and we could not possibly make use of all our space." Kwansei Gakuin opened its buildings to the Japanese navy, and early in 1945 a munitions factory making aircraft parts moved into the school auditorium and the law building on the campus.

At Kobe Women's College the gymnasium was turned into a shop for small wartime work which the students themselves did. The Mitsubishi interests rented a part of the Doshisha campus in

Kyoto for six to seven months toward the close of the war. At Miyagi Girls' School in Sendai the principal installed a radar parts factory on his campus in order to keep his girls at home and save them the effects of the Student Mobilization Ordinance. At Kinjo Joshi Semmon Gakko in Nagoya a small plant was built for the girls to manufacture powder bags.

The climax to all this battery of oppression, which engulfed schools in endless difficulty, came in the shape of bombs made in the U.S.A. To add to their hardships, aerial bombardment destroyed their physical plants. At Soshin Baptist Girls' School in Yokohama there is today not an upright structure on the campus except two gaunt chimneys, relics of the former missionaries' residence. Hiroshima Girls' School was wiped from the face of the earth in the atomic bombing of August 6, 1945. Two days later the Methodist boys' school in Nagasaki received the same fate. Only a handful of Christian schools escaped with no destruction to their plants and equipment.

Farthest north of the Christian schools in Japan is Hokusei Higher Girls' School at Sapporo on Hokkaido island. This Presbyterian school had a Christian principal, but he defected early in the war and tried to remove Christian teachers who protested his actions and were a source of embarrassment to him. The result was a badly divided faculty, an open scandal, and the prefectural government stepped in to arbitrate. The prefecture dissolved the school and established a new one in its buildings, a medical school with government affiliations and a new faculty.

There are two Methodist schools in Hirosaki at the northern tip of Japan's main island. One of them, the girls' school, carried on much in its usual manner throughout the war. The other, Toogijuku, the boys' school, left the church completely and established itself as a secular, Shinto-guided institution. In 1941 the chairman of the school's board of trustees, Baron Ryoitsu Asada, had himself elected president of the institution. He was a lukewarm Christian with family connections to the school and was a general in the Japanese army. He promptly regulated Toogijuku according to government specifications, dropped any reference to Christianity from the charter, and religious instruction was outlawed. Asada accepted the military ideology and the nationalistic Shinto doctrine. He thought they were more important than Christianity and said so openly. His attitude was not vengeful; indeed he kept two Christian teachers on his faculty and occasionally invited a local pastor to speak to the student body. Boys from the school could attend church if they desired. But Asada made it plain that he considered Christianity dangerous and foreign, and he was quoted by newspapers after Japan's surrender saying that he had no intention of restoring his school to the Christian fold.

The hub of Christian education in Japan is Tokyo, the capital city. Fire laid waste many of the buildings dedicated to Christian education there. Joshi Gakuin, the Presbyterian girls' high school, was totally destroyed, and the young women moved their classes to the buildings of Tokyo Women's Christian College. The Friends' School in Tokyo was similarly demolished. One building of the Catholic Sophia University was destroyed. The entire campus of Futaba Girls' School is gone, and the students met in a Catholic orphanage in the suburbs. The Gyosei Catholic Boys' School was badly damaged, but classes could be held. The campus of Shirayuri was wrecked, but the girls met in the empty buildings.

The most serious case of defection in wartime Japan of a Christian school was that of St. Paul's University, the large Episcopal institution at Ikebukuro, Tokyo. Much has already been written concerning St. Paul's following General MacArthur's sweeping purge of the institution in October, 1945. When the war broke out the president of the institution was the Rev. Ikuzo Toyama. During his tenure the senior military officer on the campus, Colonel Nobuyuki Iijima, launched a campaign to purify the school along nationalistic lines. He demanded that

Toyama stop all Christian teachings, close the chapel, and wipe out all traces of foreign influence. Toyama was forced to comply with these demands before he retired in 1943.

He was succeeded by the Rev. Kinzo Sanbe, who announced at his installation and in the school paper that "for seventy years St. Paul's has been a Christian school. That mistake will no longer be continued." The schools of arts, literature, and religion were abolished. Military science was the emphasis. Chaplain Takaharu Takamatsu, who was able to return and preach in the university's All Saints' Chapel before he died early in 1946, was driven from his post and forced to move from his rectory on the campus. Other Christian teachers were dismissed. All democratic student life was ended, all clubs broken up, including the athletic societies. There were no student activities outside the classroom except military drill. On the cornerstone of the science building were the words "To the Glory of God and the Education of Japanese Youth." These were chiseled away and the stone was resurfaced with cement.

In the chapel some of the worst vandalism of the war is still in evidence. The building was used as a military storehouse. The pews were removed and used for timbers in air raid shelters. The beautifully carved screen, pulpit, lectern, and choirstalls were chopped up for firewood. The pipe organ was damaged. The cross on the marble altar still shows the scars of sharp instruments used in an attempt to deface it.

Describing the case of St. Paul's as "flagrant violation of religious freedom and unwarranted vandalism," the MacArthur directive cited the charter of the institution, granted by the government in 1931, and safeguarding the school's Christian character, and ordered eleven members of St. Paul's military clique, including President Sanbe, dismissed and permanently banned from positions in any other educational, religious, or governmental organization in Japan.

Across the street from St. Paul's was the Episcopal Theological

Seminary. Its buildings were burned to the ground. They had not been used as a seminary during the war (because the Episcopal Church was officially banned) and had been taken over by the government for training Japanese officials for work in the South Seas.

Episcopal schools came in for particularly harsh treatment during the war, largely because of the state's suspicion of an institution that refused to join the prescribed church union and the church's tie to the Anglican communion. The Rikkyo Girls' School was taken over for factories and shops, its buildings altered greatly, and the chapel ruined by heavy machinery. Koran, another Episcopal girls' school, was forced by the government to discharge its principal because a British flag was in the possession of the school.

At Tokyo Joshidai the big, modern Women's Christian College in suburban Tokyo, President Ken Ishihara put up a successful struggle against any large-scale conversion of his school from Christian principles. Chapel services were held regularly every morning. Bible study went on as usual. Late in the war the school was forced to yield two of its buildings, the gymnasium and a recitation hall, to a factory making batteries. On a number of occasions the army and navy tried to take over the plant. The army was particularly anxious to have the spacious new chapel on the campus.

"I refused," Ishihara told me. "I said the chapel was the center of our school and could not be given up. The army argued that it was incidental, that the classrooms would be left. I told them the reverse was true: take the classrooms but leave the chapel." The arguments went on for a month, and finally the army yielded and left.

At Kanto Gakuin, Baptist boys' school in Yokohama, only one building remains, a large stone structure housing the administration offices, auditorium, and classrooms. Kanto lost other classroom buildings, faculty and missionary homes, a church, an industrial crafts building, and a gymnasium. Five hundred incendiary bombs fell on the campus on May 29, 1945. Thirty thousand books were burned in the school library. The entire college section of the school was wiped out. When I visited the institution it was serving eight hundred boys in the morning and six hundred girls from burnt-out Soshin Girls' School in the afternoon. Plans were then afoot to move the Kanto college and high school to a former navy college in Yokohama which had been leased from the government.

The fashionable Ferris School, one of the Orient's most famous educational institutions for women, was the billet of the 213th Military Police Company of the United States Army when I visited it. The American forces have a policy against occupying educational or religious institutions, and the presence of soldiers there surprised me. The explanation was that Ferris had also been taken over by the Japanese navy during the war, and was thus a logical prize of war for the occupying forces when they came into Japan. Ferris' main stone buildings are still intact, although outlying structures were burned. The marks of the navy are still present on the campus, with a parade ground, officers' reviewing stand, and three practice gun emplacements now rusting.

The Baptist girls' school Soshin occupied a lovely hilltop in northern Yokohama. When I saw it everything was gone—recitation halls, a new chapel (only the baptistery and stonework of the chancel remain), domestic science hall, science building, missionary residence. The carcass of a B-29 lay in the middle of it all, where it fell in April, 1945.

One of the finest women's schools in Japan before the war was the 56-year-old Southern Presbyterian Kinjo Joshi Semmon Gakko in Nagoya. With a student body of three thousand, Kinjo offered literature, economics, and domestic science, had a campus embracing fifty classrooms, laboratories, gymnasium, auditorium, library. One concrete building, badly battered, is all that remains today. Fortunately the library was in it. Two thousand students are back in this one building, a thousand high-school students in the morning, seven hundred college students in the afternoon, and three hundred night-school students in the evening.

Yoichi Ichimura, for thirty-five years principal and head teacher at Kinjo, is one of the Christian schoolmen of Japan who struggled to win against the nationalization of his school. The prefectural education office was strict in Nagoya and immediately approached Ichimura to alter his constitution and remove all religious instruction from the school. Its argument was: "If the students want to worship, let them go to church. The school is for education only."

"No," Ichimura said. "This is a Christian school, protected by your own laws. If you force me to alter its charter, I shall close the school."

Ichimura offered himself openly for punishment, imprisonment, and even execution, but he refused to change Kinjo to the government's liking. "I could not consent," he told me, "and I said to the state officials that they could put me in prison or behead me if they wanted to."

They didn't. Ichimura had two or three excursions to the police but was never prosecuted. Today he has an influential position in Nagoya and is up to his neck in plans for taking over a former military camp and its buildings outside the city for the launching of a huge new Christian Women's University, to teach everything from animal husbandry to electronics.

Big, old, professional, and largely secular in its emphasis, Doshisha in Kyoto had no major clash with Japanese officialdom during the war because of its Christian character. A few changes in the wording of the charter, retaining the word "Christian," satisfied the government. Religious activities on the campus remained, although not central to the institution's life. The navy at one time wanted to take over Doshisha's detached campus, housing its higher commercial school, for a hospital, and at another time for a wireless school. President Toraji Makino protested, argued that education was a vital national service, found a sympathetic admiral, and the project was dropped. Toward the end of the war Mitsubishi finally rented the off-campus buildings for six months for a laboratory and research plant. Doshisha shrank in size from its normal six thousand students to fifteen hundred during the war. It kept its theological school throughout the war.

Reference has already been made to some of the wartime experiences of Kwansei Gakuin, the large Methodist men's university in Nishinomiya, Kobe. President Kanzaki was a sturdy fighter and defender of the Christian charter under which he operated. The fight on his campus over the regulation of the high school brought Kanzaki into the hands of the police and nearly cost him his freedom. "I did not know from one moment to the next when I would be taken to jail," he told me. "I called my old father and my children to me one night when the pressure was most strong. We had a little prayer, and then I told them I did not know when I would be taken by the police. But, I said, there is no shame in that, for I have been honest and as true as I know how." Kanzaki avoided jail and successfully resisted all efforts of the military and his own faculty to force him to resign.

Kobe Women's College kept one of the strongest Christian emphases on its campus of any school in Japan during the war. President Hatanaka believes that, since his school is advertised as Christian and the girls know it when they enroll, a little compulsion won't hurt them. Two hours of Bible study a week, one hour of Christian instruction, and daily chapel services—these were required at Kobe Jo all during the war. Examinations were given, and grades in Bible were reported with all other subjects directly to the government. The student body, nearly twelve hundred girls, stayed on its own campus during the war, and avoided the mobilization ordinance by working in a printing shop and sewing factory on the campus.

One of the clearest cases of government aggression upon

Christian schools and property was that concerning the Baptist Hinomoto Girls' School in Himeji. There the principal on one occasion made a clear-cut criticism of the war, was forcibly and summarily removed by the police, and a non-Christian took over to handle the school as he pleased.

Just the opposite kind of conversion took place at Kwassui Gakuin in Nagasaki, where the principal, nominally a Christian, was far ahead of the government in nationalizing his school and wiping out all Christian influences on the campus. He threw out the campus church and declared in a public gathering of teachers in Tokyo that he felt religion in a school was educationally unsound and the church an annoyance. He dismissed Christian teachers, brought in an army officer to give military training to the girl students, advertised in the newspapers of Nagasaki that Kwassui had given up its past and was now a thoroughly Japanized institution, converted the daily chapel service into a hokokudan—a patriotic club meeting—altered the constitution, removed Bible instruction, called teachers who objected to his personal habits "old fogies," or whatever is the Japanese equivalent. The enrollment at Kwassui, normally thirteen hundred, went down to only a hundred girls at its lowest during the war. This figure was reached after most of the students had been conscripted for work in the Nagasaki shipyards or were evacuated to the country. There was a factory making welding equipment in the Kwassui gymnasium. "There was practically no Christian influence on the campus during the war," the dean of the college told me. "We ourselves are to blame, but it was the government's will." The atomic bomb was the final blow to Kwassui. All but the main building was destroyed, and that was seriously damaged. It was repaired by the prefectural government to house United States Marines, and on February 1, 1946, it was reopened to its own students.

Chinzei Gakuin, the Methodist boys' school in Nagasaki, occupied a site on the bluff just across from Urakami Valley where the atomic bomb fell. A large, steel-and-concrete building housing the school was jolted off its base, pitched to an oblique angle, and walls and floors were caved in. On the campus today are small charred spots on the ground where the dead of Nagasaki were piled and burned. Just below the bluff I saw the skeleton of one of the bomb's victims, picked clean by the birds and the rain, still lying where it fell. Chinzei now has four hundred students meeting in the frame Methodist church in downtown Nagasaki.

All this evidence proves the obstacle-ridden course Christian schools had to follow in wartime Japan. I asked the Rev. Shiro Murata, head of the educational bureau of the United Church, to summarize for me the wartime status of Christian schools. "All in all," he said, "I think they did the best they could. They put up rather a negative show during the war and were defensive at all points because the pressure against them was so great. Some schools gave up their Christian name and became ordinary secular institutions. Others stood firm through very trying times. Boys' schools were troubled more than girls'. The military clique on every campus grew in power throughout the war and unsettled the normal life everywhere. Everything depended on the Christian character of the school principal. If he stood up and fought, he either won or lost nobly, and the school is stronger for his efforts today, whatever the outcome was then."

Tamon Maeda, a Christian, graduate of St. Paul's University, and until the spring of 1946 minister of education in the Shidehara cabinet, told me that Christian schools have served Japan well by imparting a religious atmosphere to their campuses and touching the individual lives of the students. "Christian schools were not as standardized, formal, and rigid as government schools," he said. "They suffered many restrictions during the war," he admitted, "even though many faithful teachers tried to impart some religious influence to their pupils. Outwardly they were forced to handle everything just as the government schools did. They enjoyed no freedom of religious practice or teaching. The police were particularly hard on them. But Christian schools today have an experience of freedom in their make-up that is going to be helpful to all of Japanese education. While they lost much during the war, it was not their own fault, and from now on they will rapidly be restored to their original principles and practice. I feel they will show the other schools of the country just how it ought to be done."

The future of Christian education in Japan looked up sharply in the months following the surrender with the action of American Christians' pledging themselves to help the Japanese build a new Christian university within their country and to undergird the already existing institutions. Plans for the new university have been drawn up by committees working in both this country and Japan, and one of the first major missionary objectives proceeding from American Christians toward the Japanese church will be the building of a top-grade, postgraduate university to crown the Christian educational program in Japan and produce a new generation of the church's leadership.

VII .... BEE-SAN—FLIER WITH FIRE

"SURELY IN temples built with hands God the Most High is not dwelling." This paraphrase of the words of Stephen the martyr forced itself into my mind along with the hymns and prayers at a service one cold morning in December, 1945, in the ruins of Holy Trinity Church, Tokyo. The sun streamed through the open roof and the gaping windows. Some flowers and a cross had been raised at the altar end of the nave. There was a kneeling rail, made from scrap lumber, and a few benches had been brought in for worshipers. Most of us stood.

Bishop Sasaki, grand old man of Japanese Episcopalians, preached the sermon. Jerusalem was fought over many times, he said, and the temple was destroyed. But worship went on, and temples were restored. On that First Sunday in Advent, worship was going on in Holy Trinity Church without benefit of temples built with hands.

The congregation was mixed. There were Japanese of long devotion to the Episcopal Church. There were second-generation Japanese-Americans in the uniform of the United States Army. There were other American officers and men. Together they prayed the prayers, sang "Jesus calls us o'er the tumult," and drank from the common cup of Communion.

"Here is the brotherhood of Christians, here is the unbroken body of Christ," an American army officer whispered in my ear.

All over Japan today Christians are proving that God's dwelling and God's presence are not dependent upon material churches and religious trappings. Too many of them are gone. And worship remains.

There were four Christian churches in Aomori, the city which hugs the Tsugaru Straits in northern Japan—Catholic, Episcopal, Methodist, and Congregational. Not one of them remains today. Aomori was leveled to a field of ashes sloping away from the sea.

The city of Kamaishi, bulging eastward into the Pacific on Japan's northeast coast, was an iron and steel manufacturing center. The bombers came and Kamaishi disappeared. All Christian churches in the city were destroyed.

Sendai, northeastern Japan's metropolis, was a stronghold of the Christian faith. There were fifteen churches, twelve Protestant and three Catholic. Today there are four, two Protestant and two Catholic. The Rev. Chujiro Kawabata, a Congregational pastor in Sendai, was building a temporary meeting place for his congregation in December, 1945. He told me that worship was still being carried on. The Presbyterian and Baptist churches which remained after the bombing were sharing their sanctuaries.

It is difficult to get accurate comprehensive reports on the damage and destruction wrought from bombing by the Allied air forces on Japan. When the war ended the aerial campaign against the Japanese homeland was in an early strategic phase. Militarily, its purpose was to knock out the myriad centers of domestic and small-scale production and to terrify the people and attack their morale.

The one grim and overpowering fact in the surface picture of Japan today is fire. It has swept whole districts of the major cities off the face of the earth. It is the first outward evidence of the war which strikes a newcomer in Japan. Thousands of homes, shops, factories, churches, official halls, temples, and shrines lie in the ashes of the cities of Japan today. To an Allied observer the sight is visual proof of the effectiveness of Bee-San (Mr. Bee), as the Japanese came to speak of the fire-freighted B-29. To a Japanese it is the most complete and paralyzing disaster which ever befell his society. A little under half of the total area of Tokyo, including its suburbs, was cleared by the incendiary blazes. In Tokyo itself, the region inside the belt railway, the fire-swept area is almost 100 per cent.

The statistics on damage to churches in Tokyo have been reported variously from several sources. There were over 200 churches of all kinds in metropolitan Tokyo, and only a score or so remain. The United Church of Christ in Japan states that of its 157 church buildings only 9 remain. The Catholics lost 10 of their large churches in Tokyo and many chapels connected with schools and monasteries.

There were twenty-four Christian churches in Yokohama, and only five of them are left. The big downtown Baptist, Presbyterian, Episcopal, and Methodist churches are gaping shells. In Osaka 80 per cent of the churches are gone. Only one of the churches of central Kobe is usable. In the ruins of Nagoya lie many of its Christian churches.

The U. S. Army Air Forces strategic bombing schedule exempted one of Japan's major cities. That was Kyoto, the ancient capital. Kyoto is the one untouched Japanese city today, and all its churches are undamaged by bombing.

All of Hiroshima's churches are gone—four Methodist, one Catholic, three Presbyterian, one Congregational, one Baptist, one Salvation Army, one Alliance, and one Lutheran. Two preachers died in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima.

These reports will convey some idea of the terrific property disaster which befell the Christian church in Japan. Christianity has been largely a city religion in Japan. The evangelization of the countryside has always been limited by the conservatism of the people. With the concentration of churches and institutions in cities and the bombing schedule which timed its deadliest blows against the same cities, the result was concentrated destruction upon the Christian church. Social settlements and welfare institutions were situated in the crowded urban areas which they tried to serve. They went up in the same flames which reduced those crowded, matchbox houses to ashes in the early months of 1945.

When the atomic bomb fell on Nagasaki, nearly ten thousand

Catholic Christians were killed at one time, three out of six parish churches were destroyed and one made unusable, three out of six schools were destroyed, all but one monastery went up in flames, and all five Catholic social institutions in the city were reduced to ashes.

The Nagasaki bombing was a direct and crushing blow to Japanese Catholicism. It was there that Francis Xavier planted the church in 1549, and Nagasaki was the cradle of Christianity in Japan. After the persecutions and banning of Christians early in the seventeenth century, Nagasaki Catholicism went underground and for generations it was passed as a secret faith from fathers to their children. When Catholic work opened again in Nagasaki in 1865, following the 225-year-old closure of the country and prohibition of Christianity, there occurred the famous "finding of the Christians," when thousands of believers made themselves known and revealed that they had kept the faith through two centuries, passed down to them from their ancestors.

The bomb fell on Urakami, a valley lying somewhat inland from the port area of Nagasaki. This valley was the largest concentration of Catholics in Japan. It was flattened. A few broken skeletons of heavy stone and concrete buildings are scattered over the landscape. I was told that every patient in a hospital which lies on the side of a hill leading up from the Urakami valley was killed in the atomic blast. A huge stone tori, the typical gate facing every Shinto shrine, was broken in two. A factory chimney still hangs obliquely against the sky. The ruins of the Mitsubishi arsenal, at the foot of the valley, are a tangled mass of twisted steel girders and fragments of corrugated iron sheets crumpled and blown about like pieces of paper. On the bluff facing Urakami the large building of Chinzei Gakuin, Methodist boys' school, was heaved sideways by the force of the blast.

Nagasaki is a city of hills and valleys converging into the bay which forms the port. The pattern of destruction is easily discernible in relation to the topography. The bomb fell into Urakami, wiped out that valley, shook everything, and toppled some frame houses elsewhere in the city. The blast then rushed outward across the hills of Nagasaki, stripping the tops of them and leaving the valleys substantially intact. Nagasaki, therefore, presents a picture today of a city still able to function, because the lower levels of it, particularly in the harbor area, were protected by intervening hills from the atomic concussion.

The beautiful Church of the Sacred Heart is today grim evidence of the fury of atomic warfare and testimony to the awful truth that man's conquest of the spirit is far from matching his control over nature.

Summing up, the destruction of churches in Japan during the war reached nearly 30 per cent of the total. Of the 1,600 Protestant churches in the country, 455 were damaged or destroyed and are today unusable. A total of 331 Protestant ministers' parsonages were destroyed along with their libraries. Eighty of 240 Episcopal churches went down. Most of this destruction took place in the centers where the church was strongest.

The Young Men's Christian Association lost six of its main city centers—the national office, secretaries' residence and Chinese dormitory in Tokyo, the Sendai, Nagoya, and Kobe Y's. Partial damage was inflicted on four others, two in Tokyo, one in Yokohama and one in Osaka. The Y.W.C.A. lost its national office, secretaries' residence, foreign residence, two dormitories, and a mother's home in Tokyo, the Y.W. in Yokohama, and its main building and a women's center in Nagoya. Also gone are the Osaka Y.W.C.A. mother's home and the main Kobe Y.W. building. Both of the main Tokyo buildings of the Y.M. and Y.W. are now occupied by Allied forces.

Property damage alone was a staggering blow to Japanese Christianity. Yet not a convention or assembly of Christians goes by but what plans are laid for rebuilding. The United

Church is counseling its member congregations to rebuild on a planned basis, with unchurched areas receiving first consideration, and a spreading of the new churches so that the country is adequately served again. The United Church is telling its congregations to rebuild in temporary quarters for the present. "It would be a mistake to erect a needlessly expensive house of worship when the Japanese have no houses to live in," Tomita told me. "All we need is a central place where the altar of God can be erected and social ministrations can begin for the community life."

Episcopalians, who intend henceforth to lay great stress upon the centrality of the church in their Japanese mission, have appealed to their mother churches in Britain and the United States for help in rebuilding their sanctuaries. Straw mats have been placed on the floor in the Yokohama Memorial Baptist Church, a hasty roof put up, and Pastor Nobuo Tokita is holding regular services. One Presbyterian church in Tokyo put a sod roofing over the basement, and meetings are held there. Mrs. Tamaki Uemura preaches in her own home, and the congregation spills over through the doors and windows. A canvas tarpaulin over a bomb hole in the roof of the Ginza Methodist Church, Tokyo, keeps out the rain while services go on beneath it.

The most moving story of the will to build again and face the future with imagination and courage, despite the most paralyzing blows of death and destruction, came to me from Takuo Matsumoto, principal of the Hiroshima Girls' School. The story goes back to seven o'clock on the morning of August 6, 1945. Hiroshima lay hot and humid under a midsummer sun in its bowl-like valley rimmed by mountains. Hiroshima Girls' School had begun its day early that August 6. The younger girls of the school were in their places on the open campus of their school. Matsumoto came out to greet them. He talked to them about the work they had been asked by the prefectural government to do, about the work corps duties that every younger high-school girl in Japan was expected to contribute to her nation in the summer of 1945. He gave them a word of encouragement. Then they set out.

Into the streets they went, into the parks and cleared areas of Hiroshima. Their job was to join the women and the aged in clearing wide strips of land for fire breaks and evacuation lanes in case the city should be fired by incendiaries from the sky. All of Hiroshima Girls' School's younger pupils were out in the open on the morning of the sixth of August, some three hundred of them, giving voluntary service to the city. Twenty-five thousand of Hiroshima's teen-agers were doing likewise.

An hour later the older girls of Hiroshima Girls' School assembled in their auditorium for daily chapel services. An all clear had just sounded following a short alert announcing an enemy air raid. The sleek B-29s had been in the sky, but they had dropped no bombs and had gone away. It was a regular chapel service, with a prayer, announcements, a little talk, and hymns.

At 8:17 A.M. Principal Matsumoto was just seating himself at the desk in his office. There was no air raid alarm, not even the sound of planes. Suddenly the brightness of the day was filled with a greater brilliance, an awesome, eye-searing blue flash, as if lightning had struck just above his head. For a split second the brightness and the crack of doom hung in the air above Hiroshima. The rush of a mighty wind followed, broken by human cries and the awful, tortuous groan of a city falling into rubble. Centuries-old dust rose into the air, obscured the sun, and the dark of night fell across Hiroshima.

Down upon Principal Matsumoto's head came the ceiling, the beams, the upper floors. "I was pinned down in a pile of timber and rubble which had once been my office. It was not explainable. It was like the end of the world. I felt a strange calmness and self-possession," he told me, "as if God were very close. A fellow teacher had been with me in the room. I began to call, 'Tanaka.

Tanaka-san!' There was no answer, only low groans, which gradually grew fainter and fainter until they died away. I watched my friend Tanaka die before my eyes."

The upper part of Matsumoto's body was free, although his legs and lower body were pinned down. After half an hour's struggling, he pulled himself free of the timber and tile, the beams and plaster which covered him. Bruised and bleeding and covered with dust, he crawled to the surface and looked around him.

Where a few minutes before his school had stood, not a building remained. Everything was reduced to dust and fallen timbers, an open field of rubble as far as his eyes could see. There were no streets, no paths, just tile and stones everywhere, bricks and boards and timbers and branches of trees. Fires were already burning in many places. A parade of half-naked, unrecognizable, burned, bleeding people was walking around aimlessly, lost.

"I thought immediately of my wife and daughter," Principal Matsumoto said, "and started for our house. I never expected to find them alive. The house wasn't there. At last I heard them. You can't imagine my relief when I saw them both, near the place where the house had stood, scarcely hurt. My daughter was wounded and bleeding but able to walk.

"We hurried across the rubble to a nearby park, and there I left them with a crowd of the most miserable people in the world, the men and women and children who had escaped with their lives and that was all.

"I returned to the school grounds, picking my way with difficulty and with pain across the fields of wreckage. I knew I must do all I could for the teachers and students who were still there. I went immediately to the chapel. What a beautiful building it had been. And what a ghastly sight it was now. From beneath its wreckage came the cries of the dying.

"There they were. Their hymns had turned to screams, and the screams to groans. We tried to move the beams and timbers.

We pushed and pulled and sweated. The fires were creeping closer. It was no use. Fifty college girls of Hiroshima Girls' School were burned to death underneath the wreckage of the chapel where they had gone to worship God.

"Our little girls were out on the streets in the work corps, fully exposed to the blast and the searing rays. All but fifty of the three hundred who were out that day were burned to death in that awful moment.

"Back in the park where Mrs. Matsumoto was resting, she was suddenly caught up in a whirl of sparks and flame, or else shoved carelessly by the press of escapees, and jumped or fell into the river. She died instantly of heart failure in the water."

The uranium atom, in a skillfully contrived mechanism, product of the scientific genius of man, passing from matter into energy with the fury and power of the universe behind it, brought death to nearly one hundred thousand souls in Hiroshima that fateful morning of August 6, 1945. Nearly twenty thousand youngsters were caught at their duties in the labor service and were killed outright. Within a radius of six hundred yards from the spot where the bomb fell, an estimated seventy per cent of the people died. Not a single building in the heart of the city remained intact. It was either blown over, crumbled, wrenched out of shape, blown windowless and doorless, or burned. Practically speaking, Hiroshima was wiped off the face of the map.

Eighteen teachers, nearly three hundred and fifty students, and three faithful servants of Hiroshima Girls' School are gone. Every family represented at the school has had parents, brothers, or sisters who were casualties of the atomic bomb.

"I called a meeting of the school a few days after the bomb fell," Matsumoto told me. "I looked out on the scattering of students who were there. Such a pitiful sight! Then the thought of those who were not with us engulfed me. My voice choked. I could not speak. The meeting broke up in tears. For weeks I would walk through the city, day after day, seeking out the students who were lost. It was truly heart-rending to see their swollen, blackened bodies. Every one of those girls bore her pain bravely and listened to the words of comfort which I managed to say. Some, to the very moments of their death, sang hymns which they loved and whispered prayers. In the hospitals the doctors told me our girls were lights among their fellow patients, and how proud and grateful I felt for them. That moment alone—the moment of death—was all the justification I shall ever need for our Christian school in Hiroshima."

But Hiroshima Girls' School has had troubles before. It has been shaken down by earthquakes, burned by fire, and leveled by typhoons. Always it has risen again. Today it is a victim of the first atomic bombing in history. And today it is again on its way to rebuilding.

I hiked along a riverbank through the rubble of Hiroshima, inland toward the mountains. About three miles back, in a rugged little valley, I found a few shacks and sheds and energetic carpenters working on a long, barracks-type building. A teacher met me and said that these were the new buildings of Hiroshima Girls' School. Here the new campus would be built, better than the other one, a beautiful campus set like a jewel in the mountains. Already 850 girls were enrolled for classes.

The mystery of Hiroshima was that the atomic bomb had not destroyed it. As far as I could see were fields of devastation. Yet new life was stirring among the ashes. On the Catholic compound, broken images of the Virgin Mary lay where a church and schools and homes once stood. There two fathers had put together a shack of packing crates and were living in it. It measured not six feet by twelve, and yet inside it was an altar, and there on Sundays the faithful came to hear mass.

In Hiroshima I saw the valley of the shadow of death through which Japanese Christians had to pass. But I saw more than that. The church had been weakened, it had compromised and temporized its faith, but something had been left to it which gave it power to rise again. Somehow, within itself, it carried along the promise of new life. I saw the ocean of despair, but also the purged faith expressing itself anew in Christian works and service. I heard the dreams of the new church that would lift itself from the ashes and turn its memories of the past into strength for the future.

VIII ....THE RESISTANCE OF PIETY

BY FAR the largest single body of Christian resistance to the nation in wartime Japan was the Holiness Church. My first introduction to this fact came through a young preministerial student, Korean by birth, who had been drafted in 1944 from a theological seminary in Japan to go with the Japanese army in China. Early in 1945 he deserted from the army and escaped to Chungking. There I interviewed him and heard one of the first descriptions available from any source on the state of wartime Christianity in Japan.

It was this young man who told about the heroic and sustained opposition which the Holiness Church put up against the spiritual pretensions of the state, a fact which he declared, and which I was later to discover for myself, was one of the most telling witnesses to pure Christianity in the Japanese empire. The Holiness position was peculiarly nonpolitical in its origin, although eminently political in its impact upon the history of Japan's wartime experience. It riveted attention upon the one important fact for Christians in militaristic Japan—the fact that theirs was a religious struggle with the nationalistic ideology. No amount of juggling political convictions could obscure for the Holiness Church the rival claims of Christianity and Nipponistic Shinto to the basic loyalties of the people. That the Holiness pastors and members set this conflict so sharply before the attention of Japan during the war years was a Christian witness that will be long remembered in the history of the Japanese church.

It was the state which precipitated the Holiness Church into the center of the political struggle in wartime Japan. The church did not arrive there by itself, but once it had arrived it stood and took its medicine and showed a political resistance of heroic proportions. It was a rude shock to law-abiding, pious Christians to find themselves in police custody, but once the police drew the line the Holiness Church stood up to it.

The Nippon Seikyokai (literally, Japan Holy Church) is an independent Christian communion in Japan which claims to be the fourth largest Protestant denomination in the country. It has no world-wide connection as a church, but is related to the missionary efforts of the Oriental Missionary Society of Los Angeles. It is a common man's church, has carried an intense, evangelistic message far and wide in Japan, and has emphasized salvation from sin in simple, understandable terms. In doctrine it is fundamentalist and premillenarian. Its belief in the second advent of Jesus was the "thought" which proved "dangerous" in the eyes of the Japanese police and brought the Holiness Church into direct conflict with the state.

This denomination in 1942 had 164 churches, 300 circuits, 160 male preachers, 90 women preachers, 25,000 members, a seminary, and a leper colony. Its head was Akiji Kurumada. The entire denomination was eventually hounded into dissolution, all its leaders picked up for questioning, detention, or imprisonment, and the United Church, of which it was one of the founding members, was forced to erase its name from the rolls.

One of the chief figures in the case of the Holiness Church was a prominent pastor named Toyozo Abe. I spent an entire day with this man, going through his journal, and learned the inside story of this celebrated case. Abe is a quiet, dignified man, somewhat stouter than the ordinary Japanese, soft-spoken and at ease. His face is not that of a fighter, but reflects rather a kind of placid determination that is his stalwart character.

Abe was one of the committee of seven from all denominations which organized the United Church. He was prominent in drafting its charter, in representing his church before other denominational bodies, and serving on committees for the United Church's creed and general affairs, and work with Sunday schools and young people. His local appointment was as pastor of the Kosei Church, Koenji, Suginami ward, Tokyo. His church was burned on May 25, 1945, and only a few homes of parishioners are left today as central points of the congregation.

As the journal which Abe kept in prison was opened before us, time turned back to July 26, 1942. It was early in the morning, the customary hour for Japanese police to call. Abe was awakened from his sleep. Mrs. Abe opened the door and found four men from the Metropolitan Police Station. These were the civil police, agents of the Ministry of Home Affairs. Abe met them as they entered his home. They were in a state of great excitement. One was trembling from nervousness. He opened his brief case and handed Abe the summons.

"I knew that there must be some mistake," Abe told me. "We had no warning that the police were interested in us. I had been a full-time Christian worker since I was nineteen years old, had joined my profession over my father's protest and eventual disinheritance. I was a devoted Christian, all that I considered a model citizen, and a loyal, patriotic Japanese. I could think of no reason that the police should want me. I make this element of surprise so clear to you, because there was nothing in our behavior as a church which was intended to provoke the political powers that be."

The summons specified that Abe was wanted for questioning in connection with violations of the statutes protecting law and order. He dressed immediately and went with two officers to a suburban police station in western Tokyo near his home.

A police official came shortly from the city headquarters and brusquely placed the charges before him: "You are propagating teachings contrary to the interests of the Japanese empire. You have done so for five years in Suginami ward." Abe protested that he had done no such thing and would fight against the charges with his life.

He was immediately transferred to detention quarters across the city in eastern Tokyo, a place well known as the permanent jail for serious offenders. He discovered that his detention was ordered by the public prosecutor's office. This meant that his was no ordinary police crime and that he was destined for a long stay.

After four or five days the same brusque officer who had talked to him in Suginami came to him and started again. He handed Abe some questions which he was supposed to answer. The questions covered matters of his religious doctrine, his ideals regarding the Japanese empire, his actions.

Forty-six Holiness leaders were rounded up on the same day. They included the two most prominent men in the denomination, Mr. Kurumada, its head, and Professor Masakichi Ichinomiya of the seminary, in addition to Abe, who was a leading figure by virtue of his position as general affairs chairman for the church. All were taken separately and held separately. All had the same experiences.

It was about August 20 when the police officials took up Abe's case again. They had examined the answers to his earlier questioning, they said, and had drawn up a statement of his beliefs for him to sign. "We are acting according to the orders of the office of the prosecutor of the Imperial Japanese Government," they announced. "This government never did any wrong. Its courts are fair and unprejudiced. You will have a just trial."

Then they handed him the document, a description of his beliefs which was cleverly incriminating and obviously proof that he did believe things detrimental to law and order. The signature would have proved the prosecutor's case for him. Abe saw it, knew the answers were twisted to incriminate him, and refused to sign. The policemen flushed with anger, beat him with bamboo thongs, and slapped his face repeatedly.

"If they had been able to trap me," Abe said, "they would have had a proclamation of guilt from the head of the general affairs bureau of our church, guilt which would have subsequently brought punishment to all Holiness people in the land. I was a test case."

Abe reasoned that it was going to be the policy of the government to persecute Christians in order to unify the people around Shinto and the war. So he determined to go the limit in resistance, to prolong the struggle, and force the government to reveal its full intention.

After Abe's skirmish with the police in August, 1942, the long-drawn-out siege began. Abe made himself as comfortable as he could in his detention quarters. He did his own housework, and also cleaned other rooms and the common chambers. He was given some privileges for this service, made friends, spoke his mind freely, found some sympathetic response to his spirit and his efforts. "I became almost the boss of the place," he told me. "When drunken men were brought in off the street I took care of them. Even policemen came to me with their troubles."

He had only twenty minutes of direct sunlight during the whole 288 days he was in police detention. His sight became feeble because of a lack of vitamins. He lived in a small room with seven men, each with a small straw mat and one blanket. During the winter his leg was chilled and still gives him pain. He was lonely and sad. Officials tried at irregular intervals to get him to sign his confession, using harsh means and then quiet, friendly persuasion. He resisted all efforts. He had no lawyer, of course.

According to Japanese law, the right of habeas corpus comes due for an offender twelve months after the date he is arrested. Abe's detention was running long, and the prosecutor needed some decision before the year was up in order to launch his case. The officials decided, therefore, to yield a little. They softened their attitude toward Abe, and agreed that a new confession should be written. It was not much different from the first, but a few glaring incriminations had been removed, and after a month of questioning, argument, and deliberation, Abe decided to sign. This was toward the end of March, 1943. He signed because he saw no reason to prolong the detention and because he hoped to speed his case into court where he could make further statements and arguments.

He was guilty by his own admission. The prosecutor's office rushed clerks and lawyers to him, began lengthy questioning as they prepared their case. He told me that the entire prosecution was inspired by the Ministry of Home Affairs and its policy of suppressing every Christian tenet which could not be brought into line with official Shinto. Down to the smallest police functionary, the questioning and arguments carried the same line of attack. Abe is convinced that the anti-Christian persecution was official, that individuals or guilt amounted to nothing, that they were caught in a huge political maneuver, their fates sealed in advance.

After 288 days of police detention, on April 9, 1943, Abe was able to "walk on the real earth for the first time in almost a year." This rare freedom came to him as he was transferred from detention to Sugamo prison, the same institution in which Japan's war criminals are today incarcerated. There he was given a small cell to himself. Once a week he was taken, in handcuffs and roped like a common criminal, to the public prosecutor. His first act was to try to change his plea and disavow his signed confession on the grounds that it had been coerced. The prosecutor would not hear of it.

This vast emptiness of waiting, this repeated bumping his head against the stone wall of the state's scheduled case against him continued for nearly a year. A grand jury investigation then took up the case in February, 1944. Many of the Holiness pastors did not get this type of investigation, and Abe thinks that his persistent protestations over the coercion of the signed statement produced the grand jury survey of his case and that of other top Holiness figures.

Abe used the courtroom for a thoroughgoing attack upon Japanese police procedures and the stoutest denial of his "confession." His criticisms reached into the top quarters of the

Ministry of Home Affairs. The judge tried angry reprimands, but Abe talked quietly on, lining up his arguments, each one more forceful than the one before. At the end the judge decided that there must have been coercion of the confession, and ruled that it could not therefore be considered valid. The judge and Abe then proceeded to work out a systematic analysis of Holiness belief and a legitimate interpretation of it. The judge asked new questions, and Abe answered them. Finally the judge presented Abe with a list of questions and ordered him to answer them freely and without coercion. This Abe did, and on the basis of his answers the judge drew up a new document which Abe had no objections to singing. The investigation continued until March 13, when Abe was released pending trial.

But the release meant nothing, Abe told me. He went back to Sugamo for another four months. "I think they were afraid to release me," he said. "I had protested so much and made such direct charges against high state officials that they considered it unsafe to permit me to get out and tell all I knew."

On July 3, 1944, after 427 days of imprisonment at Sugamo, weakened and sick, Abe was released. Mrs. Abe had arranged for a lawyer, a certain Yoshio Suzuki, a Christian, and together they prepared their defense for trial.

On August 21 it began. The top Holiness offenders, thirteen of them, were brought into court together. A panel of four lawyers defended them, including Suzuki. All denied that their confessions of belief were incriminating against them. The trial was the climax of the state's case against the Holiness Church. All over Japan for the preceding two years the church had been under surveillance by the state. In April, 1943, the United Church was ordered by the government to oust the Holiness people from the kyodan. Its officials asked the Holiness Church to resign, and the Ministry of Home Affairs ordered the banning of the church. It should be noted that the state action against the church came not from the Ministry of Education, the so-called competent approving body for churches, but from the ministry in which the civil police bureau was located. There was considerable jurisdictional squabbling between the two ministries over handling the Holiness case, with the Ministry of Education defending its right to govern religious matters and protesting the interior ministry's interference with the legal rights of the denomination under the Religious Bodies Law. The police had the final say, however, and the church was dissolved. Great interest attended the Holiness trial in the Tokyo Local Criminal Court, beginning in August, 1944, because of the preceding two years' discussion of them and the numerous cases involving them throughout the country.

The state's charge against Holiness doctrine was that it contested the sacredness and inviolability of the Japanese emperor, that it believed in a political kingdom of God to supplant the kingdoms of this world, that it was part of a plot for Jewish world hegemony, and that it was being preached to the detriment of Japanese morale with criminal intent. The ground for these charges was the Holiness premillenarian hope that Christ would come again to judge all men and establish his reign.

Did that mean Christ would also judge the Japanese emperor? If so, was that not implication that Holiness doctrine considered Christ superior to Tenno? Would the Jews rule at the millennium?

The Holiness defendants replied that their beliefs were religious and without political implications. They pointed out a large body of court precedent which had arisen in Japan by this time. Most judges were dismissing religious "thought criminals" with the explanation that their doctrines were spiritual and not to be interpreted in legal, political ways. There are certain things which belong to the secular world, they argued, and certain things clearly spiritual.

The prosecutors and the court were unmoved. They insisted that political inferences were intended, that the Holiness defendants hoped to supplant real life rulers. The defense cited biblical passages to prove their fidelity to secular power. There was no thought that Jews would rule at the millennium.

Stoutly the Holiness men denied that they had propagated their doctrine with criminal intent, and assured the court that they acted only with the best interest of the nation and the world upon their hearts.

The judges tried to shame them for changing their confessions, for signing and unsigning the documents given them by the police. "You are cowards without the courage of your convictions," the court accused them angrily.

"We shall prove whether or not we are cowards when we face the jailers and executioners you are holding in store for us," they replied.

Through eleven sessions, lasting from August until December, the trial proceeded, a parody of justice, a game of words that would have been ridiculous for intelligent men if it had not been so deadly serious. The defendants were permitted to live in their homes during the duration of the trial. At the seventh session witnesses from outside were permitted to testify in defense of the Holiness men. Professor Shuen Kuwata of the Nippon Theological Seminary, the official United Church college for ministers, was the first. Abe told me that he was of no help to the defense because he was too personally opposed to Holiness doctrine, considered it heterodox, and so informed the court. Professor Zenta Watanabe, head of the women's section of the United Church seminary, was the second witness to be called for the defense. He was sympathetic and helpful. When I asked Abe how he appraised the attitude of the United Church and its leaders toward their case, he waited a moment and then replied that their attitude varied from harsh disapproval to friendly sympathy, but on the whole they were not helpful in the hour of crisis for the Holiness group. He particularly criticized the role of Koji Suzuki, head of the general affairs section of the

United Church, in assisting at the trial. At the offices of the United Church, Hiraga, who was Suzuki's successor in the chairmanship of the general affairs section, told me that the United Church had done all it could to defend the rights and beliefs of the Holiness people among its constituency. They were tried in local courts throughout Japan, and according to Hiraga the kyodan officials repeatedly interceded for them. The church advised suspects not to emphasize the questionable doctrines in their preaching lest they inflame public opinion and the police. Tomita went once to the Ministry of Justice on behalf of the Holiness group and found the minister sympathetic.

On December 13, 1944, the prosecutor made his final plea and asked for sentences ranging from three to seven years for the thirteen offenders. Abe was the subject of a plea for five years' imprisonment. The Holiness lawyers immediately protested the pleas. Abe told me that his lawyer, Yoshio Suzuki, made an excellent and daring rebuttal to the prosecution, a Christian layman's appeal for men of conviction, a speech that might easily have brought punishment to himself. The result came on December 27 when the court pronounced sentence. Abe was given three years' imprisonment and five years of probation, the most severe of the sentences. Five other men received the same treatment. The others ranged from a year's imprisonment and probation for two years to two years' imprisonment, probation for three. The defendants were given ten days in which to appeal.

The prosecution acted first and on December 29 filed its own petition for appeal against the leniency of the local court's sentences. The Holiness lawyers appealed on December 30. Nothing happened to the case in subsequent days, however, because in the air raids and general confusion the court was burned and its records were destroyed. Abe told me that he feels the case was purposely stalled because by this time the government was fearful of continuing a case that was becoming more ridiculous day by day.

When the Higashi-Kuni peace cabinet was installed, the entire case of the Holiness men was placed before the Ministry of Justice. This government department immediately queried the prosecutor's section for a brief on what had happened to the church. The prosecutor tried to rationalize and explain with a great deal of embarrassment, stopped his appeal for a strengthening of sentence, and secretly asked the Holiness men to stop their appeal likewise. The case was still dragging along when the October 11 SCAP directive was published granting amnesty to all "thought" prisoners.

This was the story of just one Holiness pastor in Japan when the state stepped in to correct his beliefs. All Holiness pastors were examined, questioned, and called in, including women. Every one of them spent at least a few days in police detention. Five women were detained or imprisoned for long terms. Some fifty-seven pastors underwent long imprisonment or detention. Laymen and important church leaders were taken along with their pastors. Outside Tokyo police and court officials were more lenient and took action only at Tokyo's insistence. Many of them were given suspended sentences or were released. No one recanted throughout the entire ordeal. Abe made this point very strongly in my presence.

Two pastors died in jail, the Rev. Toshi Sugeno of Yokohama and the Rev. Hoji Koide of Osaka. Two—the Rev. Takashi Takeiri of Kyoto and the Rev. Chojuro Ikeda of Nagoya—had their health ruined at police and jailers' hands, became seriously ill, were released, and died at home. Many were released because of illness. Japanese police were always quick to release ailing prisoners to avoid the charge that persons had died in prison.

Abe told me that he thought the trouble all stemmed from a man named Morita in the "thought-crimes" section of the Home Ministry. He has been purged but is not a war criminal.

Abe stands today as a Christian whose faith was purged in the fires of persecution and a Christian who harbors no feelings of revenge toward his captors. He has suffered long embarrassment, suspension of his work and income, and painful chagrin to his family. "But I am glad for the experience," he says. "The hard life in prison toughened me for the even more difficult life we have to live in Japan today. My spiritual life was deepened, and I cannot regret that by the state's action the meaning and integrity of Christianity became known to the people. We met people from the lower walks of life and were able to show them Christianity. From the courtrooms all over Japan the faith that we hold was proclaimed for us."

Abe believes that Christianity must be quickly shown to the people of Japan today. The Christianization of character is essential to the people's democratization, he maintains. To this purpose Abe is devoting himself in approaches to the common people, in community visitation, in street preaching, in songs and hymns, in Christian movies, and in the distribution of Bibles and tracts.

In all this experience a curious contradiction appears. The most hardened resistance to the political ideology of wartime Japan came from men whose position was primarily religious. The Christians who emphasized social action and political awareness were not the men who stood most firmly in the struggle between justice and injustice on the Japanese political scene. They were able to find moral reasons for supporting the political aims of the state. The Christians whose emphasis had never been upon political or social affairs, however, the ones whose primary concern was God and pious devotion to his Kingdom, were the men who made the strongest political resistance within the Christian community in Japan. Their case proves that real political resistance is finally religious resistance, that the revelations of truth for men's society come to men who are first and foremost sure of their relationship to God.

IX. . . . . KAGAWA

THE DEBATES which today rage around the person of Toyohiko Kagawa concern his record as a member of the Japanese nation in wartime and have been precipitated by two sharply different estimates of that record. On the one hand, a set of measurements has been drawn up which is entirely political. Kagawa is appraised for his judgments in the political arena, his actions as a member of the warring community, his decisions regarding the relative rights and wrongs of the policy of his nation in the recent war. According to these measurements, Kagawa failed to show discriminating moral judgment, acted in the interests of the warring state, and did not resist the injustice which his nation was perpetrating throughout the Orient. Therefore, says this school of thought, "under Christian guise this Jap fostered war" (to use the headline from Corporal Barnard Rubin's column in the *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, an article which precipitated most of the current furore around the subject of Kagawa).

On the other hand, a set of measurements is employed which is larger than political, more long-term than immediate, more spiritual than ethical. This school of thought, judging Kagawa, says that a man's Christianity is never to be measured exclusively by his political and ethical judgments, that motives and background and nonpolitical references tend to make a man understandable across differences. This school of thought discounts the importance of Kagawa's mistakes of judgment in the politics of his times for the sake of the larger role he plays as a Christian.

To bring these two schools together is well-nigh impossible, because they are arguing from two different sets of premises. One has its standards drawn entirely from politico-ethical absolutes. The other says that these judgments are relative and not final in the measurement of a man's true Christianity. The observer who has a well-endoctrinated "line" of proper political behavior condemns Kagawa for his wavering from that line. The observer who looks beyond the proper codes of political behavior and judgment to the man and his motives sees a different result. The first berates the second for obscuring ethical matters in vague spiritual considerations. The second berates the former for making absolutes of relative moral matters and condemning to ignominy all persons who do not qualify according to the line.

Certain continuing characteristics of Kagawa need to be kept in mind if one is to understand his wartime activity in Japan. Kagawa is a lyricist, a poet, highly imaginative, and almost completely lacking in logical processes of thought. He is able to dream dreams and see visions, but needs an interpreter to explain them. Being this kind of person, Kawaga is both emotional and dramatic. He thinks with his feelings and is not averse to staging himself effectively.

Kagawa's chief emotional trait is a passionate sympathy for the suffering and the underprivileged. This has created him and fashioned his whole career. Anyone who has followed Kagawa's elaborate works for the slum dwellers and economic outcasts of Japan will know what is meant by this description of him.

Involved in Kagawa's emotional makeup is a deep and irrational response to his own people and nation. He is one with all his fellow countrymen in this, and not unlike many other patriots in every land who have from time immemorial been led into errors of judgment by an unthinking desire to believe the best of their own country and refuse to believe the worst.

Emotions are always socially conditioned. One feels deeply along with the prevailing moods of the society as a whole. Kagawa was swept up into the prevailing nationalism of the war years in Japan and the utterances he made were tempered to that mood.

All these traits combine to produce the Kagawa of today.

Even his close friends admit that he became too nationalistic during the war years and that he is not averse to inviting public approbation. It is my belief that his wartime activities and statements are understandable as coming from a man like Toyohiko Kagawa.

For example, Kagawa has been considered a pacifist. He is by instinct, I am sure, revolted by war's agonies and violence. But he is not a "line" pacifist, an absolutist, with pacifist action arrowed straight to the point in every political situation. He is rather a pacifist of the heart, and when sympathetic human considerations led him to believe in Japan's Greater East Asia campaign absolute pacifism went by the board.

Kagawa's friends in China and the United States do not quickly forget the risks he ran in his attitude and statements toward Japan's aggression upon China. Let us examine that. In those days—1937 to 1941—Japan was clearly the aggressor. It was a situation in which Kagawa could see clearly the burden of injustice which his country bore, its role as oppressor of a weaker people. Furthermore, a point not to be overlooked, in those days he could still read literature from Britain, the United States, and China. Kagawa spoke out courageously against Japan's campaign in China and was twice imprisoned for his efforts. He went to China and publicly apologized for the aggression of Japan. In private interviews in China as late as 1944 Kagawa was still regretting the policy of his country vis-à-vis China, although he publicly spoke of his country as the suffering servant for all the countries of Asia.

Just here it is important to point out how Kagawa differed in this understanding of history from most of his liberal colleagues in Japan. To the majority of political liberals the Japanese war in China was unimportant, an incident, an aggression, yes, but against an inferior, undisciplined foe. To these men the war against China was rationalized as just, and they would have accepted gladly its results, had it been successful. The war against the United States and England, in the eyes of these liberals, was the mistake. Kagawa, on the other hand, was more outspoken in opposition to the Sino-Japanese war than he ever was against Japan's struggle with the Western powers. He felt that there was greater justice in Japan's struggle against the United States and Britain than there was in Japan's open invasion of China. This is a reaction of conscience in Kagawa that is morally sound, and reflects again his immediate response to the suffering and the underprivileged.

The second stage of Kagawa's development during the years of Japan's warfare came after Pearl Harbor. An embargo was effected against all foreign news. Kagawa could no longer read the world-wide opinion touching his country. He was robbed of the perspective which such a clash of opinions might have given him. The propagandists in Tokyo took over the duties of establishing Japan's public opinion. And note this: They never spoke of their campaign in East Asia as an enlargement of their territories or a spreading of their national sphere. Never mentioned was the economic advantage to Japan of the imperialist grab. Not a word about the military anguish visited upon the countries of the Orient by Japan's marauding, brutal armies. The campaign was idealized. It was a blessing which the gods ordained and which Japan had been commissioned to sprinkle on the peoples of the East. The Western powers fought against Japan because their domination was threatened, an unjust domination to begin with. Japan was liberating Asia. That was Tokyo's story, and the only story Kagawa ever heard.

Kagawa wanted to believe well of his country. He was no imperialist. Any student of his writings and utterances will quickly confirm the fact that he has always been opposed to Western imperialistic exploitation of the Orient. Nothing would please him more than freedom for all people everywhere. He believed the propaganda, and many non-Japanese interned in

Japan during the war, uninformed by outside information, also believed it.

Furthermore, after Pearl Harbor Japan was no longer up against an inferior foe. No longer was the war an open and shut case of Japan's single aggression upon an inferior enemy. Now the match was more even, and Japan no longer bore the full burden of warmaking. As the contest of power became more balanced, the injustices of power, which Kagawa had clearly seen when the battle was against China, were no longer so obvious.

Before long it was the Japanese who were the oppressed and the injured. The soldiers came back from the battlefronts maimed for life, or families received boxes of ashes of the killed. When the bombs began to fall on Japanese cities the suffering was more than any sensitive soul like Kagawa's could bear without emotional response to it. All this served to heighten Kagawa's identification of his beliefs with those of the reigning propaganda and his opposition to the enemy who was bringing domination and suffering upon his people.

Kagawa could see Western domination and imperialism. He could not see his own country's capitalist-imperialist exploitation of the countries it was "liberating." He was told of unfortunate American brutalities on the battlefields. He was never told of atrocities committed by the troops of his own land. He could see the suffering in the cities around him. He could not see pictures of similar devastation in Manila and Nanking.

Kagawa's disfavor in the public eye generally stems from certain utterances he made during the war. Some of them are in print from the newspapers of wartime Japan. Others were carefully monitored by the United States Office of War Information and given circulation by that agency.

In the October 24, 1942, issue of the *Nippon Times,* Tokyo's English-language newspaper and a vehicle for official Japanese propaganda intended for foreign readers, there is an account of an interview with Kagawa under the headline, "Toyohiko

Kagawa to Visit Philippines to Support Educational Movement." Notice the date. Japan was already sovereign in the Philippines. In this article Kagawa is quoted:

> I will go anywhere if it is for the good of our country. . . . When I was in the islands (before) I was surprised to learn that the tenant farmers of the islands were living a miserable life. This state of affairs can be explained by the fact that the American capitalists made it a point to exploit the farming population of the islands. . . . The Filipinos, especially the farmers, have to be educated properly before they can be brought to make a contribution toward the reconstruction of the islands as a component of the Co-Prosperity Sphere.

The interview speaks of "the good of our country," criticizes American capitalist exploitation, sympathizes with the suffering peasants, refers to the need for retraining the Filipino people, and accepts the ideology of the Co-Prosperity Sphere—all things which reflect the letter of Japanese propaganda. It is silent on criticism of Japan, of the exploiting interest of Kagawa's own country in the Philippines, and is typical of his wartime statements in being sharply critical of the enemy and very equivocal toward Japanese policy, without openly endorsing Japan's war. Like others of Kagawa's wartime remarks, the importance is in this implication. Kagawa is correct to condemn capitalist exploitation if he holds that belief, but the use made of his criticism by implication exonerates all of Japan's similar imperialistic intentions.[1]

Kagawa's condemnation of bombings, his moral outrage at the use of Japanese bones as American souvenirs, his criticisms of American policy in India and our treatment of the Negroes were all legitimate criticisms, but coming as they did, and not matched with equally legitimate criticisms of Japanese policies, they were extremely useful to Japan's propaganda efforts.

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[1] For the sake of the record, Kagawa never went to the Philippine Islands during the war. The projected trip was to be taken at the invitation of Filipino Christians. When it came time to seek passage, the army refused to grant Kagawa a passport. No doubt they knew his record on the Japanese army in China and feared that he would see too much in the Philippines.

In August, 1942, Kagawa was quoted on the Japanese radio: "I cannot believe that the Almighty God of all the earth will permit the success of their (the Americans') inordinate ambitions for world domination which forged the spirit of racial superiority, but at the same time talks of freedom and liberty, using these words while waging this unjust war on the Oriental race."

When questioned about this "unjust" war, Kagawa reveals that he meant what he said. He felt the American intention in Asia was to dominate it for an economic purpose and therefore America's war was "unjust." His thinking again shows the tendency toward nationalism of which his enemies accuse him and certainly reflects his gullibility in swallowing the Co-Prosperity Sphere ideology.

Of course there can be no defensible argument that Kagawa was used unwittingly for propaganda purposes. Japanese did not use the radio in the English language during the war years for any other purpose than attacking the morale of the British and American people, a psychological warfare device, and Kagawa used it.

When American correspondents reached Kagawa shortly after the occupation began, one of them asked him (he says, "sarcastically"), "Are you glad Japan was defeated?" He replied, "No, sir! I wish I had rather died."

Kagawa has two explanations of this remark. In the first place, he says: "At the outbreak of the war I had felt so strongly that if only I could go out into the Pacific and die on the cross as Jesus died, it might be I could bring about reconciliation between the two countries. My mind was full of this vision, and without realizing that the friend I was talking to would not understand, I simply said, 'I wish I had rather died.' I meant really, 'died on the cross of Christ.' The correspondent then published that I would rather die simply because Japan had lost the war. The agony of my heart, however, is not so simple."

In the second place, he maintains that he as a Japanese could not answer "Yes" to the correspondent's question and keep his following among the people. "If I were one who could rejoice over the defeat of my own country," he says, "the Japanese public would certainly have revolted against me and all our Christian activities would have been stopped."

He explains his attitude a bit more fully in a written statement: "The war ended at last. Japan made a complete surrender. However, I am not glad that Japan was defeated. Only I could not have been happy either if Japan had won the war. I have been to China to express my repentance to her people, and I wish I could express my repentance to the American people too. The moral degeneration of the Japanese people has been tremendous. I think if we ever had won the war with this moral deterioration among the people, the whole of Asia must have been thrown into the worst stage of corruption. From this point of view there is a definite reason why Japan lost the war."

The explanations of this remark made in an interview with an American correspondent are still difficult to understand. According to my information, Kagawa was angry when he replied. My personal feeling is that he spoke rashly and now has had time to think it over, rationalize it, and actually has come to believe that Japan's defeat was a good thing. When I asked him pointblank, "Do you think Japan is better off under the occupation than she was during the war?" he answered unequivocally, "Yes."

Kagawa admits that at one time he purposely consented to broadcast propaganda. Just before the San Francisco Conference, Kagawa was referred to in an American broadcast as a likely candidate to head the government of Japan when the Americans invaded the islands. This word ran around Tokyo, blackened Kagawa's reputation with his own people, and actually endangered him. He was marked as traitorous in the eyes of the military police and military government. "I thought I would certainly be given the death penalty as a traitor to my own country," he says. "At that critical moment I decided to stand up and defend myself against this crooked propaganda."

So he went on the air, and it suited his purpose to make clear that he was no friend of the enemy. Every Saturday during UNCIO he broadcast from Radio Tokyo, wishing success to the conference, but chiding the United Nations for the folly of trying to set up a peaceful world around a few large armies, and expressing clearly that he could never agree to an Allied colonization of Japan.

All this record has been analyzed again and again. It has taken careful interviewing and soul-searching to find out exactly what Kagawa's own explanations of it are. Unexplained, it is doing Kagawa's reputation no good among many people both in Japan and overseas. When asked to explain, Kagawa is inclined to be alternately aggrieved and peppery. He considers the past a dead issue, is so busy with urgent demands every day that time-consuming explanations are bothersome and, he thinks, unnecessary. "Let them judge me by what I am doing today, not what I said yesterday," is his attitude.

Kagawa's postwar record is not going uncriticized. On many of the most controversial issues confronting Japanese life today Kagawa takes a surprisingly conservative stand. He was drawn into the inner circle of the first postwar cabinet when Premier Prince Higashi-kuni asked him to become an adviser to the government. The premier also appointed him head of the International Peace Society and the Moral Uplift Movement. Both of these organizations have merit but are generally considered to have been inspired by Japanese elder statesmen to curry favor with the occupying authority. Kagawa believes in both these organizations and has tried his best to keep them spontaneous and free of government sponsorship. Units of both movements have been set up throughout the country, and Kagawa has addressed mass meetings called by them, with thousands of people in attendance. Many critical Japanese consider the two movements as palliatives set up by the conservative monarchists and holders of economic power to save the emperor system and avert any real revolutionary changes in Japanese society.

On the issue of retaining the emperor in Japan, Kagawa has been as outspoken as any other single person favoring the monarch and is for that reason again classified as on the conservative side. He has been smiled upon by the court in a number of small ways, has been an adviser to Higashi-kuni, an uncle of the emperor, and has been received by princes and others close to the throne.

There are two teachers' unions in postwar Japan, one radical and one conservative. Kagawa is head of the conservative Japan Educators' Union. The radical National Teachers' Union has tried unsuccessfully to effect a merger with Kagawa's union, but he has opposed the consolidation on the grounds that his union cannot sacrifice its position on the emperor by merging with an organization that is clearly anti-Tenno. Kagawa is outspokenly anticommunist and refuses to engage in any popular-front activities with them.

In the *Nippon Times* late in January, 1946, Kagawa made known his stand on strikes, labor's most precious weapon and safeguard for economic democracy. Kagawa is against them in so far as his union is concerned. "A teachers' union should strictly refrain from taking such violent action as strikes," he was quoted. "The guiding principle of a teachers' union should be the bonds of love and spiritualism."

One other charge is rather serious in the case against Kagawa, and that is his relationship to a certain Yoshio Kodama. Kodama was a procurement officer for the Japanese navy who became fabulously wealthy during the war. He is now under indictment as a war criminal on charges of stripping China of its wealth and reselling the goods to his own government at a huge profit. Tokyoites referred to him as "that gangster." Both Kodama and

Kagawa were advisers to the Higashi-kuni cabinet. That was the first meeting of the two men. During this period of association, Kodama approached Kagawa with a repentant spirit and told Kagawa that he wanted to turn over a new leaf. He has given away much of his money and was a key figure in carrying out the emperor's cease fire orders of August, 1945. Kagawa argues that these actions prove Kodama's sincerity, but most Tokyoites feel that Kodama's change of heart was opportunist in the extreme. Kagawa says that he scarcely knows Kodama, but that both were advisers to Higashi-kuni and both spoke together on one occasion from the same platform at a rally of the International Peace Society. This current position of Kagawa in the turbulent Japanese politics of today, plus his wartime record of statements, are the factors which are raising the criticism of him today.

But there is much to be said on the other side. Nothing in the record shows Kagawa as a warmonger or even a fellow traveler of the military clique. He had no standing in Japan during the war so far as the persons in power were concerned. He was even suspect in their eyes, and was watched at every turn. He was twice imprisoned during the China incident and twice detained for questioning by the police during 1943. On one occasion he tried to break the ban which the police had effected against his speaking in public, and they seized him before he could reach the platform. Later he was taken for nine days of investigation by the Tokyo police and spent the time in writing. He was on a number of occasions referred to in public statements or documents as an untrustworthy character in Japan at war. Leaflets were distributed in Kamakura charging him with pacifism. Another pamphlet, citing Kagawa's general unfitness as a Japanese subject, was circulated widely among soldiers, apparently with the imprimatur of the army. These are little things and do not add up into a record of heroic resistance to the war on Kagawa's part, but they do put the lie to the *Stars and Stripes* headline which said he "fostered" war.

There are two other little stories which came to my attention and serve to reveal Kagawa's character as a Christian and his reservation on some of the ultranationalism which was sweeping his country during the war. When the Kobe Union Church was being confiscated from its rightful owners, the international congregation, by a series of intrigues in which the United Church of Christ in Japan was involved, it was Kagawa who tipped off the Kobe owners of what was about to be done. Through his information the Kobe congregation was able to lay its plans intelligently to delay the seizure. Another instance: When Higashi-kuni invited Kagawa to become an adviser to his cabinet in the early days after the surrender, Kagawa refused to take the position while his fellow Christians, the Holiness pastors, languished in prisons for "thought crimes" against the Japanese state. In both these cases there can be no doubt Kagawa acted as a true Christian. In the case of the Kobe church Kagawa supported the international congregation as a witness to the universality of Christianity, which he hoped to keep alive in wartime Japan, and in the second he rose to the defense of men who had been imprisoned solely because of their stalwart faith.

Kagawa was a member of none of the patriotic organizations which swept Japan like wildfire. Along with many liberals in Japan today, he takes a position a good distance to the right of communism, a position that subjects him to a great deal of criticism which he takes no pains to reconcile. He has a right to hold this position, and he is not alone in it. Many of his activities during the war years were inspired by a conscientious desire to keep the entire Christian church out of trouble. Kagawa admits that there were two courses open to him: one was martyrdom, the other was to yield as little as possible and stay alive to bear the burdens of the church and his work. Kagawa chose the latter. His explanation of his choice is that the church is tiny in Japan and was already being squeezed without mercy. If he had resisted further, it might have led to another persecution and obliteration of the church as in 1600. This conflict between the pastor and prophet in a man is not unknown in church history.

But because he was not a martyr, we should not be blind to the fact that his record against war is certainly as good as most patriotic Japanese who are now carrying the banners of liberalism in that country. Kagawa told me that the information he received was misleading, and that he has changed his mind on many things with the freer flow of news which followed the occupation. He has brought himself up to date on just how idealistic the Co-Prosperity Sphere was. He has learned the actual details of Japanese military aggression. But this information does not make him any less critical of imperialism or of Western domination of the Orient. He has told American servicemen in public speeches that domination by their country will never bring peace to the world, that moral degradation among the Japanese caused their downfall and similar moral degradation among the Americans can also cause theirs, that, "even America, the glorious victor, may fall someday if she neglects the humble, serving spirit of Jesus Christ."

The point at which Kagawa proves his worth to his country and his religious community is a point at which he surpasses most of his fellow countrymen in the imagination, resourcefulness, and energy he throws into programs for betterment of a gravely disturbed society. He has sensed much more keenly than most Japanese the real spiritual and moral depravity which caused his country's downfall and the vacuum of hope and belief which followed upon the defeat. He is not unaware of the basic economic difficulties which must be overcome if Japan is to get on her feet again. He realizes the urgency of feeding and housing. He knows the importance of starting the educational wheels rolling again with a new content for the new day. These are four topmost priorities on the schedule of reconstruction in Japan, and Kagawa is at work, not merely talking, on all of them.

It is in this realm of imagination for social improvement that Kagawa is at his best.

Kagawa has taken the chairmanship of the United Church's committee on postwar relief, has an office in the Kanda headquarters of the kyodan. He is speaking to Americans at every opportunity, sometimes to mass meetings, sometimes to small groups of students, at his church on every available Sunday in his schedule. His sermons carry a highly evangelistic note, stress the spiritual resources of Christianity, proceed with altar-call directness in trying to enlist workers for the Christian reconstruction of Japan.

"Christmas is not a historical fact of nineteen hundred years ago," I heard Kagawa say to a big gathering at Christmas time assembled to hear a joint American-Japanese chorus sing *The Messiah*. "It must be an epochal event which takes place in Japan at this season. Now Christ must be born in every branch of Japanese life. Through Christ a new Japan must be built. Rebuilding Japan requires a new spirit, and that spirit is Christ. It is the spirit of service, of working for others."

On another occasion he preached: "Japanese leaders became too conceited of their past successes and went too far in dreaming of bossing the whole of Asia and even America and other countries. They were pitifully lacking in Jesus' spirit of serving others for their own happiness. 'Be a clerk to serve the customers; it is better than being a king to be served by subjects,' teaches an old Japanese scholar. This is also the spirit of Jesus Christ. Jesus often washed the feet of his disciples. If all of us truly live this humbleness of Jesus and wash the feet of one another, our society will surely be cleaned someday. If America and the Soviet Union wash the feet of other smaller, weaker, and even defeated countries, there certainly will come the highest civilization and cultural development the world has ever known. If Japan had been washing the feet of Korea and China in the past, she would not be facing her present crushing and misery."

Kagawa has leaped back into prominence as an organizer of economic co-operatives. He told me that thousands have been reformed since the surrender, and he posits his whole scheme for the economic reconstruction of Japan on co-operative principles. Not only is his co-operation theoretical, he also has factories and stores functioning. One of the first enterprises he started was a factory for the repair of clocks and watches. He found a precision instrument factory left over from the war, had its title transferred to him, introduced co-operative principles, rehired the machinists and skilled workers, and found plenty for them to do with the broken-down watches and clocks of the country. This factory is located near the Saginomiya station in Tokyo. An Imperial University professor is assisting in the training of workers. The supply of instruments upon which to work is handled by station masters and railroad workers who bring the clocks and watches back with them from their runs. Kagawa is extremely anxious that these factories shall succeed, because he sees in them much of Japan's economic hope for the future, light industry, small-scale manufacture, winter industry for farming people, a diversified economy, decentralization of industry from the big cities. He feels that Christian influence has been weak with industrial and rural people, and believes that this is the way to evangelize their life. A church near the Saginomiya factory is closely associated with the plant. The master is a Methodist layman who came to Kagawa after the war for suggestions and conference on the plan to revive the factory. He, a certain Kanewo Nagata, is an earnest Christian and skillful worker. Permission from the occupying forces was granted for taking over the plant, and the project was launched.

In Kagawa's home ward of Setagaya, Tokyo, 47 of the 120 neighborhood associations have formed co-operatives.

In direct relief Kagawa is also in the forefront among Japanese leaders today. He explained to me some of his plans. Sixty per cent of sweet potatoes is waste after the starch is removed, he said.

"Our plan is to utilize this waste for the manufacture of flour." Huge reserves of this potato paste are now available. It will be mixed with wheat flour at a ratio of seventy to thirty and baked into bread to supply a hundred public kitchens in the Tokyo area. These feeding stations are now set up in churches, schools, burnt-out houses, police stations. The municipal government is carrying the burden of the work, but it was Kagawa's inspiration that stirred the city to action. He is also experimenting with acorns as a possible food supply.

The problem of orphaned children in Japan is enormous. Through the Christian relief committee, of which Kagawa is head, orphanages have been enlarged and equipped in Tokyo, Yokohama, Kamakura, and Osaka. It is not difficult to place children in foster homes in Japan because relatives and other families are always glad to care for children without families. "But the problem," Kagawa pointed out, "now is the influx of sick, underfed, dying, diseased children from overseas. They are coming back from the Philippines, the South Seas, China in pitiful condition. They cannot be placed in foster homes in this condition. Our orphanages, therefore, are working today to restore the health of these youngsters so that they can be moved out into new homes."

Kagawa is alert to the needs of educational reform in Japan. He is himself teaching once a month at Doshisha University in Kyoto, a 300-mile trip from Tokyo. He lectures frequently at the Tokyo Imperial and other universities. He is active in labor organizations, in the All-Farmers' Co-operative Union, and the newly formed Nippon Kyodoto, a political party built around the co-operative organizations.

Kagawa became too nationalistic during the war, but he was driven by the sincere if somewhat naïve belief that his nation was doing the right thing to free Asia from Western domination. He certainly permitted himself to be used for political purposes and for propaganda. But the instances in which he was so used were comparatively few in the total scene. Generally speaking, Kagawa was out of favor in wartime Japan. He could not even hold office or membership in the committees of the United Church because he was "indiscreet" in pacifist utterances and socialist leanings. In the larger sense it will do no harm to the world to listen to the cry of this Oriental for freedom, for co-operation, for humility, and service as the code of nations, and for an end to brutality and war. Nor to watch him today in the midst of a calendar full of good works.

X. . . . . .THE REMNANT

> Ah sinful nation, a people laden with iniquity, a seed of evil-doers, children that deal corruptly! They have forsaken Jehovah, they have despised the Holy One of Israel, they are estranged and gone backward. Why will ye be still stricken, that ye revolt more and more? The whole head is sick, and the whole heart faint. From the sole of the foot even unto the head there is no soundness in it; but wounds and bruises, and fresh stripes: they have not been closed, neither bound up, neither mollified with oil. Your country is desolate; your cities are burned with fire; your land, strangers devour it in your presence, and it is desolate, as overthrown by strangers. And the daughter of Zion is left as a booth in a vineyard, as a lodge in a garden of cucumbers, as a besieged city. Except Jehovah of hosts had left unto us a very small remnant, we should have been as Sodom, we should have been like unto Gomorrah.

THIS APOSTROPHE to an unjust nation was not written by a prophet of present-day Japan, his ammunition aimed at the desolation of his own country. It was written by the prophet Isaiah to a wayward Israel. Yet, for a case of forsaking Jehovah, desolation of one's land, cities burned with fire, a nation overthrown by strangers, it is Japan.

"Except Jehovah . . . had left unto us a very small remnant" —the few who remained steadfast in their faith are in Japan today like the faithful remnant of ancient Israel, the hope of the spiritual rebirth of their people. The church in Japan bent but never broke because God saved a very small remnant, a part of the soul of every Christian which somehow bent the knee not quite completely to the reigning ideology, a person here and there who braved the sting of death itself to speak prophetic judgments upon the spiritual depravity of the Japanese state. Except for them the church would have gone down in wartime

Japan. Because of them it today has a reserve of power within itself to face the new day.

The faithful remnant:

Michi Kawai, who told the police, "Take the word 'Christian' out of the constitution of my school, and I close it. It has no purpose except that of Christian training of young women."

Yoshi Tokunaga, principal of Fukuoka Girls' School, who braved the wrath of her students, her alumni, her parents, her faculty and refused recognition by the state, recognition which would have brought many advantages to her graduates, but recognition which would have likewise taken away her freedom.

The handful of boys at St. Paul's University, who tramped for miles each week to sit down with the banished dean of their chapel in his own house and hear his religious teachings.

The 250 pastors of the Holiness Church, who sacrificed their whole freedom and the identity of their church rather than give up that in which they believed.

Tadao Yanaihara, Kotaro Tanaka, Ken Ishihara, Toshio Suekane, Mrs. Tamaki Uemura, Mrs. Motoko Hani—the full list will never be known. At one place a simple pastor opened his home to the homeless after their houses had gone up in smoke following the incendiary raids. At another place Christian schoolgirls rolled up their sleeves to jobs in hospitals. I watched the girls of the Hirosaki Jo Gakko making straw sandals, knitting crude socks for the people of Aomori. Hirosaki was never bombed; Aomori was levelled. The Christian girls at Hirosaki saw their responsibility in such a situation and shouldered it.

I put great store by this faithful remnant. To me it is the hope of the church in Japan, the true dividend on missionary investment of earlier years. I think of the remnant in two ways: First, a part of the soul of almost every Christian in Japan was reserved for his faith over and above the demand of the state for loyalty; second, the few absolutists who resisted to the end. In other words, the remnant principle was at work in Japan even in the compromises which Christians admitted to their faith. The point is worth making that Christians *yielded;* they did not offer up their souls willingly. There was a drag, a reservation, in them, a holding back which proved in the last analysis a ground of faith that was more fundamental than the political beliefs of the day. Somewhere in their relationship to God and their Christian experience they had picked up a platform of belief that gave them something to stand on from which to judge the state.

Japanese Christians were alone. They had no contact with the world-wide fellowship of Christians, the presence of which is a convenient reminder of the universality of their faith. The reminders constantly drummed into them by the Japanese propaganda were entirely nationalistic. Japanese Christians are also young in the faith. None of them has as many centuries of tradition behind him of Christianity working on his culture as Western Christians have. Actually the Japanese have an archaic tradition behind them that is quite different from Christianity. It is not easy to mature in Christianity with backgrounds which are so alien to it. Nevertheless they weathered the storm with sufficient remnant of the faithful to promise well for the church of the future in Japan.

One of the most sainted characters in Japanese Christianity is a member of that fellowship by adoption. His name is Merrell Hitotsuyanagi, who went to Japan in 1905 as William Merrell Vories, a young student volunteer signed up with the Young Men's Christian Association for a teaching assignment in that country. He is now a naturalized Japanese and heir by marriage to one of the famous families of Japan. He is one of the most magic Christians in the world. His Omi Brotherhood is well known through his own writings. He is highly respected in Japan, was so even during the war, and his institutions—including churches, a mentholatum factory, a tuberculosis sanatorium, a social center, a girls' school, a library, a Y.M.C.A.—are among the best in the country and more than ordinarily effective in producing strong Japanese Christians. Hitotsuyanagi has tremendous personal following in Japan both among the people and recently among Americans who have learned about him and his program and have responded to his peculiarly winsome personality.

I asked Hitotsuyanagi to tell me of some of the evidences of spiritual vitality in the wartime Japanese church. I asked him to name the remnant. He mentioned Admiral Mizuno, a well-known figure among Tokyo Christians, a linguist, scholar, artist, poet. Admiral Mizuno, onetime personal adviser to Prince Takamatsu of the imperial family, during the war continued to teach a Bible class in Tokyo and to take an active part in church and student activities.

The head of the Women's Christian Temperance Union of Japan (I am quoting almost verbatim from Hitotsuyanagi), a Japanese woman nearly seventy years of age, was pestered for months by an officer of the military clique with the suggestion (really a polite command) that the word "Christian" be dropped from the name of the organization. She consistently refused to comply, and explained that the organization would prefer to be disbanded rather than give up such a fundamental principle. In the end the persistent officer was converted to Christianity, and the W.C.T.U. remained Christian.

"Another of my friends," Hitotsuyanagi went on, "had a similar experience. He is a former atheist and member of a university faculty, who, upon becoming a Christian, gave up his highly honored position and all his family property in order to devote himself to evangelistic work in a country village where there was no other Christian influence. For stating his convictions against war he was imprisoned for eight months in solitary confinement except for a series of examinations, the examiners spending days at a stretch quizzing and trying to intimidate him.

"In the end, having never varied his original denunciation of war, he was unconditionally released, and almost immediately became the object of a new investigation by the same examiners, this time as earnest inquirers into the faith which had so sustained my friend throughout his long imprisonment," said Hitotsuyanagi.

Concerning himself Hitotsuyanagi said: "I feel sure that officials as well as the people in general knew I have always been opposed to war, and probably some of them feared I might have a troublesome influence upon potential soldiers. Yet I was invited to become a regular lecturer at both Tokyo and Kyoto Imperial Universities and was never dismissed or even restricted in freedom of speech, either private or public. During the war there were several instances of conversion to Christianity among my students."

No listing of the faithful remnant in Japanese Christianity would be complete without the name of Professor Tadao Yanaihara. This is a name that will surprise many non-Japanese Christians, because his witness has been obscure to most of us, but penetrating and widely influential among Japanese. I should say that he is today the most influential Christian among students and thoughtful Christian leaders in the Tokyo area. I heard from many unrelated quarters statements of high commendation of this man. One prominent layman told me that Yanaihara represented a silent protest to the opportunism and ineffectiveness of the wartime church generally. "His letters and meetings were far more influential than the church," this man said to me. "One of the bravest and finest Christians in the land," another Japanese Christian ranked Yanaihara.

Professor of colonial policy on the economics faculty of Tokyo Imperial University, Yanaihara resigned from his job nine years ago when a purge of that faculty cleared out all opposition to the militarists' policies. "My colonial policy was so fundamentally opposed to theirs that I could not continue," he explains. He retired to his home in Tokyo's southwest suburbs and "did nothing," to use his words. That "nothing" meant a great deal to the life of the Christian church in wartime Japan. He held regular meetings, two of them a week, one a worship service and Bible class on Sunday morning, the other a study of Japanese classics on Saturday afternoon. He published one book, translated two others, edited another. His personal writings appeared month after month in *Kashin* ("Glad Tidings"), his own periodical.

Yanaihara kept up a running battle with the police throughout the years. Once every two months he was required to report for examination and questioning. He was never prosecuted, although his writings were prohibited. His name could appear in no Japanese magazine, and after 1943 he was expressly forbidden to write at all. His own *Kashin* was refused a license, and he was told to discontinue it. But he did not; he printed twelve hundred copies a month and distributed it through the mails. "It was dangerous," he admitted, "but your own William Lloyd Garrison and Elijah Lovejoy were inspirations to me, and I went ahead."

His Sunday meetings averaged some forty people in attendance; they sat on the floor and packed the tiny house to the doors and windows. He taught them straight biblical Christianity with an accent on the prophets: "I wanted Christians to develop a sense of judgment on their own culture, a critical approach to life, a profound religious conviction that would have results in the day-to-day politics of men's lives."

Yanaihara is an ascetic-looking individual, tall for a Japanese, fifty-three years of age. He minces no words in his criticism of Japanese wartime policy and is equally penetrating in his criticism of the present occupation. We discussed at length the absence of strong Christian resistance to the war in Japan.

"Why was it?" I asked him.

"One reason was the missionaries," he replied. "They came into a strange culture and had to make their message winsome and attractive. Etiquette demanded that they not be too outspoken in criticizing life around them. The result was that they produced a church which never offended anything or anybody.

It was too genteel, too gracious, too amiable, too susceptible to flattery. It had no backbone. It was never the church militant, and it should have been. Also the missionaries tended to emphasize quantity over quality, and numbers are always a handicap in focusing to a sharp point of criticism against the general social scene. The Japanese church," he continued, "has emphasized the social gospel to the virtual exclusion of dogmatics and the Bible. I consider this fact as significant as any in producing a church that was nonprophetic in the war years here. There was never enough Bible study in our church, never enough prophecy."

Yanaihara's church, the so-called Nonchurch, grew up in the Meiji era around the forceful personality of a worthy scholar named Kanzo Uchimura. It appealed to students and scholars, did not emphasize Christian rituals or practices, held no common worship, but its members accepted the philosophy of Christianity and the person of Jesus. It has been an extremely influential witness in Japan since the days of Meiji. From its numbers have come Yanaihara, Toraji Tsukamoto, Tamon Maeda, Shigeru Nambara, and others. Tsukamoto was a government official twenty years ago in the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, but gave up his promising future in order to devote himself to Christian service, has carried on through the last score of years as leader of a group of intellectuals studying Christianity. His group met regularly throughout the war, encountered some hostility from the police, but is today a large and influential Sunday meeting of Christians. Maeda was the minister of education in the Shidehara cabinet from autumn of 1945 to January, 1946. Nambara is the newly chosen president of Tokyo Imperial University, the highest school position in the country.

Kotaro Tanaka, professor of commercial law and jurisprudence at Tokyo Imperial University, chief of the school bureau of the Ministry of Education in the early months of the Allied occupation and now its minister, is another of the influential Christians of Japan. He is a parish member of the Catholic cathedral of

Seikiguchi, Tokyo, and since its destruction has worshiped in a small chapel near his home. Tanaka has been a central figure in the strong liberal group of faculty members at Tokyo Imperial University. For over ten years they have resisted every effort of the government to suppress their thinking and teaching and to militarize the educational administration and instruction at the university. Tanaka is a liberal in educational theory, has always regretted the stern formality of Japanese education, and is now giving himself to efforts to liberalize the curriculum of Japanese schools and democratize the student life.

Miss Michi Kawai, principal of Keisen Girls' School and a faithful Christian if ever there was one, enlarged upon this thesis of Tanaka. She holds that Christian schools in the future must do more than hire good faculties and employ the best equipment and make curricular improvements. "Christian schools should have a really evangelistic passion," she said. "They should not only call themselves Christian institutions and have a passing interest in the faith. They should *make* Christians." Miss Kawai envisages great Christian universities in Japan as well as competent Christian scholars and teachers in all universities. Miss Kawai is daughter of a priest at the shrine of Ise, Shinto's holy of holies. Her conversion to Christianity separated herself from parents, friends, and inheritance. She is a Presbyterian by denomination, is sixty-eight years old, was a Y.W.C.A. secretary until 1926, and is now the vivacious, though aging, principal of Keisen ("Blessed Fountain") Girls' School in suburban Tokyo.

Ken Ishihara, another of the list of the faithful Christian remnant, used the war years to strengthen the spiritual life and independence of his school, the largest and most influential women's college in Japan, Tokyo Joshidai. Not a minute of Christian worship was discontinued at Joshidai. Bible study went on as usual. And enrollments went up from 450 to 650 students.

There were other Japanese Christians who showed leadership during the war years and are today frequently mentioned as proved and tested in the faith. One was the Rev. Yozo Nihei, a Congregational pastor without a church. He held Bible classes in a middle school in Tokyo where he rented a room. During the war he published a magazine called *Shukyo* ("Religion"), which was thoughtful and provocative and eagerly awaited by its readers. He gradually ran into police opposition which suppressed his activities and his writings, but his name is remembered today for strong and prophetic leadership during the war years.

A word should be written in this context about the Y.M.C.A. and its general secretary Soichi Saito. The "Y" avoided any direct clashes with the state and slid through the war years with its program and property still in its own control. It had strong friends in high places. The significant comment on the Japanese "Y," however, came to me from Chinese Christians. The "Y" sent men of its own choosing and not under government auspices to China for work with its own men and service to those Chinese who cared to accept it. Normally such deputies in China received the cold shoulder from the Chinese. But in both Peiping and Shanghai I found the readiest acceptance on the part of Chinese Christians of the Japanese Y.M.C.A. secretaries who worked in their country. Toshio Suekane in Shanghai and Tsutae Nara in Peiping were highly regarded for their work, their sympathetic approach to China, and their unwillingness to identify their efforts with the empire-building schemes of their country. Dr. T. Z. Koo told me in Chungking in 1945, just as he was slipping out from occupied east China, that Suekane was one of the finest Japanese he had ever met.

The explanation of this strange phenomenon in Sino-Japanese relations is traceable, it seems to me, to Saito in the home office. He is a twinkling, amiable gentleman, thoroughly cosmopolitan and international. Although a layman, he is one of the acknowledged leaders of the church in Japan today. For months after the repatriation began for Japanese soldiers and civilians from overseas portions of the empire, Saito was approached again and again by the government to accept a position in relation to this gigantic movement of displaced persons, one of the most trying of Japan's postwar social problems. Saito refused all such offers in the belief that he was needed in the Y.M.C.A. to reorganize its life. Finally, the minister of health and welfare said to him: "If you will become director of our repatriation program, you can bring your entire staff with you and do the job as the Y.M.C.A." Under those terms Saito accepted the post and is today the director of repatriation in the Ministry of Health and Welfare. Meanwhile he is leading the "Y" in making one of the biggest contributions to the democratization of Japanese life and thinking of any Christian organization in Japan, holding seminars, discussion groups with people from all walks of life in villages, towns, and cities throughout the country, is promoting co-operatives, understanding between Japanese young men and Allied soldiers, and broadminded town meetings on all subjects of concern to the Japanese people today.

Any discussion of Christian leaders in Japan today should include the name of Mrs. Tamaki Uemura, who fittingly became the first Japanese Christian to re-establish firsthand relations with the rank and file of American Christians by visiting this country in 1946. Also included should be the old matriarch of democratic education in Japan, Mrs. Motoko Hani, whose Freedom School, northwest of Tokyo, is unique in Japan for its democratic student life and its schedule of manual labor for students. In addition to her school activities, Mrs. Hani has her hand in most women's activities of the country, edits the magazine *Fujino Tomo,* one of the largest circulating papers for women in the country. She also operated a small school for Chinese girls in Peiping.

I think of other small incidents of heroic standing for one's Christian loyalty. There was eighty-eight-year-old Motojiro Yamaka in Hirosaki, a member of the board of trustees of Toogijuku, voting in the minority against every effort of the leaders of that school to convert it to Shinto. There was a quiet little teacher at Kwassui Gakuin in Nagasaki. She had been trained in the tradition of that school, respected the principles upon which it had been founded, and loved the teachers who had worked there. It was this teacher who hid away the bronze bust of Miss Elizabeth Russell, founder of the college, so that it would not be taken in the government's scrap metal drive. She was fired summarily for this action. There was Miss Iwasaki at the same school, fighting to maintain Christian services on the campus against the ruling of the principal. There was Principal Hatanaka of Kobe Women's College, who kept Bible study and religious worship as compulsory features of his curriculum. There were others, all of them faithful witnesses to the Christ in whom they believed.

I do not want to ignore the sins of commission and omission which marked the church of Japan during the war years. No Japanese I met wants to do that. He is loud in his vociferations of repentance. But I do not want either to ignore the faithful remnant which kept the witness pure and gave it continuity in the stream of the ecumenical Christian tradition. Japanese Christians faced their unique spiritual problems in their own ways. Today they have a church intact, legally protected and recognized, and sufficiently powered with energy to meet the opportunities of the new day. They have that church by their own efforts, and it is my conviction that it is theirs today because God saved a few of them and a part of each of them for the tremendous tasks which lie ahead.

XI. . . . . KOREA

THAT PENINSULAR projection of the continent of Asia, stretching out into the jaws of the Japanese dragon and calling itself variously Korea, Chosen, or the Land of the Morning Calm, has from time immemorial borne a precarious relationship to its neighbors. To each of them, Russia, China, and Japan, it has proved in times past a tempting invitation to empire building.

Japan coveted the rich territories of the Chosen peninsula for its luxurious rice paddies, minerals, and strategic position in the geography of east Asia. The penetration was well on its way to success when Japan removed Chinese influence from Korea in 1895 and established herself as protectorate of the kingdom in 1904, following the successful Russo-Japanese war. The protectorate waxed more and more violent in the years after 1904, despite Japan's protestations of independence for Korea, and in 1910 the reigning family was removed and a Japanese governor-general installed. Korea was firmly planted in the Japanese sphere, and the Empire of the Rising Sun was on its way.

Korea was the practice ground of Japanese imperialism, and many policies later to be regretted found their testing there. Anti-Russianism, clever economic exploitation, racialism with a convinced belief of Japanese superiority to subjugated peoples, unbridled terror, proclamations to the world and the people at home that Japan was "protecting" Korea, bringing her prosperity, and tutoring her for independent nationhood, the concept of Greater East Asia and co-prosperity for the circle of nations clustered around Japan's sovereignty—all these aspects of imperialism were apparent from the earliest days of Japanese government in Korea and had not changed substantially when the empire began expanding in earnest in 1937.

Japan can point to many improvements her period of sovereignty brought to Korea. But whatever improvements came for the face of Korea, it was at terrific cost in the heart and soul of the people. Never was a reign of such uninhibited terror put down upon a people in modern times.

The missionary movement got under way in Korea just at the time the Hermit Kingdom was coming out of seclusion and meeting the pressures of Japanese aggrandizement. Missionaries steadfastly disavow any part in the creation of independence sentiment in Korea, but the facts are that the modernization, education, and spiritual uplift which they gave the people greatly bolstered the cries for freedom in their throats. Read any history of the Korean independence movement and you will realize that it could not have been written without Christians. They were educated, some of them abroad, they were inspired to independent conviction and moral courage, and they shot into positions of leadership in the anti-Japanese movements from 1904 on. To this day the chief figures in the Korean independence movement, the provisional government and the independence party—Dr. Syngman Rhee, Kim Koo, Kim Kiusic, and others—are Christian laymen.

This coincidence of a strong rebellious spirit in the Christian church of Korea did not go unnoticed by the Japanese, and from the earliest days the fight was on between the Christian movement and the Japanese police. It is a bloody, gruesome history and not to be recounted here, save to make the point that the Christian church was one of the chief objects of attention of the punitive arm of the Japanese government in Korea from an early day.

In all this persecution of Christians the Christians of Japan were not immediately involved. It was a struggle between the Korean church and the Japanese gestapo. There is very little record—I know of only unconfirmed rumors—to show that the Japanese church made itself an ally of the police in trying to bring Korean Christians into line with the Japanese policies for that country. Japanese-Korean Christian relations were surprisingly few. The church in Korea was independent, affiliated on its own with all the major international committees and organizations of the Christian movement, and did not turn toward Japan for leadership, nor did the Japanese church attempt to force its leadership upon Christians in Korea. There were Japanese missionaries in Korea but most of them worked almost exclusively with their own nationals domiciled there. In October, 1940, an effort was made to unite the Korean Methodist Church with the Japan Methodist Church, a move calculated to save the Korean body further difficulties with the police, but the government-general vetoed the project as inimical to its authority. It wanted no interference from the homeland with its own campaign of terror against the church. The pressures to which the Korean church finally had to submit in the way of Japanization of its faith were never inspired by Japanese Christians; they went far beyond anything Japanese Christians would admit for themselves. The pressures came from purely secular, political sources within the Japanese ruling clique in Korea.

Christianity in the Japanese empire was treated in a fairly uniform way everywhere, from Korea to the islands of the sea. The pressures put upon the church followed a similar line: one, wean it away from foreign associations; two, streamline it into one unified agency for ease and speed of control; three, in utter disregard for orthodox Christian tradition, Orientalize its thinking; four, harness it as an opinion-forming agency to the instruments of Japanese propaganda; five, elevate to positions of leadership persons amenable to Japanese suggestion. These were the policies of the Japanese overlord which confronted the Korean churches with mounting insistence as Japan's star of empire waxed in the eastern skies.

Missionaries were squeezed out of positions of leadership and control, a movement disguised as the nationalization of the church. The "shrine question" was furiously debated in the nineteen-thirties, and the Christian world saw for the first time clearly revealed the essential battle of faiths which was their relationship with Japanese Shinto. The church-state battle was locked in Korea long before it appeared elsewhere in the Japanese world.

In 1938 the Korean National Christian Council was dissolved by the Japanese police, and the Korean churches were forbidden to send representatives to the International Missionary Council which met in India that year. The Japanese argued that Korean organizations had no right to use the word "national" as Korea was not a nation, and this was their legal explanation for dissolution of the independent Christian council in that country. The Korea Sunday School Association was dissolved. The Y.M.C.A. and the Y.W.C.A. were forced to cut their connections with their own international committees and affiliate themselves with the national "Y" headquarters in Tokyo.

The regulation of education by the Japanese began in 1915 when bans were published prohibiting the teaching of religion in the schools. The hold of the totalitarian state on education in Korea tightened into a vice-like grip through the years. It eventually produced such a secularization and profanation of Christian education that one mission body of Presbyterians closed its schools, and all the rest were virtually useless if not hostile to Christian influence inside their gates.

The two crowns of Christian education in Korea are the Chosen Christian College for men and Ewha College for girls, set among the pines in the hills just northwest of Seoul. Both these schools felt a gradual constricting of their religious life through the years. In 1943 Chosen Christian College was declared enemy property, its grounds were seized by the Japanese, and it reopened as the Keijo Technical Management College. The Japanese installed their own president and the school was almost completely changed, with only a few of the same teachers and students as before. Large sections of the beautiful campus were removed from the college's title and used by the army. When I visited the campus in February, 1946, it was still laced with trenches and mines, and ammunition dump areas were patrolled by American soldiers. During the latter years of the war some of the Chosen buildings were used for soldiers' barracks. The experience of Dr. Yu Uck-kyum, now the director of education in the government, is typical of what life was like for a Christian professor at Chosen Christian College. Dr. Yu is a strong internationalist, was trained at Tokyo Imperial University in the liberal tradition, has been active in the Institute of Pacific Relations and the international Y.M.C.A. He taught law at Chosen Christian College from 1923 to 1938, and in the latter year was imprisoned until 1940. He went back to the school in 1942 but remained only a year, then was expelled again. He returned to the campus in September, 1945, and was elected president.

The story at Ewha is much the same. I sat with the radiant, energetic Miss Helen Kim, president of the college, in the fine, stone Pfeiffer Hall overlooking the campus. She replied to my questions honestly: "I had to give in. Everything was regulated to the last dot of an 'i.' I put up a fight but they were all losing battles."

The Japanese had their own way with educational institutions. The Japanese language was standard, Korean forbidden. All books of a liberal nature were removed from the library and stored away, along with all books in English. Japanese books took their places. A chapel was not permitted, but an auditorium was used for religious purposes now and then. Religious services were prohibited. Portraits of American benefactors were removed from the walls, and in the spring of 1945 three buildings at Ewha were confiscated by the Japanese army for billeting troops en route to the last Manchurian redoubt. Ewha is now making forward strides to compensate for the restrictions of earlier years. A normal enrollment of 400 girls has shot up to 850. A six-year medical course has been started, with ninety girls enrolled, eighty-seven in pharmacy.

Middle schools had an even more stringent control of their curriculum and life. I visited the Methodist boys' school in Songdo and found that it had the customary taint of pro-Japanism. Its principal, who had appeased the Japanese consistently, had resigned. The school had a small shrine in one of its buildings, no Christian symbols anywhere on the campus, no chapel, and after 1938 no religious instruction or worship. Songdo had two Japanese military officers in prominent positions on the faculty during the war. Drill was compulsory and graduates were conscripted.

Christian seminaries went out of existence in the campaign to reform Christianity and cut it off from its traditions. The Methodist bishop himself closed that church's seminary in 1940, and President Fritz Hongkew Pyen was jailed and tortured for 105 days. A reformed seminary was opened later on other premises (the original property was seized by the Japanese army and used for troops) with the Rev. Kim In-young in charge. It had military training, no study of the Old Testament and only the four gospels of the New (even the gospels were expurgated), and courses on Shinto and Japanese traditions.

The Japanese campaign of making the position of missionaries in Korea untenable had reached such a stage in 1940 that their presence in the country was so embarrassing to their own work that they began evacuations. Bishop Abe of the Japanese Methodist Church visited Seoul in September, 1940, and with sadness in his heart advised the missionaries to go home. Within two months most of them were on their way.

Simultaneously the Japanese unleashed a wave of terror on the Christian church in the hope that it would confuse and break the back of Christian resistance to their imperialistic plans for the country. They fell back on their accustomed devices of imprisonment and torture. On September 20, 1940, began the roundup of some three hundred preachers and lay leaders of all denominations. They were imprisoned, cruelly mistreated, and many of them died in jail or of illnesses contracted during their incarceration. One was the Rev. Kang Chang-keun, who died in jail in 1941 of beatings. His crime was that he had been reared by an American missionary.

This roundup of resisters was projected by the Japanese for two purposes: thoroughly to frighten the church and to clear the way for a new leadership more co-operative with the Japanese. Both purposes were achieved. The church recoiled in fear, was confused, and temporarily stunned. Its missionary leadership was throttled, its own leaders imprisoned, and into the gap rushed a well-prepared program of reform.

There is no better description of this new Christianity for Korea, revealing its childishness, the extremes to which it went, its thoroughgoing apostasy, and its utter obeisance to the reigning Japanese ideology, than to quote from the document of reform adopted by the Korean Methodist Church on October 2, 1940:

Reform Plan for the Korean Methodist Church

It is both urgent and proper that we Christians should bring to reality the true spirit of our national polity and the underlying principle of Naisen Ittai (Japan Proper and Korea form one body), perform adequately our duties as a people behind the gun, and conform to the new order. Therefore, we, the General Board of the Korean Methodist Church, hereby take the lead in deciding upon and putting into effect the following:

I. *Right Guidance of Thoughts*

1. To make the principle of "Construction of New Eastern Asia" and "Naisen Ittai" (Japan Proper and Korea form one body) thoroughly understood.
2. To make it thoroughly understood that Christ's teaching the brotherhood of man is realized in "Hakko Ichiu" (Jimmu Tenno's "Universal Family").

3. To make it thoroughly understood that the spirit of loyalty and patriotism is one with Christ's principle of self-sacrifice.
4. To disallow the idea that the people are sovereign, which is contrary to the polity of the Empire.
5. To oppose individualism that has degenerated into selfishness.
6. To oppose liberalism which has degenerated into a devouring of the weak by the strong.
7. To extirpate cruel and irreligious communism.

II. *Educational Reform*

1. National polity shall be taught in (a) theological seminary, (b) colleges and professional schools, (c) middle and primary schools through the morals course.
2. Military training shall be given in (a) theological seminary, (b) colleges and professional schools, (c) new emphasis upon it as already given in middle schools.
3. Theological training: To make the gospel (Christ's teaching and example) the basic substance of theological education; to dissociate Jewish history and the pagan thoughts and usages that have crept in on the path of western cultural progress; and to make clear exposition of the gospel by the use of philosophies and traditions of Oriental saints. . . .

IV. *Support of the Army*

1. Church members should be encouraged to enlist as volunteers in larger numbers.
2. To make church members understand the meaning of military duties.
3. Church members should do their utmost to prevent espionage.

V. *Unified Control of Organizations*

1. The Korean Methodist Church and the Japan Methodist Church shall bring to reality their union.
2. The evangelistic work of the Korean Methodist Church, men's and women's, and all institutions that are connected with the Methodist Church (U. S.) shall plan to be financially independent.

3. Foreigners shall be caused to avoid positions of leadership or representation in churches and institutions.
4. The Methodist Theological Seminary shall be entirely made over.
5. The Central Council, which is organized with the Methodist missions, shall be dissolved (but a committee of five, of whom one shall be the bishop, shall be chosen to contact the missionary group).
6. In order to put into effect the above articles an executive secretariat of appropriate size shall be appointed by the bishop.

This plan was pushed through because of the weakened resistance of anti-Japanese church leaders, the temporary confusion in the ranks of the faithful, and the new prominence of such figures as Bishop Chung Choon-soo and Dr. Hugh Cynn, through whom the Japanese police were able to work their wishes without hesitation. The whole weight of the Japanese gestapo, judiciary, and military was behind this reform program, of course.

The chronology of this program of corrupting the Korean Methodist Church is worth studying. Bear in mind that throughout the whole reform campaign of five long years the rank and file of Korean Methodists held out against the leadership. It was not the case of a defecting church, but simply of defecting leaders, because the church never went along with the reforms but was powerless to stem the pro-Japanese tide.

By early 1941 the confusion in the ranks of faithful Korean Christians had begun to clear and resistance to Bishop Chung and Cynn was rising. The bishop summoned an extraordinary session of the Methodist general conference to affix its approval to further reforms of the church's life and discipline. At this session Dr. J. S. Ryang, Bishop Chung's predecessor as general Methodist superintendent in Korea and a determined opponent of his reforms, along with several others, launched a protest against the legality of the conference. Their protest carried the day and the session adjourned without doing any business.

A month later, March, 1941, the extraordinary session met in

Seoul with the Japanese chief of police and public prosecutor sitting beside Bishop Chung on the platform, and dozens of agents in the audience. The same prosecutor is now under charges as a war criminal. Revisions of the *Discipline* were railroaded through the conference. "Adopt the measures first, and ask your questions later," Bishop Chung ordered when debate threatened to wreck his plans. The Methodist annual conferences of Korea were dissolved, Bishop Chung was named "tongnicha," the Korean equivalent of the Japanese torisha, dictator of the church. The revisions served to remove all traditional marks of autonomy from the Methodist annual conferences and made Bishop Chung supreme in the general conference which he, with help from the police, could control.

The revised *Discipline* provoked a storm of protest from the church and its leading pastors. Bishop Chung asserted his authority against these recalcitrants, assigned them to impossible posts, and excommunicated them when they refused to obey his orders. Some of the leading pastors of the denomination were removed from the rolls during these months.

After the outbreak of the Pacific war Bishop Chung began to cast covetous eyes upon the mission properties attached to the church in Korea. These properties, estimated as worth twelve million yen at the time, included houses, schools, seminaries, institutions which had never been transferred in title from their owners in foreign lands to the Korean national churches. In January, 1941, Ryang had been appointed by delegates from the Methodist Board of Missions to be custodian of these Methodist properties owned by the New York board. Bishop Chung wrote Ryang a threatening letter in March, 1942, demanding the cession of these properties to him without compensation. Ryang refused. Two months later, acting under the privileges of international law, the Japanese governor-general in Korea declared all these mission-owned properties confiscated as enemy holdings.

At the same time another wave of terror broke across the church. Rumors were inspired by the Japanese that thirty thousand Korean Christians were going to be killed in an all out purge to wipe out Christian resistance once and for all. The police bureau then countered this siege of fear with a new device, the Chong Chin Hoi, or "Forward Association." Bishop Chung was named chairman, and the Rev. Chung In-kwa, a Presbyterian, vice-chairman. The object of the association was to investigate the ranks of church members for subversive thoughts and help Christians to change their attitudes and thus save themselves from destruction. The association terrified the churches and served to heighten Bishop Chung's strangle hold on the organization.

The general superintendency of the Korean Methodist Church is a post with restrictions of tenure put upon it. The bishop must be elected every four years and may not hold office for more than two quadrennia. In the fall of 1942 Bishop Chung's first term of office was completed, and a regularly scheduled general conference was due for the election of a new superintendent.

Acting in advance of this session to quell his opposition, Bishop Chung ruled that Ryang, his predecessor and now his chief opponent, could not be seated in the conference. Ryang, he argued, was disqualified because he was not an acting pastor but the head of the Christian Literature Society, a connectional job. Word of this ruling reached the church and another storm broke. In Pyengyang and Seoul the leading pastors and laymen drew up a petition of protest to the general conference and began circulating it for signatures. The lists were long. The answer to this protest came not from the bishop or church officials, but from the power behind them, the Japanese gendarmery. Two leaders in Pyengyang were arrested and three in Seoul. Their homes were searched, they were examined and tortured every day and far into the night. One was released after three months of investigation and torture. Two others were cleared in court. The other two served a year each in prison.

One of these petitioners who was jailed at this time was the Rev. Lew Hyung-ki, American-trained and for years the efficient and energetic Methodist director of religious education in Korea. His jail experience was so severe that he suffered a nervous breakdown and was out of his mind when he was released.

The petition ignored, Bishop Chung convened the regular general conference of his denomination on October 2, 1942. The first business was a bill of nonconfidence in Bishop Chung presented by the delegates. It was passed by a vote of twenty-five to nothing. A temporary chairman took the floor, but the removed bishop got word to his friends in the police headquarters, and by the next day they had him reinstated to conduct the next piece of business—adjournment.

Then began a juggling of the Methodist *Discipline* which brings a smile to the face of most Korean Christians as they recall it today. Within the next twelve months five more general conferences of the denomination were held, six in all, trying to seat a bishop. The second in order got under way in December and elected Dr. Fritz Hongkew Pyen as head of the church. Pyen was fresh from 105 days inside a Japanese jail, was the ousted president of the closed-down Methodist seminary, and his election was a clear repudiation on the part of the church of Bishop Chung and his pro-Japanese policies.

Bishop Pyen's tenure was of short duration. Foiled in their schemes to bring the Methodist Church under controllable leaders and seeking to follow the lead of the church in the homeland, the Japanese police put through a plan in April, 1943, to dissolve the Methodist and Presbyterian denominations and set up a Korean Reformed Church. The third general conference of the Methodist Church was called therefore on April 1 to vote itself out of existence, and the next day the government announced the formation of the union. The Rev. Chun Pil-soon, a Presbyterian pastor, was named head of the united church. But the plan was premature and blew up in the face of the police. The presbytery of Seoul met and declared that they had not voted for such a union and that if Chun chose to become head of such a new organization he did so of his own volition and would be removed from the presbytery. This move frightened Chun and he returned to the Presbyterian fold. Then Bishop Pyen and his followers demanded the reinstatement of the Methodist connection. The fight ended with both Chun and Pyen resigning and the Methodists again without a bishop.

The fourth general conference convened in July to fill the vacancy caused by Bishop Pyen's resignation. The police had the assembly well in hand, and the election of one of their men, a certain Kim Yung-sup, was railroaded through. It had no sooner been announced than heckling, scolding, and shouting broke out in the conference, so great that Bishop Kim was frightened and resigned on the spot.

Fifth in line came a conference in August. At this meeting the anti-Japanese forces had again rallied their strength and put through the election of the Rev. Chun Chin-kyu. Within a few days the police bureau ruled that his election was illegal, nullified, and his tenure voided.

Good Oriental compromise and political horse trading took place in the next few months. The pro-Japanese officials agreed to drop their demands for a reformed church if the opposition would drop its hostility to Chung. In October, 1943, at the sixth general conference within a year, Chung was re-elected as the police desired, and the word "reformed" was dropped from the title of the denomination. Instead, the name of the church became "The Korean Methodist Church of Japanese Christianity"!

Once back in office, Bishop Chung promptly forgot his pledge to the opposition and proceeded with a complete reformation and transformation of the church. He closed thirty-four churches in the country, ordered their congregations united with others, and started selling the buildings. The sales campaign was done under the slogan "Buy Airplanes for the Japanese Army." I was informed that Chung sold some sixty churches, parsonages, and land for 410,000 yen, only 200,000 of which ever went to the government's war chest. The Methodists are asking for an accounting of the remainder. These churches, when I visited Korea, were serving as homes, factories, shops, wineshops, restaurants, warehouses, and even prostitutes' quarters.

The final proof of Bishop Chung's apostasy came in the autumn of 1944, when he ordered the Second Methodist Church of Seoul closed (the Sangdong church) and a Shinto shrine established in the building. The building was stripped of its altar, and thousands of yen were spent in converting the interior, installing straw mats on the floor, erecting the symbols of Shinto in the sanctuary. Renamed the "Civilized Hall of the Imperial Way," it was opened with a gala program from September 26 to 29, 1944, with all the Japanese notables of the city in attendance. Bishop Chung was president of the hall. Climax of the ceremony came when Bishop Chung led the dignitaries, and those of his pastors whom he could coerce, to the Han River for the Shinto water purification ritual of misogi. (Translators generally render this word as "baptism.") The bishop threatened punishment to any pastor who refused to attend, but most of them stayed away.

The Methodists are singled out for description here because their leaders presented a sad record of defection. But this is not to say other denominations did not feel the pressures too. The Methodist connection, with its episcopal polity, was seized upon by the Japanese police for control through its top-down organizational structure. The local presbyteries of the Presbyterian Church, with a looser organization, were not so easily handled by the state.

But all Christians were subjected to cruel punishments and pressure to forsake their traditional beliefs and streamline their faith and works to the Japanese pattern. In March, 1942, a roundup of Presbyterian pastors carried many of them to jail where some died of tortures. Others were forced out of the ministry. The Rev. James K. Chung, a Presbyterian pastor, was one of the chief "reformers" in that denomination. He had spent some time in jail in 1937 and 1938 and came out with an unaccountable turnabout which led him to play into the hands of the Japanese until 1945. He tried to take over the Bible societies for the Japanese, the literature society, and incurred the hatred of his fellow pastors by reporting on them to the Japanese military intelligence.

In May, 1943, over three hundred pastors and laymen of the Holiness Church were arrested and put into prison. Two pastors died of this ordeal, two others died on the way to their homes after release. The Holiness Church was dissolved by the Japanese prosecutor-general on December 30, 1943, and its entire properties sold.

Simultaneously the Seventh Day Adventists ran into trouble. Several of their pastors died of torture in the Chong-no police station, and the church was dissolved and its properties sold in the same order of December, 1943.

Catholics report very rough times during the war, although their position vis-à-vis the Japanese was eased somewhat by the Vatican's recognition of Manchukuo and the presence of so many German and French missionaries in Korea. The leadership of the church was nationalized, Koreans replacing French. A ceremony of obeisance to Shinto symbols was required at every worship service. A five-minute bowing ceremony took place in the churchyard outside Seoul cathedral before every mass. Japanese national flags decorated all the sanctuaries; shrines were built in a few. Three or four priests were imprisoned, and all of them were watched continuously. All services had to be reported, even the smallest. In small places the gendarmery forced the people to work all day on Sundays, and services were dropped and churches abandoned as time went on. Some churches were occupied as soldiers' barracks. Some priests were forced to preach in Japanese, whether or not the people understood, and hymns were sung in the Japanese language. Many Korean priests gave up wearing their garb on the streets because suspicion of them was so intense. Altars and sanctuaries were stripped of their precious things, particularly metals. No doctrine could be taught in schools. The mass could never be sung on a school campus. Catholic children in public schools were forced to give up church attendance on penalty of being removed from the rolls. Shinto doctrines and observances were required in the school curricula. On certain days all school children had to attend the shrines. In every school the imperial rescript on education was enshrined and children had to bow before it in passing. Catholicism did not grow in Korea during the war. Baptisms fell off. Two of the three seminaries were closed. One big grammar school in Changyun was taken over by the government and made into a public school.

Protestant leaders told the same story of the wartime difficulties under which they met and carried on their activities. In Seoul church services were cut down to one a week. Passages in the Bible were rubbed out which referred to Jesus as king, and hymnbooks were marked up with huge red crosses through passages which sang of "lord of lords" and "king of kings." Innocent remarks from pulpits were misconstrued by the police, and preachers summarily punished. One girl secretary in the Y.W.C.A. was taken in for police questioning because she dated a report according to the Christian calendar instead of the Showa calendar. She was charged with being Occidentalized and not a true Japanese-Korean.

An interesting document crossed my desk one day in Seoul which had reached a United States Army chaplain from the leaders of a sect called the Presbyterian Church of Zion. This extremely pietistic, premillenarian sect (like some of its counterparts in Japan) put up one of the strongest shows of resistance to the Japanese in all Korea. Its pastors prayed publicly for an Allied victory, burnt Japanese flags and every Shinto symbol they could lay their hands on, closed churches and excommunicated members and pastors who had traffic with the Japanese, gloried in deaths as martyrs, took their sons out of schools rather than have them receive "a Babylonian education." For all this they were persecuted by the Japanese and removed from all Presbyterian connections in Korea. At least three were killed.

All Korean families, Christians particularly, were required to set up godshelves in their homes and institutions. There was one even in the headquarters of the United Church. In taking the census the Japanese carefully inquired as to every family's religious connection. I was told this was most unusual in the Orient and was for the sole purpose of ferreting out Christians in the population.

The seizing of church and mission properties by the state resulted in the stoppage of numerous pieces of Christian work. A busy Methodist social welfare center in downtown Seoul became the police headquarters for the city and was still, in 1946, not returned to its original uses. Removal of schools from mission ownership resulted in a unique situation in Korea, where many formerly Christian schools are today owned by individuals who bought them. Some of these new owners treat their schools as Christian institutions of which they are the patrons; others are lost to the Christian cause and are simply private institutions run for profit.

Korea is a somewhat unique mission field in that it has been organized on a comity plan among the major denominations from abroad, and there are really only two major Protestant churches in the field, Presbyterian and Methodist. The 1937 statistics of church membership are revealing: 109,963 Roman Catholics and 120 missionaries; 281,939 Presbyterians and 140 missionaries; 54,654 Methodists and 67 missionaries; 10,445 Holiness adherents with most of their missionaries removed in 1937; 8,688 Episcopalians and 27 missionaries; 6,387 soldiers of the Salvation Army and 19 missionaries; 5,096 Seventh Day Adventists and 9 missionaries.

Japanese official policy in the homeland, Korea, China, and the Philippines was directed toward amalgamating these denominations into one streamlined organization. I have described the way this union was consummated in Japan. It was slower in coming in Korea, and was largely a Presbyterian-Methodist affair.

On June 25, 1945, Vice-Governor General Endo invited fifty-five of the leading Korean Christians to the government headquarters and "suggested" the formation of a united Protestant church. Conferences had preceded the meeting, and one after another the delegates rose to second the vice-governor general's suggestion. The meeting voted to proceed with union without delay. Within the next three days a committee of twenty, including two civil servants from the government-general's Bureau of Education, drew up the constitution of the new church.

On July 19 and 20, 1945, a constitutional assembly of the unified church met in the Chongdong Church, Seoul. Present were twenty-seven Presbyterian delegates, twenty-one Methodists, six from the Salvation Army, and one each from five small bodies—fifty-nine in all. Many Japanese officials were present to congratulate the new body upon its formation. The regulations of the united Korean Christian Church were read at this meeting and adopted. Then the heads of the Presbyterian and Methodist churches and the Salvation Army formally announced their resignations and the dissolution of their denominations. An election was called for the chief executive officers of the church. The delegates were polled, the ballots sealed by representatives of the Bureau of Education, removed and counted, and a government official returned to announce the results. The Rev. Kim Kwan-sik, a Presbyterian, was elected tongnicha, and the Rev. Kim Eung-tai, a Methodist, vice-tongnicha. Kim told me that he personally suspected fraudulent counting of the ballots because he was convinced he did not have a majority of the votes cast. But he accepted the post upon assurances that the whole Bible would be accepted as canonical, shrine attendance would not be made compulsory upon Christians, and Sunday schools could be reopened. The government said, "Go ahead." American landings were imminent at the time, and the Japanese were shifting their policy at the last minute in an effort to woo the Christians. The government realized that after thirty-five years of persecution the Christians were a potential fifth column in Korea and would most certainly aid the Americans in a landing. An entirely new attitude was apparent at this season. The government-general seemed willing to concede some of the points upon which it had been most insistent in times past and made a show of democracy and noncoercion. Kim was immediately sent out to travel through the churches, and on August 1, 1945, the united church was declared to be in operation. Kim told me that he was informed and himself convinced that the united church was the Christians' last chance in Korea. If it had failed the most bloody of purges would have followed and the Japanese would have squelched their fifth column by the sword.

The united church lasted exactly fourteen days. After the day of Japan's surrender it ceased to function. All over the country churches and leaders expressed their nonconfidence in the Japanese union and refused to co-operate with it. The executives in Seoul discontinued operations. It was not until October 20, however, that the formal dissolution of the church was accomplished. On that day a meeting was called. Northern Korean Christians from above the 38th parallel could not attend, and only a few southerners. There was not a quorum present, and the assembly was dismissed after accomplishing only one act of business, the resignation of the directors.

Immediately a mass meeting of church leaders was called on the same day in the same place. Delegates who had refused to sit in the united church assembly crowded in for the mass meeting immediately thereafter. A committee of forty was appointed to deal with the problem of re-establishing a union of Protestants without government coercion. The Rev. Kim Yang-cho, a Presbyterian, was named chairman.

This committee drew up its plans and called a mass meeting of Christians for November 17 to greet the return of Dr. Rhee, Kim Koo, and their government which had been in exile for twenty years. It was an enthusiastic meeting, with more political than spiritual fervor. The following day the Christians again assembled and a motion to form a united church was received. There was debate. Certain members declared that the meeting was not delegated for such a decision, that union should be approached through the constituent denominations and a constitutional convention duly empowered. But unification was in the air. Great political stress had been laid upon the idea in the preceding day's meeting. The temper of the group was to go ahead. The opposition was voted down, a union declared, and Kim Kwan-sik was again elected its head.

Kim admitted to me that it might have been more fair to constitute a new union through more orderly channels, but at the time the sentiment seemed to be fairly representative and almost a popular acclamation. Kim maintains that there is a united church in Korea, popularly chosen, with officers and a program.

In point of fact, the situation is somewhat different. The enthusiasm of November 18 cooled quickly, and the denominations began to find themselves. Presbyterians in southern Korea reformed themselves into seven presbyteries; thirteen in the north. Methodists legally constituted their three original annual conferences which had been wiped out by Bishop Chung in 1941. The Salvation Army has indicated that it does not intend to continue in the union.

A so-called maintaining committee of the Korean Methodist Church met in Seoul on January 25, 1946, and voted (1) to reopen its seminary; (2) to readmit into the ministry those fifty pastors who were discharged by Bishop Chung when they disagreed with him and refused to obey his orders; (3) to rehabilitate forty churches which were forced to sell out by Bishop Chung to furnish funds for airplanes; (4) to investigate Methodist properties and reincorporate their holdings around juridical persons; (5) to call a full Methodist general conference for April to launch the denomination's new program.

The onetime pro-Japanese leadership of the churches, meanwhile, has retired from public life. They cannot appear, are shouted down in public. On August 15 the Sangdong Church ceased to be the "Civilized Hall of the Imperial Way."

"What happened to the Shinto trappings?" I asked a woman who lived near the church gate.

The gist of her reply, as it was translated to me, was: "Oh, they went out of here so fast on August 15 that you couldn't see them for dust!" She laughed as she answered.

Men and companies who purchased through legitimate legal transactions the churches which Bishop Chung sold are now nervous, apprehensive, and eager to get rid of them if adjustments can be made. I visited one church which had been purchased by a speculator and rented as a school. The owner's representative on the premises assured me that services were being held again in the building at his invitation and he hoped the property would be appropriately restored before long.

The general social and political situation in Korea is not conducive to permanent re-establishment of institutions and programs at this time, although there is a will and feverish desire to do something and start moving.

The church has few resources to support its workers, and men must eat. The pastors and laymen have found ready offers of jobs with the American forces and have felt obligated to take these posts in order to earn enough to live. Christians, because of their training, integrity, knowledge of English, and general hospitality to Western and American manners, have been capturing some of the best posts in the postwar Korean government.

The capitol is jokingly referred to these days as the "Alumni Club of Chosen Christian College." Dr. Yu Uck-kyum, president of Chosen Christian College, left his job to become director of the Bureau of Education in the military government. Dr. Ku Cha-ok, general secretary of the Korean Y.M.C.A., was the first democratically elected official to take office in postwar Korea. He was chosen by a committee to become governor of Kyunggi province, the province of Seoul. Christian pastors are serving as interpreters and liaison men for the ranking generals in the United States forces in Korea. Dr. Rhee's and Kim Koo's parties have also drawn upon Christian personnel for workers. It is a great day for Christians in the politics and government of Korea.

From all sides I heard distress at the existence of the 38th parallel dividing the Russian and American zones of occupation in Korea. I crossed the parallel for one day in the Russian zone, but was unable to do more than feel a general friendliness of the people toward Americans and see the cities and villages bedecked with Soviet posters. Schools seemed to be in operation, and commercial life was going forward, even if there were no evidences of its flourishing. There are a great many more Russian troops in evidence than there are American in the southern zone.

I am not anxious to worsen Russo-American relations even more than they are by passing on stories and rumors I heard about life in the Russian zone, many of them from extremely prejudiced persons. But there are a number of evidences that the life of the churches has been made difficult by the Soviet occupation. One prominent Christian pastor who was elected to the people's committee in the north had to escape into the southern zone when his feelings against trusteeship became known to the Russians.

Catholics report the virtual paralysis of their work in the north. Maryknoll mission territory around Pyengyang is so weak that not one missionary is working there, seven stations are vacant, two hospitals have been closed, and properties pillaged and occupied.

Difficult as the situation in present-day Korea is, the church looks forward to an increase in its influence and numbers. Church attendance is currently a fad; services are packed from Sunday to Sunday. Numbering at the most 2 per cent in the total population, Christians are playing a disproportionate role in the public life of the country. When General Hodge chose twenty-eight high-ranking Koreans to serve him as an advisory cabinet to his military government, Christians quickly pointed out that ten of the number were of the Christian faith. Two of the group were named as representatives from the churches—Chaing Myun, a Catholic schoolman, and the Rev. Ham Tai-young, a Presbyterian elder statesman. The three most prominent names on the committee were Dr. Rhee, Kim Koo, and Kim Kiu-sik. All three are Presbyterians. Rhee was once a Y.M.C.A. secretary. Park Yun-hee, representing the Nationalist party, was once a Presbyterian pastor. Mrs. Kim Sun, of the Women's Nationalist Party, is a Methodist Bible woman. Miss Whang Hyung-shu, of the Women's Nationalist Party, is a Presbyterian. Pack Ham-hun, of the Democratic party, was once a "Y" secretary in Tokyo, and Yi Eui-sik, of the Democratic party, is an elder of the Myodon Presbyterian Church in Seoul.

Missionaries are gradually returning to Korea. Many of the earliest arrivals with the American occupation were missionaries on loan to the military government and are working in relief, public welfare, interpreting, the Department of State, agriculture, hospitals, public health and leper asylums, the writing of reports and investigations, and actual public administration itself. Major General Archer L. Lerch, United States military governor, told me that he was prepared to adapt the services of from 150 to 200 missionaries to his administration of southern Korea.

The church's institutions are pitifully run down and dilapidated, and millions of yen will be required to set them in order. But I nowhere talked to anyone who was not full of eagerness and hope concerning the future. Korea's big day has come. For thirty-five years she has looked forward to shaking off the shackles of Japan. She is not to be blamed if for the moment she is a bit hysterical and lost in a tempest of political voices. She accepts the presence of the Americans as a necessary step for the time being. But independence is still her goal. I saw solemn documents written in blood and signed by Christian congregations from at least two south Korean villages pledged to the removal of trusteeship. One pastor, I was informed, was jailed by the American military police for illegal possession of firearms. Christians have been brought up on the dream of freedom for their country, and they will not forsake that dream just because the Americans are now in the country as trustees.

The Land of the Morning Calm is now a land of noonday bustle and activity. But discipline will return, institutions will be re-equipped, organizations will stabilize themselves, and the Christian church of Korea, on a foundation of faith born in struggle and martyrdom, promises to become one of the most energetic, growing, and socially influential communities of Christians anywhere in the world.

XII CHINA

THE MOST welcome discovery one can make in those areas of China recently liberated from the yoke of Japanese aggression is the fact that "collaboration" is not an issue. It is refreshing for one who has lived a half year in an atmosphere of recrimination in the postwar Japanese, Korean, and Philippine churches to find that the taint of having co-operated with the enemy is almost entirely lacking when he comes to the Christian church in China.

The fidelity of Chinese Christians is a product of three traits in their character: one, an appreciation of true Christianity, its universality, and a refusal to yield matters of faith to the state; two, a canny political astuteness which kept these people loyal to the Chinese Republic and Chiang Kai-shek through all the vicissitudes of eight years of enemy occupation; and three, an immutability toward the Japanese which was at once racial, smug, superior, and deep-seated. The Chinese have a strain in their character that would prohibit their ever learning anything from the Japanese.

The problems which confronted the Christians of occupied China, those areas of the country which were part of the Japanese empire, were not so much ideological as physical. They were problems of hunger, poverty, plunder, destruction of property, separation from fellow Chinese and fellow Christians elsewhere in the world. These were the crosses which the church of eastern China had to bear for eight long years while the Japanese made themselves at home in their land and institutions.

The way in which Chinese Christians bore these crosses, deepened their spiritual life as their homes, churches, hospitals, and schools disappeared, learned the lessons of self-support and administration of their own affairs, and refused to swallow any of Japan's described statism may someday be written in the history books as the farthest advance toward maturity ever accomplished in the experience of the Chinese church.

Such writing will depend upon what happens now. If China's unsettled national life robs the people of opportunity to grow in a stable environment, if the wrecked economy refuses to yield to doctoring and continues to make the people's livelihood a virtual impossibility, if corruption and international meddling bring grave injustice into the politics of China, then the Christians of China may be seized by such a disillusionment and despair that time for them will be turned back and their hard-won gains of the war years nullified. Christians stood up to the testing against the Japanese occupation. Today they are tired and ready to relax. The testing of the "peace" years may prove too much for them.

A secretary of the National Christian Council in Shanghai told me: "The one thing we discover about downriver Christians is that they are tired out. We must not count on a quick recovery of all phases of our work. It is natural that there should be something less than the enterprise and initiative necessary for new adventures. Everyone longs for enough leisure to think and plan but is preoccupied with the pressing problems of every day." He told me that in council sessions it is impossible to launch long-range plans for the future in anything more detailed than generalities because the people are too tired to project their imaginations forward.

This weariness and disillusionment has been produced the hard way. No other people on the face of the globe stood up to such a long ordeal of fire and sword as the people of China. Japanese aggression upon China went through two clear-cut phases. The first was a repetition of Korean policies, rule by the sword, terror, and all out military aggression, replete with blood and fire. The second dates from shortly before the outbreak of the war against the West and was a phase of co-prosperity, wooing the Chinese into solidarity with the Japanese campaign for swinging the Orient into its orbit, a phase of the politicians rather than the militarists.

The Christian church found itself unable to co-operate with either of these two policies of Japan toward China and resisted them both. In the first phase the Japanese military opposed the church for its proforeignism, pronationalism, and its Christian name. The army transferred its suspicion of Christianity from Japan to China and took savage delight in destroying it. These were the days of bombs upon Christian institutions, bayonets in the hearts of pastors, firing of churches, humiliations of missionaries, and seizure of their properties.

In the second phase the Japanese tried their best to woo the Christians away from dependence upon the United States and Britain, to grant them a semblance of autonomy, to use their resources for spreading the ideas of Oriental co-prosperity.

Through all this the Christians went their own way, standing up to martyrdom without flinching, adroitly turning back the friendly approaches, and maintaining as much of their life as they could.

The most obvious result of the Japanese occupation of eastern China, apparent on the surface, is the widespread destruction and damage of the church's physical properties. This destruction dates to three periods of the war. The first occurred in the coastal fringes of China, notably the Shanghai area, in the months of the autumn of 1937, when Japan's armies clashed with those of Generalissimo Chiang in all out, large-scale warfare. The second dates to December, 1941, when neutral American and British properties were seized by the Japanese and turned to their uses. The third wave of destruction came in the closing months of the war, chiefly in the Hunan-Hupeh regions, when the armies again clashed and leveled the earth before them and behind.

The Southern Presbyterians' field in the provinces of Chekiang, Kiangsu, and Anhwei lost 20 per cent of its village churches, mostly in the battles of 1937. Kiangyin, a town on the lower Yangtze, is a sample. Here the marauding Japanese armies burned twenty-two of twenty-five buildings attached to the station, including a hospital, schools, homes, and churches.

The concession areas of Shanghai bear few of the visible scars of war. The outlying districts, however, have still not been rebuilt since the battles of 1937-38. Many churches lie in these ashes. On the campus of Mary Farnham School for Girls a women's seminary building is gone and four residences. The bannister in the main college building is scarred and whittled by Japanese bayonets, a memorial to the use of the campus by the Japanese and their puppets.

The story of the University of Shanghai is typical of the wear and tear which depreciated mission properties in the eight years of Japanese sovereignty in eastern China. The university lies outside the city proper and was in the direct line of march of the Japanese troops as they stormed down upon Shanghai from the north. The students evacuated in 1937 and never returned to their campus until the middle of 1946. Since it was an American school, the Japanese passed it by until Pearl Harbor, and then entered and made themselves at home. They made a bathhouse out of a dining room, a stable out of a recitation hall, tore out the walls of the lower floors of the middle school building to make a garage, converted the men's gymnasium into a shop, and built toilets everywhere. The campus lost all its trees, which were transplanted to a nearby park, and was cut up with trenches and dugouts. Cornerstones of buildings were chiseled away and cemented over to remove all traces of the original purpose of the school. The premises seemed to have been used as a billeting area for troops, a kind of training school, and, after Japan's surrender, as a camp for Korean soldiers fighting alongside the Chinese. The latter contributed more than their share to the general clutter and destruction of the place.

Fitch Memorial Presbyterian Church in the Hongkew section of Shanghai was taken by the invading troops for a barracks throughout the first winter of the war. When the Chinese tried to recover the property for church purposes, Fitch Memorial became the leading Japanese church in Shanghai. Its members rebuilt the edifice, replaced pews, redecorated and paid rent to the Chinese church. They were still worshiping in the building in August, 1945, when the Chinese finally regained the property.

Properties owned within the foreign concessions did not fall on evil days until after Pearl Harbor removed the protections under international law. At that time the Japanese moved into the concessions and took what property they wanted or had not already been annexed. The excellent Moore Memorial Church and social center, serving two thousand people a day, beautifully appointed and equipped, was taken by the Japanese navy on December 8. It was a branch headquarters and station for the garrison which patrolled the nearby racecourse and Nanking road areas. The auditorium became a storehouse, the pews were demolished, the library sold.

McTyeire Girls' School became a hospital for wounded Japanese. The girls moved to the campus of the Anglican Cathedral School and continued their studies there. The Allen Memorial Methodist Church in Hongkew was seized by the Japanese navy and made into a memorial hall for the war dead. It was a branch of the Shinto shrine system of Japan, ashes were placed on the altar, and it became a holy place to the invading troops. The Chinese congregation protested volubly against this desecration of its sanctuary, but nothing availed and the navy refused to give it up.

Some Shanghai Christian institutions were not so much as touched by the invaders. St. John's University steered a discreet course and managed to save itself from Japanese meddling. Its president is now under indictment as a collaborator, the only Christian leader I know of in China who has the pro-Japanese taint upon him. The mission house near the bund, home of many headquarters of Christian organizations, was safely invested in the hands of a Chinese holding corporation and escaped seizure.

I visited the town of Kashing, just over the border in Chekiang province south of Shanghai, to watch the boys of the Kashing High School come home to their studies after nine years of wandering. Like many other middle schools of the occupied area, Kashing had closed its doors in the early days of the fighting. Then had begun a weary trek which took the school to seven different locations in nearly nine years, to a nearby village where the Japanese drove it out, to the international settlement in Shanghai until Pearl Harbor, to the interior of Kiangsi province for three happy years, then to two makeshift campuses in the mountains of Fukien, back to Shanghai, and eventually home again. At the last sixteen Christian high schools of occupied China were moving together on this trek.

Soochow saw most of its mission institutions occupied by the invader. The Methodist university became a Japanese military hospital, the Baptist and Presbyterian properties were also occupied. The Elizabeth Blake Mental Hospital, only one of its kind in east China, is a shambles. A famous old Christian cemetery in Soochow, last resting place of many missionaries, was desecrated, stones removed, and the ground plowed. The Blake Hospital became a prisoner billet after the surrender, and it was months before it was returned to the Southern Presbyterian mission.

Approximately a third of the Christian property in the Ningpo area of Chekiang is destroyed. In western Chekiang, where the Japanese launched one of their pushes in 1942, half the Christian churches, schools, and hospitals are gone.

Up the Yangtze, properties in Nanking are fairly well preserved. The union Christian University of Nanking was taken over and became the central university of the puppet Chinese government. Professors who stayed on with the puppets have now been discharged and are discredited. The women's Ginling University became a Japanese barracks. In Wuhu the Japanese took over the big Methodist hospital commanding the bluffs of the river. It has gradually been restored and put into operation. General destruction and dilapidation mark the picture of properties in the Kiukiang-Nanchang area of Kiangsi province. The Hankow area was subjected to a strenuous bombing schedule late in the war and properties are in bad shape. The Yale-in-China buildings in Changsha are burned. Everything in Hengyang was leveled in the heroic last stand of the city in the summer of 1944. The same situation prevails in Kweilin and Liuchow.

In western Hunan and Kweichow the Evangelical mission reports that nine tenths of its property is destroyed, the result of the battles of 1944-45. In Foochow, Fukien Christian University was evacuated from its campus and everything is in disrepair. Hwa Nan College lost two buildings. Rural work in Shantung province received a setback because of the skirmishes which raged through its villages among Japanese, communists, bandits, nationalists, and puppets. Many villages were burned entirely, their churches with them. Stations in Taian were appropriated by the Japanese and are damaged.

North China did not suffer so much in the way of physical destruction, but many institutions were lost to the Christian cause in the policy of the Japanese toward decreasing its influence in the region. Schools in Tientsin, Changli, Peiping, and Manchuria were turned over to the bogus government. Hospitals were seized for civic uses and the Japanese military. Stations in Manchuria have lately been looted by the Russians and more so by the Chinese communists.

Yenching University went over to the Japanese on December 8, 1941, at half-past eight in the morning, three hours after bombs dropped on Pearl Harbor. Soldiers with fixed bayonets took positions at the gates, and a lieutenant summoned a university assembly. He announced to a thousand students and a hundred faculty members that the Japanese army was in possession. Faculty houses and dormitories were systematically searched for evidences of contact with the United States or Chungking or Yenan, and letters, books, photographs, and cameras were confiscated. Eight professors were taken immediately, and eleven students were detained in a hall of the college overnight and removed to jail the next day. The students dispersed immediately, dragging their things behind them, many of them later to escape across the border and join their refugee university in Chengtu. In the fall of 1942 the Japanese set up the North China Synthetic Research and Investigation Institute on the Yenching premises, an experimental school and laboratory for the South Manchurian Railway Company, the North China Development Corporation, and other Japanese exploiting companies in China. It moved into Peiping in the spring of 1945, and Yenching became a rest camp for wounded soldiers. They were there when the Japanese surrendered. Yenching suffered changes in its campus, dozens of small sheds were erected, and buildings were stripped of their equipment.

The Peking Union Medical College was taken over by the Japanese as a medical research institute. All the middle schools of the city, two each for the Presbyterians, Anglicans, Congregationalists, and Methodists, were turned over to the bogus municipal government, their curricula were prescribed, textbooks changed, English instruction removed, and Japanese courses set up. The two Anglican schools eventually closed in protest to the Japanese and puppet coercion. Hospitals were put under the control of the new authorities and declined in the quality of their work. The Methodist seminary became a Japanese gendarmery headquarters. Statistics for the Young Men's Christian Association of Japanese-occupied China show nine buildings destroyed, six others occupied and damaged.

All this adds up into a gigantic repair bill running into astronomical figures for the church. It is one of the biggest tasks for the church of China in the future, overcoming the eight long years of wear and tear, depreciation and destruction of the tools of the Christian enterprise.

But what of the people? What happened to them because they were Christians? Were there Christian persecutions in China as there were in Japan and Korea? The answer to this is, for the most part, "No." The people of China suffered all the tortures and anguish of life under a cruel enemy occupation. Christians took this punishment with the rest. But there is little evidence that they were singled out for particular punishment because of their faith. Even when they received particular attention from the Japanese police and military, it was more for their ties to the United States and Britain, a political factor, than for their faith.

Missionaries were repeatedly humiliated and not a few were tortured. But considering the nationality of most of these people and their well-known sympathies and hostility to Japan in China, it is a wonder that they did not receive worse treatment. The Geneva convention and Japan's fear of reciprocity in the treatment of internees probably saved these missionaries and effected their repatriation.

One of the most disgraceful humiliations of missionaries took place in Fukien province late in the war when the Japanese pushed their last drive into Foochow city. There women missionaries were seized and forced to break rocks and work on the public roads. I know of three nurses from a mission hospital in Foochow who received this treatment. The German Dominicans in Foochow protested vehemently against this outrage, and the women were taken off their road duties after the second day.

When the Japanese invaded Yenching University in December, 1941, they cracked down hard on the pocket of resistance which Yenching harbored. President J. Leighton Stuart, later to become United States ambassador to China, was himself seized in Tientsin on Pearl Harbor day and held in close confinement for the next four years. Eight professors and eleven students were arrested immediately, and others followed them to jail later. Eleven students went to a military jail in February, 1942. Some have never been heard from since. All the Yenching professors were released by June, 1942, but in a weakened, sick condition.

At the Catholic Fujen University in Peiping two officials, the school's disciplinarian and the director of studies (the latter a Dutch subject), were seized in 1939 for assisting Fujen students to escape to Free China. The disciplinarian was tortured for over a month, the Dutch priest released after a day. Many Fujen students were picked up secretly, were missed only when they did not respond to roll calls, and have never been heard from since. The worst case of Japanese persecution at Fujen came in 1944 when thirty professors, including most of the school administration, were taken and held for four months, tried, and sentenced to terms ranging up to fifteen years. Their crimes were alleged acts against the Japanese regime, membership in the Kuomintang, proforeignism. One assistant professor, Tang Pao-ju, disappeared completely. These professors were released without explanation a month before V-J Day. The Fujen middle school was closed down two months before the surrender as discipline for not having participated in pro-Japanese demonstrations and refusing to hoist the puppet flag on the campus. The Fujen library was rifled of many of its books, all of which were carefully returned after Japan's surrender by the same men who had taken them away.

Repeatedly I was told by such objective observers as Dr. T. Z. Koo, Bishop Kaung, and the Rev. Z. S. Zia, pastor of Moore Memorial Church in Shanghai, that they knew of no cases where Christians had been persecuted for the reason that they were Christians. The heavy hand of Japanese punishment fell across them only when their Christianity and their anti-Japanese politics coincided.

The one striking example of Japanese religious persecution in China during their occupation befell the large Jewish community in Shanghai. At the time of the first Japanese Nuremberg decrees in February, 1943, there were sixteen thousand Jews in Shanghai, the majority of them recent arrivals and refugees from Hitler's wrath in central Europe. Despite their German or Chinese citizenship or stateless (and therefore neutral) relationship to nations, these Jews were brought under stringent regulation in Japanese-occupied Shanghai. They were segregated into a restricted ghetto with barriers in the streets through which they might not pass, they wore armbands, were subjected to curfew laws at night, were publicly beaten, humiliated and forced to stand bareheaded for hours in the hot sun, and were almost entirely deprived of their economic pursuits in the city. They had absolutely no legal protection. In fact, the Japanese were incited to bold action against them by the German diplomats. They had no voice in the courts or possible protest against the discriminations put upon their community. Their position has not noticeably improved today.

As in Korea and the Philippines, the Japanese had elaborate plans for making use of the Chinese Christian church. In the years after the formation of the Nanking puppet regime and the pretense of self-government for China began, the Japanese took a peculiarly friendly attitude toward the church. They sent emissaries to it, set up buffer authorities to arbitrate between the church and the occupation army, and made a pretense of offering the most complete freedom to Christians. Behind all this, however, was a determined Japanese policy of weaning Chinese Christians away from friendship toward Chungking, the United States, and Britain, nationalizing and unifying the churches, and using them for disseminating ideas dear to the heart of Japanese propagandists. It was in their refusal to go along with these policies that Chinese Christians made their best show of resistance to the invader.

In the first months after Pearl Harbor all Christian preachers had to submit their sermon outlines to the Japanese gendarmery for approval before preaching.

On one occasion Bishop Kaung was approached by the Rev. Michio Kozaki, a Japanese visitor in China at the time and today the head of the United Church of Christ in Japan, to join him in sponsoring a Greater East Asia united revivalist campaign. Bishop Kaung refused.

The Hsin Min Hui, a pro-Japanese party of Chinese puppets, tried to woo the North China Church Federation with gifts of money, but they were all refused. After the war the Japanese community of Peiping did raise five million dollars in Federal Reserve Bank notes (FRB, the Peiping currency, is of slight value) as indemnity and "apology money" and gave it to Yenching University. Yenching also collected twenty million from the Japanese army for use of its buildings.

The Japanese insisted upon drumming their language into the school children of China and put through a requirement for examinations in the Japanese language as prerequisite to college entrance. Christian schools had to meet this requirement with the rest. But it was easily circumvented. "We gave the tests," the president of Fujen University told me, "but even if a student got a zero marking we admitted him."

The first of the Japanese delegates to the Christian churches of China was Bishop Yoshimune Abe, who arrived on January 1, 1942. Well known in America, onetime school president, and bishop of the Japanese Church, Abe is the subject of heated debate today in China, Japan, and the United States. He is devout, modest, and friendly as a person, and through the years has been the American Methodist Church's chief adviser on policies to follow vis-à-vis the Japanese nationalist state. He has been devoted throughout his lifetime to cordial

American-Japanese relations and was in this country a few months before Pearl Harbor.

There is no doubt in my mind that Bishop Abe went from Japan to China in the hope that his mission would strengthen the relationship of Christians in the two countries. Such a mission would have been in keeping with his desire for Christian fellowship across international boundaries, with his career as a "middleman," and I believe he was sincere. But as Bishop Kaung sagely observed: "All Japanese in China were sent here. There was Japanese national purpose in their coming. True missionaries come objectively for the betterment of the people and for the satisfaction of their own internal missionary drive. These Japanese missionaries came in their national interest. Their basic wrong assumption was never questioned, that Japan had an invader's right in China. Many of them were friendly. Many of them helped us a great deal. Several interpreted their national interest in China as the opposite of the militarists' interpretation. But their nation's interest was strong in all of them."

Bishop Abe says that he was invited to China. I found no one in Shanghai who remembered this invitation. Certainly it was not given by the recognized officials of the churches, and if it was a fact it was never voluntarily offered. Bishop Kaung told me of Abe's mission to North China: "I was told to 'invite' Dr. Abe so that he could visit us and let us know what the Japanese wanted us to do. I sent him a wire. It said, 'Welcome to north China'!"

Around Shanghai, Bishop Abe's first task was in relationship to the unification of the churches. The initiative for this movement did not come from him. It came from the Japanese special service corps, a branch of the secret service, a semimilitary outfit, with responsibility for checking, controlling, investigating, and changing public opinions and attitudes. It was this corps which began coercing Chinese Christians to unite. Bishop Abe was close enough to Chinese Christians to realize that this coercion was bound to fail, and he did persuade the special service corps to remove its pressures and leave the matter of handling the churches to him. The Japanese military agreed to this. Bishop Abe then called a series of committee meetings, banquets, and joint Sino-Japanese affairs, in the course of which he politely suggested the formation of a church federation. The Chinese actually already had a similar organization and agreed to Abe's proposals. But it was a lukewarm agreement, Chinese were slow to attend its meetings, and Bishop Abe himself never appeared. He scrupulously took a back seat in the affairs of this federation, and toward the end of the war was even more cordial than before to the Chinese.

The Japanese got around to the matter of the Christian churches in north China early in 1942 and again used Bishop Abe as their agent. As part of their policy of nationalizing the church and ridding it of ties to foreign countries, the Japanese military intelligence officer of Peiping called all Christian executives to the Grand Hotel de Pekin on March 14, 1942. Missionaries were also present. The officer presented the missionaries with papers already drawn up transferring the title of properties to the Chinese unconditionally and without recompense. The missionaries responded that they had no power to sign. "Whether or not you have the power, you will sign," they were told. They did, and the officer put his seal to the document as witness.

This achievement was a great victory in the eyes of the Japanese. Actually it was no more than what the Christians were ready to do and had already agreed to. When military parties raided Christian properties thereafter, it was always a convenience to have a clear Chinese title to the properties recorded with and witnessed by the occupying forces. The Japanese realized their mistake about a year later and changed their policy completely. They ordered all mission properties seized as enemy holdings and transferred to the puppet Chinese Enemy Properties

Commission. This puppet organization then passed the properties on to the Japanese if they required them. This was the transaction in the case of Yenching University's transfer to a research institute. In more cases than not, however, the puppet commission failed to annex the properties, because they were prevailed upon by their fellow Chinese not to do it, or else they were afraid of the consequences from their own countrymen if they became too unpopular.

Early in 1942 there was founded in Peiping a League for the Promotion of Church Union. It was headed by a Chinese Y.M.C.A. secretary, and everyone thinks it was a Japanese-inspired organization. Christians throughout the north knew that pressures were rising for unification of the churches on the same pattern as it had been forced elsewhere. In June Bishop Abe arrived in Peiping and advised the churches to unite. Shortly thereafter the church heads were summoned to the Japanese embassy and told to consummate a union. The constitution of the United Church of Christ in Japan was put into their hands to copy.

Bishop Kaung, who by then was the recognized elder statesman of north China Christians, said to his friends: "Let us not be led; let us do the leading." So he pointed out to the Japanese officials that they would not copy the charter of a church in another country but would write one of their own. Before the pressure was finally brought upon the churches, therefore, they presented the Japanese with a *fait accompli,* the North China Church Federation. It was its own type of organization, copied not in one item from the prescribed Japanese formula, and the Chinese Christians rallied to its support. The Japanese were dissatisfied with it but finally gave their approval, and the federation came into being on October 15, 1942. Denominations kept their separate identities and properties. Some small sects, the Holiness people, Seventh Day Adventists, Anglicans, and Roman Catholics were not involved in it. Bishop Kaung was elected its chairman. It was strictly a Chinese organization and, despite Japanese efforts to use it for propaganda purposes, it successfully resisted all such attempts. Two Japanese pastors in Peiping were nominal advisers to the federation and were friendly to it.

Creating a united church was one of Bishop Abe's commissions in China. Another of his duties had to do with church properties and serving as a middleman between the Chinese Christians and Japanese army in protecting the interests of both. He seldom scored a victory for the Chinese churches when the army or navy of his own country wanted church property. But he did speak for them. In the cases of Allen Memorial Church, McTyeire School, Moore Memorial Church, and others, Bishop Abe tried to get the Japanese armed forces to move out. But he was never successful except in the cases of some small churches. Allen, McTyeire, and Moore were necessary to the occupation and stayed securely in the invader's hands. When the navy flew its flag above the cross on the tower of Moore Memorial Church, Pastor Zia objected, and Bishop Abe was able to prevail upon the navy to take it down. That was about the extent of his visible accomplishments.

Abe moved into the Anglican Holy Trinity Cathedral in downtown Shanghai, lived in the deanery, appropriated the dean's automobile, installed a large staff, and supervised Chinese Christendom from there. I was told that Bishop Abe was always friendly, anxious for smooth and harmonious relations, but paternalistic and superior toward the Chinese withal. He said on one occasion: "I could use force if I wanted to. I have the armed might of Japan behind me. But I don't want to use it."

His critics accuse him of using his position for political privilege and financial advancement. In Japan he had been a leading figure in the formation of the United Church, was legally elected its head but declined the position. He was later president of a patriotic organization of religious groups in

Japan, but most people feel that his association with that group was impelled by his familiar desire for cordiality and good will, an accustomed impulse to "do the right thing," rather than by rabid patriotic conviction. Chinese have no specific charges against Bishop Abe. Some of them liked him. But the majority accepted him while they waited. "He did the churches very little harm," one pastor told me, "and no good." Following the surrender he moved into a squalid apartment in the Hongkew section of Shanghai, restricted for Japanese, where his wife was nursing him through a siege of pneumonia when I tried to gain an interview with him. He has since been repatriated to Japan and is recovered in health.

Chinese Christians do not want to give the impression that they feel the struggle for Sino-Japanese Christian fellowship is lost. Many of them can tell touching stories of Christian Japanese soldiers who crept into the back pews of their churches to worship, hear the scriptures, and sing familiar hymns. Many of them asked to share in Christian festivals with Chinese friends. Pastor Zia told me that he was informed by a Japanese friend of his record on the police books, a piece of information which helped him greatly in protecting himself. Bishop Kaung had almost exactly the same experience of being tipped off to danger by a friendly Japanese. Late in the war he was told by Japanese Christian friends that they had stood sponsor for him ever since 1942 when the Japanese police were ready to arrest him. They had interceded with the police and agreed to be responsible for Bishop Kaung's future conduct. Chinese Christians feel that they have no better friend in the world than little Toshio Suekane, who was a "Y" secretary in Shanghai through the war. Dr. Ronald O. Hall, Anglican bishop of Hongkong, told me that two Japanese Christians, one a schoolman from Kobe, the other a pastor, had repeatedly risked their positions and even their lives to protect the Christians of Hongkong. Dr. James

Sakamoto, a layman, was largely responsible for saving the Community Church in Shanghai as a house of worship.

Others were accepted less cordially by Chinese Christians. The Hon. Tsunesaburo Matsuyama, Christian layman and member of the Japanese Diet, visited China with Kozaki in 1942. In Peiping at that time the Japanese delegates invited the leaders of the church to a feast and asked them: "What can the church of Japan do for the church of China?"

There was an uneasy moment. Finally one of the Chinese spoke: "Work for the freedom of our country."

Matsuyama took the floor. "You must understand," he said, "that freedom comes by adapting yourselves to the plans for Oriental co-prosperity which Japan desires. What Japan is doing now is protecting her lifeline. For this she must have Korea. In order to strengthen Korea she must have Manchuria, and behind Manchuria, north China, and behind north China she must have central China."

Bishop Kaung then spoke: "All we want from you is freedom to preach the gospel. We need no financial assistance, no organizational help. We know the road ahead is not roses but thorns, but by the grace of God we are willing to travel it." This was reported back to Tokyo and entered in Bishop Kaung's record as a non-co-operator. Such incidents did not help strengthen the ties of Christian fellowship between Japan and China during the war.

Sino-Japanese Christian fellowship cannot be built on patronizing attitudes among Japanese Christians toward their Chinese brothers, nor vindictive, vengeful attitudes on the part of Chinese toward Japanese Christians. I heard Christian after Christian in Japan speak words of high respect and appreciation for Chiang Kai-shek's surrender message pledging just treatment without revenge for his country's official policy toward defeated Japan.

The Chinese church learned a great deal during the eight years of war. Suffering brought the people together and strengthened their spiritual life. The congregation became a real community of worship and fellowship. Members enjoyed meeting because the church was one place where they could feel free and get away from Japanese propaganda. "The first demonstration of self-support was won by north China churches during the war," Professor William Hung of Yenching University told me. Responsibility was on the Chinese. Christian laymen rallied to the support of their pastors cut off from mission incomes. Anxiety and sorrow in the people's hearts cried out for spiritual comfort. Everywhere I heard reported the fact that revivalism had been an important emphasis of the church's life during the war. The rise of laymen, both in free and occupied China, to positions of mature leadership in the church was everywhere gratifying. The faithfulness of small village congregations in place after place was one of the striking achievements of the war, for village churches are hard to support and many had to close.

But not all the results of the war in China were good. The destitution in the life of the church forced some pastors to leave the ministry, forced most of them to take on business pursuits outside. In the struggle for the most meager physical existence, many others forgot spiritual things. Not a word has been said in this chapter about the most important phenomenon of the war in China, the westward migration, largely because it is already a well-known fact. But the effect of this evacuation of eastern China cannot be emphasized too strongly. Families were uprooted. Large sections of the most aggressive political, intellectual, and economic populations of eastern China removed to the west. Restraints of home and family were off. A community sense was lost. Demoralization resulted.

I was told by a student Y.W.C.A. worker in Peiping, the capital of China's educational life, that she was struck by the mental and moral deadness of students in Peiping: "They have been influenced by the Japanese more than they know. They have been deadened by eight years of foreign rule, are eight years behind in a decent education. They are stunned by hunger, by the atmosphere of fear and suspicion in which they have lived."

Chinese Christians face enormous problems of relief. Yenching students, when I visited the campus, were eating bread and cabbage three meals a day. The rehabilitation of their properties is a tremendous undertaking. Many of them are still tied down in occupation by Chinese forces, although an Executive Yuan order has assured the return of every piece of church property to its rightful owner. There are problems of adjustment of the people from the west and those who stayed behind in occupied China. This problem has eased itself considerably in the church. Many organizations have already worked out personnel adjustments that are fair to both groups. But the persistent trouble remains of schools with two principals, one an evacuee, one who stayed behind, churches with two pastors, committees with two different sets of personnel.

No one in the church is yet sure what will be the Christians' relationship to the communists of China. In some quarters sharp hostility has been shown by lesser communist officials to the churches and Christians in their territories. Villages and churches have been burned. Communist troops walked off with the X-ray machine from a Christian hospital in Changli. A Catholic priest, interviewed in Nanking, reported that many village churches had been burned by the Mao Tze-tung followers. On the other hand, high-ranking communists have indicated that Christians are free to work in their territories. It is a known fact that Chou En-lai himself wrote the bishops of the Episcopal Church in China inviting them to establish missions in communist regions.

These are some of the items of unfinished business facing the church of China after eight years of war. More than any other

Oriental church, the Christians of China turned a deaf ear to the propositions of Japan. Hers is not a church with its soul eroded by Shinto. The aftermath of Japanese empire in China is a picture rather of destruction, division, poverty, and weariness. But these too are shadows left by the Empire of the Rising Sun and will not be flooded with new light in a day.

XIII..................THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

JOHNNY FUJITA, junior partner in the Japanese empire, whose story began this chronicle many pages back, was significant of Japan's whole policy toward the churches of the Philippines. On the day before Christmas, 1941, he scrambled over the side of a ship in Lingayen Gulf, in the northern Philippines, and went ashore. He was one of the members of the religious section of the propaganda corps attached to the Japanese military administration of the Philippine Islands.

That Johnny Fujita and twenty-five other Japanese Christians were in this early detachment of propagandists sent in just behind the vanguard of Japanese forces in the Philippines signified an interesting development of Japan's imperial policy. Brutality had not paid in Korea. The days of the rape of Nanking had given way to the days of Wang Ching-wei and his puppet government in China. Rule by terror had bounced back on the empire-builders of Japan in feelings of hatred and revenge among conquered people. Therefore, when the schemes for spreading the skies of the Rising Sun over the Philippines were born, the moderates had their say and won the day. Japanese policy in the Philippines was established as persuasion rather than force. That was why some five hundred opinion formers landed on the Lingayen shores close on the heels of General Homma. That was why their job was cut out for them, to spread out among the people, to assure the Filipinos that Japan was not at war with them, to tell them that the Japanese soldiers were liberating the Philippines from American domination, to undercut the influence of the Americans in the islands, and to spread the gospel of independence and co-prosperity.

The thirteen Catholic and thirteen Protestant corpsmen were specifically assigned to the Christian church of the Philippines.

Their job was to discredit the American missionaries, unite the churches and Filipinize them, serve as a buffer between the Japanese military and Filipino churches, and use pulpit, religious press, and personnel to spread the doctrines of the empire.

The deputation arrived in Manila on January 2, 1942. The religious section moved into the American Union Church and organized for its task. Bishop Yoshigoro Taguchi was head of the Catholic section, and the Rev. Tadashi Aiura, a doctor of theology from the Pacific School of Religion, Berkeley, California, was head of the Protestant section. The Rev. Isamu Chiba, a young Baptist clergyman and graduate of Colgate-Rochester Seminary, Rochester, New York, was Aiura's assistant.

Their first task in the Philippine capital was to assist the law-and-order campaign of the victorious invaders by reorganizing church life and re-establishing services and worship as usual. The Filipinos went back to church with little interruption of services save that occasioned by the destruction of some churches and the removal of all missionaries to internment camps. The religious section gave permits to churches for the holding of services, and there was a semblance of freedom of worship. Everything about the services, however, had to be reported to the religious section—times of meeting, numbers of persons attending, subject of the preacher's sermon, even the amount of money in the collection. As time went on the religious section took a growing interest in the sermon subject. It carefully checked in advance the complete text of what the preacher intended to say, and when there was a chance, it inserted material which served the propaganda interests of the Japanese.

The problem of the missionaries was the second job which the Filipinos worked out with the religious section. This came in January, 1942. Efforts had been made by Filipino Christians to have missionaries released from internment, particularly sick persons and young mothers. The efforts came to nought. Most Filipinos feel that the religious section worked boldly for the release of missionaries against the army's adamant refusal to release them. Other observers assured me that the religious section had its own veiled reasons for urging the missionaries' release.

Whatever the motive, one day Chiba telephoned the Filipino leaders: "I have good news for you." The missionaries were to be released the next day, through the good offices of Aiura, Chiba, and company. What was not made public at the time was the fact that a number of leading Filipino Christians had been forced into signing security statements for these missionaries. Dr. Gumersindo Garcia, a Protestant physician, prominent layman, and one of the most devoted, right-minded Christians anywhere, was one of these who signed a pledge of responsibility for the conduct of missionaries.

They were released with apparent freedom. Then, late in January, a meeting was called in the Manila Hotel by the religious section leaders, and missionaries were summoned to it. They were presented with a document to be signed, in which they pledged themselves to refrain from political activities and any action designed to endanger the Japanese regime in the Philippines, to obey the mandates of the military administration, to respect it, and to declare by their signatures that they realized that God's will was behind all that was transpiring in the Pacific. Most of the missionaries signed the pledge and were free until later in the war when Japan's fear of a fifth column brought internment of all enemy nationals. Four missionaries refused to sign—Dr. Don Wendell Holter, Dr. Francis W. Brush, the Rev. W. H. Fonger, and the Rev. Edward C. Bomm—and were taken immediately back to Santo Tomas camp for the duration of the occupation.

There is some doubt that all the missionaries knew what they were signing, as Chiba, who wrote the pledge, had evolved a statement that carefully produced one effect with the Japanese military and another with the missionaries. Part of this confusion was due to the translation into English. I was told both in the Philippines and in Japan that Chiba's English translation of the pledge, which the missionaries signed, was not an accurate rendition of the Japanese version which reached General Homma's desk. In the Japanese version clear references were made to divine blessing on Nippon's ambition for Oriental liberation from the yoke of American and Western domination and the missionary's endorsement of the co-prosperity ideal. These somewhat treasonable (for an American) declarations were played down in the English translation. The text of the pledge required of Protestant missionaries in exchange for their release from internment on January 28, 1942, follows:

> We Protestant missionaries and those who are connected with Christian work will gladly co-operate with the Japanese army as it proclaims the military administration in the Philippines, and do hereby pledge to take up the duties of the restoration and maintenance of peace by observing the following items:
>
> (1) Although we are granted the freedom of faith, we will gladly offer our buildings and their equipment whenever they are needed for military strategy.
>
> (2) We would never hold meetings primarily held for the people of the hostile nations (worship services included).[1]
>
> (3) We would not hold, for the time being, any other meetings than religious services.
>
> (4) We would lead and instruct our church members, trusting in the Japanese army, understanding that the great ideal of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is on the road to its realization, and believing that the very fulfillment of that great ideal is in line with the will of God.[2]

[1] When copies of this pledge were printed in the *Manila Tribune* on January 30, this item was amended to read, "except services in the Santo Tomas Internment Camp."

[2] When the pledge appeared in the *Tribune* this item was changed to read, "Fulfillment of that great ideal is to attain world peace." Thus, attainment of world peace was substituted in the English text for "the will of God." This change was done at the insistence of two missionaries who would not otherwise sign. The Japanese original was not changed, only the English translation.

> (5) We would positively co-operate with the Japanese army and would not fail its generous considerations toward us.

The religious section members began immediately on their campaign to unite the churches, a repetition of what was already transpiring under government coercion in Japan, Korea, and China. Their first step was to form a federation of Protestant churches on the way to organic union. They completely ignored the already existing church federation, an institution of long and excellent traditions in the Philippines. Right here it should be noted that it was not unification itself which the Japanese were after; it was unification according to their mould, unification which left no loopholes for democratic life among the people, but a structure of organization which fitted the totalitarian pattern of Japan at war. They wanted a church which they could control easily, which would enable them to impose their wishes from the top down upon the whole Christian population with a single command.

The religious section called in various Protestant leaders and began sowing seeds of the federation idea. A few leaders heard these appeals and were flattered by promises of position into supporting the move. In May, 1942, a meeting was held at the Manila Hotel which brought the federation movement to public notice for the first time. The *Manila Tribune,* only English-language paper in the city at the time, headlined and subheaded its story: "Plan Church Federation. Army Officers, P. I. Ministers Talk at Meet. Narusawa Hails Formation of Union in the Philippines."

Here are some quotations from the *Tribune* story:

> Preliminary plans for the founding of a federation of all evangelical churches in the Philippines were discussed last evening at the Manila Hotel at a conference of representatives of Protestant churches and members of the religious section of the Imperial Japanese army.

The conference, which was presided over by the Rev. Dr. T. Aiura, chief of the Protestant unit of the religious section, heard a keynote speech by Lt. Col. Narusawa, chief of the religious section. . . .

There was practically unanimous agreement of the need of a federation, lack of which, according to various speakers, prevents the evangelical churches from making their voice heard.

For the purpose of giving the conferees an idea of the federation, the Rev. I. Chiba sketched a brief history of the federation movement among the evangelical churches in Japan and read the constitution of the Japanese National Christian Council. . . .

Among the members of the religious section of the Japanese army present were Lt. Col. Narusawa, Dr. Aiura, Rev. Chiba, Rev. J. Furuta, Rev. N. Kusama, Rev. M. Yamada, Rev. J. Shirato, Rev. M. Korogi, Rev. M. J. Fujita, Rev. Y. Nakada and T. Ono.

This newspaper article is revealing. It shows the clever flattery of the Filipino Protestants by the Japanese, at once flattering and arrogant. It shows the complete disregard of the already existent federation of evangelical churches and National Christian Council in the Philippines. It shows the temporary nature of the projected federation with the idea of organic union looming in the very near future. At the meeting Colonel Narusawa spoke and revealed Japanese military policy regarding Christians when he told of the army's part in the unifications in Manchukuo and Japan. The article reveals also that not a single Protestant of first-rank leadership attended the meeting, and the major denominations were not represented. The *Tribune's* list of delegates included those from denominations of only minor importance in the islands.

The project proceeded apace. Many small sects combined with larger ones, and on October 10-11, 1942, the combined total of thirteen denominations sent their representatives to the United Church in Manila to affix their signatures to the articles of incorporation of the Federation of Evangelical Churches in the Philippines (not to be confused with the prewar Philippine Federation of Evangelical Churches). Led by Dr. Enrique C. Sobrepena, late of the chaplains' corps of the Philippine Army, the Rev. Matias Cuadra, also a former chaplain, and the Rev. Francisco Galvez, a Methodist district superintendent, the federation grew in power over the denominations, tried to receive title to all mission properties in the islands, and moved at the religious section's bidding toward outright Protestant unification.

By the end of August, 1943, a group of federation leaders succeeded in drafting a constitution for a united church, a document which reads satisfactorily, but was considered vicious by the rank and file of churchmen because none of them had been consulted about it, nor did it in any way express the democratic desire of church people for union.

The executive committee of the federation declared the union in effect in October, 1943, and then resigned as federation heads and dissolved the organization. The churches who were invited to join the union were given a year to make up their minds and set their houses in order for dissolution prior to incorporation into the united body.

Quietly but firmly, dissension arose from almost every walk of church life in the Philippines. A meeting of the executive committee of the Methodist central conference of the Philippines and the council of district superintendents of that denomination convened in Manila. The Methodists were on the list to be integrated into the union. The council noted this inclusion and went on to say in a formal declaration:

> The Methodist Church has always been deeply interested in the ideal of a united Protestantism in the Philippines and in all worthy plans for genuine co-operation. . . . This new plan proposes an organic union of all evangelical churches and will require careful and thorough study by all the churches concerned. We recognize that neither we nor any official of the Methodist Church has the authority to commit the Methodist Church to any participation in the proposed Evangelical Church in the Philippines, but we are happy to receive a copy of its constitution and

> we will be glad to bring it before our people for their serious study and for any necessary action by the officially constituted bodies of our church qualified to act on such matters. Be it therefore resolved that pending final decision by the properly authorized bodies of the Methodist Church, we declare the Methodist Church in the Philippines not yet a member of the Evangelical Church in the Philippines. Be it further resolved that we earnestly recommend the continuation of the Federation of Evangelical Churches in the Philippines until the question of church union shall have been finally acted upon by all the churches concerned, and we hereby declare that the Methodist Church in the Philippines is desirous of retaining its membership in the said federation.

The resolution was signed by Juan Nabong, vice-chairman of the meeting, a prominent Methodist attorney, and the Rev. Vicente S. Cordero, secretary.

At the same time a memorandum was addressed to the federation officials from the Philippine Episcopal Church:

> After careful and sympathetic consideration of the constitution of the Evangelical Church in the Philippines, approved by the standing committee on organic union of the Federation of Evangelical Churches in the Philippines on August 24, 1943, we deeply regret that there are certain insuperable difficulties which make it impossible for the Philippine Episcopal Church to enter into organic union with the Evangelical Church in the Philippines as at present proposed. These difficulties arise from our unique position as an integral part of the Anglican Communion which is one of the three great historical branches of the Catholic church.

Protests were also received from the Samahang Tagapagpalaganap ng Evangelio, Inc. (Mga Iglesia ni Cristo sa Pilipinas), eleven Manila congregations known simply as Churches of Christ, the Baptists, and others.

But all this dissension did not stay the plans for union. The Disciples of Christ supported the plan, as did the United Church of Christ, parts of the United Evangelical Church of the Philippines which followed Sobrepena's leadership, and several other small groups.[3] In the final stages of the formation of the union the Methodists affiliated themselves as associate members, as did the Independent Methodist Church. The year of discussion prior to adoption of the constitution was never observed, and on April 30, 1944, the Evangelical Church of the Philippines came into formal being. The controlling body was called the supreme council.

The evangelical union was largely a paper organization. A few months after its formation American bombers started their runs over Manila, and the whole civil life of the people was disrupted. The religious section disintegrated. By December all but one of its members had left the city for safer places. Pastors' weekly reports were never submitted after December, 1944. All the propaganda and civil administration details of Japan's hold on the Philippines were sacrificed in the rising need for attention to military matters.

With the coming of the American forces in February, 1945, the union fell to pieces immediately and the prewar status of all the constituents was revived. The United Church of Christ was the first to pull out of the union. The Manila conference of the United Evangelical Church disavowed the right of that denomination ever to have been included in the body. Some United Brethren churches in the North and the Disciples group seemed to be the only denominations willing to try to make a further success of the union.

Concurrently with the disintegration of the union began a campaign to discredit Sobrepena. It started in his own church, where, according to the protesters, he had exceeded his authority and acted unconstitutionally. The last official assembly of the United Evangelical Church before the war had elected the Rev.

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[3] These names are confusing. The United Evangelical Church of the Philippines was an earlier union of several denominations, largely Calvinist in theology. Sobrepena called himself "bishop" of this church. Those which followed his leadership supported the union; another strong faction repudiated him and the unification movement.

Leonard G. Dia its moderator in 1941, and he had never been consulted about using the church's name in the all-Protestant unification drive. Dia clearly disclaimed his church's part in the union. A similar petition was drawn up by individual members of this church, beginning: "We the undersigned hereby protest against the alleged inclusion of the United Evangelical Church of the Philippines, or any part of it, in the Evangelical Church in the Philippines." Both petitions accused the union of being forced by Japanese pressure.

At the same time Sobrepena and his assistant, Cuadra, found themselves in hot water with the Philippine army. Both were put on the stand in courts-martial on charges of collaborating with the enemy. Sobrepena was acquitted by one vote less than the necessary two-thirds majority of the judges to convict. He was promptly relegated to inactive status. Cuadra was found guilty on a number of counts and was dishonorably discharged from the army. He appealed the decision. Meanwhile Sobrepena tossed his hat into the ring for a seat in the national assembly, running from his home district in northern Luzon. Despite his alignment to the winning Roxas ticket, he failed of election and will have difficulty returning to the church. Cuadra, on the other hand, appears regularly in his chaplain's uniform at the United Church on one of Manila's main thoroughfares, the Azcarraga, and has a busy program of activities, services, joint Filipino-American Youth for Christ rallies, and other meetings taking up his time.

The Catholics' alleged collaborator was Bishop Cesar M. Guerrero, ranking Filipino prelate in the Roman Catholic hierarchy in the Philippines, auxiliary bishop of Manila, vicar-general, and national director of Philippine Catholic Action. I read the draft of the charges against him in the People's Court.[4] His indictment was for treason. He was accused of making speeches urging Filipinos to acquiesce in the workings of divine providence and to co-operate with their Oriental brothers. He was the leader of the Nippon-Filipino Goodwill Catholic Association, an organization sponsored and inspired by the Japanese propaganda corps. He was also editor of *Tagapagturo,* a Catholic magazine published at Japanese expense, and gave it his imprimatur as bishop. The indictment also charged that he traveled through the provinces on a pacification campaign against the guerrillas and gave re-endoctrination lectures to Filipino prisoners of war on behalf of the Japanese. On one occasion in the Manila cathedral he prayed openly for a Japanese victory.

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[4] He had not been brought to trial when this book went to press.

However, lest collaboration receive too great an emphasis in this report, let me say that the church's record of co-operating with the Japanese in the Philippines cannot begin to match its record of determined resistance. Christian resistance to tyranny in the Philippine Islands deserves to rank with that in Norway and the Netherlands. Let it never be said that the Filipino Christian church has no moral conscience. Filipino Christians risked and gave their lives in the struggle against the invader and for human freedom.

Nine years ago in the Philippines I had as close personal friends Dr. and Mrs. Cirilio B. Perez and their three children. They were members of Central Student Church (Methodist) across from the Luneta between the government and university sections of the city. Mrs. Perez had been a deaconess and was then a trained social worker and executive secretary of the Associated Charities of Manila. Perez was an archivist in the government library.

When I returned to Manila in April, 1946, I again met Mrs. Perez but not her husband. A few days before, she had been to the Chinese cemetery north of the city and identified his remains. Cirilio B. Perez is today one of the Philippines' heroes of the anti-Japanese resistance.

In 1941 Mrs. Perez had been named by President Quezon as director of the bureau of public welfare in the commonwealth government. At the end of that year the Japanese were in Manila, and both the Perezes resigned their government jobs. They went to their home in the suburbs, and there, beneath a gnarled old giant of a mango tree, began their work for the resistance. At first the home became an underground railway station for Filipino soldiers escaping from Bataan, establishing contact with their families, getting some money and clothes and medicines, and scurrying off into the hills to join the guerrillas.

Before long Perez was a colonel in the guerrilla army. Mrs. Perez was a lieutenant colonel. Ernesto Perez, 24, whose fingers are as nimble over the *Rhapsody in Blue* as they are over a typewriter, was a lieutenant, typist, and news disseminator. Mrs. Perez trudged around the city, past the Japanese guards, furtively passing notes from hand to hand, carrying down orders to patriots in Manila from the guerrilla headquarters in the hills. The Perezes secured money and medicines, much of it from persons with high rank in the Japanese puppet government. For months on end they squeezed through one narrow squeak after another. Then, at 4 A.M. on February 3, 1944, the gendarmes from Fort Santiago, the death chamber among Japanese prisons in the Philippines, came to the Perez home. Perez was taken first. Mrs. Perez followed a few hours later. The gendarmery never found Ernesto.

Mrs. Perez was put into a small cell with ten other people. They were huddled together with a strip of space eighteen inches wide to sleep upon. Only through the peephole on the door of another cell nearby was she ever able to exchange a word or two with her husband.

Then the investigations started. The Perezes were taken to the investigators together. They were confronted with two of their contact men from the hills. "They were literally black and blue from beatings," Mrs. Perez told me. "We knew them well. But never a glimmer of recognition passed among us. They never betrayed one thing." The investigations became more frequent, particularly for Perez. He grew old and tired and began to lose hope.

One day he asked the attendant: "May I walk back to the cell just holding my wife by the arm?" It was permitted.

"That was our last talk together," she remembers. "We talked of little things, the children, of faith and hope. He went into his cell and I into mine."

On May 16, 1944, at eight in the morning, Perez was led with fourteen others down the corridor, and Mrs. Perez waved goodby through the peephole on her cell door. That was the last she ever saw of him. Three American missionaries—Mrs. Mary Stagg, ill and on a stretcher, Dr. Hawthorne Darby, and Miss Helen Wilk—went with Perez. Later Mrs. Perez learned that they were taken to Bilibid Prison and in mid-September carried to a Chinese cemetery north of the city. Forcing them to kneel beside an open pit, guards cut off their heads, and their bodies toppled into a common grave.

Later in May Mrs. Perez was released. Tipped off by a friendly Japanese, she knew that she was followed and never went out again except to church and market. The Japanese confiscated her home under the mango tree, and when the dust-covered, tall men in khaki came striding through the rice paddies of Bulacan province on their way to release the captives in Santo Tomas prison camp, Mrs. Perez was out to greet them and toss bananas into their arms. She was living in a chicken coop in her husband's native village when the liberation came.

The Perezes were only one family out of many. Mrs. Stagg, who died with Perez, was an American missionary, pastor of the Cosmopolitan Church in Manila. Her church and hospital became a center of guerrilla activity. She and two American colleagues from the hospital paid with their lives for this devotion to the cause of freedom. Seventeen American Baptist missionaries, who fled into the hills of Panay to escape the Japanese and hold out against them, were captured and massacred, women and children among them. In the garden of St. Augustine's monastery in the Intramuros eighty-four priests were killed at one time by the Japanese.

I stood in the ruins of the Methodist Central Student Church and heard the story of that institution's role in Philippine resistance. The organ chamber had housed a radio transmitting station. The potted palms and altar rail were strung with wires. Not even the pastor knew what was going on, except that his electricity bill seemed inordinately high. The janitor was dead, they told me. The organist, the choirmaster, others of the youth group in that congregation—all martyrs to the cause of anti-Japanese resistance during the occupation. With the blood of Jose Rizal in their veins, these boys had braved the wrath of one of the most cruel machines of tyranny in the world to make their country free. The son of the Methodist bishop in the Philippines, young Dever Alejandro, had been another in the valiant company.

Bishop Alejandro opened his roll of pastors. There was Vicente Cordero, felled by a piece of shrapnel through the heart. There was Vicente Amos—his two sons were active guerrillas—taken by the Japanese and killed as a hostage. There was Teofilo Pascual, taken by the Japanese and never heard from again. There was Crisostomo Bartolome, killed with all the prominent men of his village, the priests, businessmen, and officials, when the Japanese punished Bongabon, Nueva Ecija, for hostile activities. All were buried in a common grave. There was Catalina Santos, hit by a Japanese shell. There was Jacinto de Guzman, executed when he married a guerrilla leader and papers were found in his parsonage involving him with the warrior bands in the mountains. The bishop's list involved only one denomination. All Filipino churches have similar records of death-defying resistance to the Japanese. Not all these resisters, by any means, were caught. I talked to pastors who had left their villages and gone as chaplains to the guerrillas. Eleven such pastors left their parishes in the

Methodist connection alone. Others went as line officers, and dozens were secret agents.

The last battles which raged across the northern Philippines between American and Japanese troops brought the final blow in Japanese retaliatory massacres of civilians, slaughter of innocents as the fighting raged about them, and endless destruction of property. Manila today is one of the worst battered cities in the world. All the grace and languorous, tropical calm of its prewar days are gone, and ugly scars mar its face. Buildings lie in heaps of ruins. The Intramuros is a leveled field of white dust from the pulverized buildings which once lined its quaint, narrow streets. The maimed prowl like scavengers through its hideous, smelly, damp shanty towns. The toll in Catholic churches is deadening to the senses. Only a few in the city of Manila remain. Only St. Augustine's in the Intramuros is still upright and functioning, and it has gaping shell holes in its side. The cathedral of Manila is a pile of pulverized mortar and stone. Only one compound of Methodist mission buildings in Manila still stands. The Central Student Church was taken by the Japanese in 1945 and fortified. Commanding the Luneta approaches on one side and the Japanese headquarters and Taft avenue on the other side, the church became a machine-gun nest and finally a crematorium for Japanese dead. It was soaked with gasoline and given the torch in the last days of fighting for Manila.

In central and northern Luzon the Methodists lost eighty-seven churches, parsonages, and dormitories. Fighting in Batangas and southern Luzon cut a wide path of devastation through Presbyterian properties. In the Visayan islands the Baptists suffered similarly. Catholics in every village owned the most imposing piece of architecture there; uniformly it was smashed or burned. Property damage alone to the Philippine Christian church will take a century to repair and rebuild.

This was the respect for Christianity which the Japanese brought to the Philippine Islands. This was the mission upon which the religious delegates were engaged. Yet in the Philippines today one finds little resentment against these Japanese men of God who came behind their country's arms.

"They were ordered," the Christians of Manila told me, "and had no choice. It is to their honor that they failed in their mission."

I remembered the stories I had heard in Japan of the failure of this mission. Most of the original conscripts were ordered home in December, 1942, a year after they had arrived. Already the Japanese military was suspicious that they had a bear by the tail in trying to handle the Christian church. Johnny Fujita was ordered to Radio Tokyo, where he monitored American broadcasts. Too many red neckties and too frequent repetition on the streets of what he heard from San Francisco about the true facts of the war finally closed the prison walls around him. A few weeks before the surrender he was released, an eighty-eight-pound skeleton. Isamu Chiba went back to Tokyo and became secretary for Sunday schools in the United Church. The Rev. Yoshiaki Nakada was left in charge of the mission in Manila.

Nakada's is a tragic story. He took over his job with the religious section just at the time Christian resistance was becoming a real nuisance to the occupying army. The militarists held him responsible for the insurrection centered in the person of Mrs. Stagg. Pressure upon him was terrific. He tried to coerce pastors into fulfilling the requirements of Japanese propaganda, and more and more they defied him.

Nakada was removed from his post after the Mary Stagg episode, and the religious section atrophied. The army took over the guardianship of the church for itself. Nakada was transferred to head the Japanese bureau of information in the town of San Pablo, Laguna. On February 24, 1945, the Japanese military authority, to which Nakada was attached as a civilian employee, ordered a systematic massacre of the Filipino and Chinese residents of the town and the subsequent burning of the city. War crimes trials caught up with these San Pablo authorities in later months, and the responsible army officials were sentenced to hang. Nakada was also tried, and in early summer of 1946 sentenced to thirty years imprisonment for conspiracy in the army plan and for failing to interfere with the orders which sacked the city.

Nakada and Aiura were not popular with the Christians among whom they worked. Aiura's chief theme was anti-Americanism, a note which did not sit well on the hearts of Filipino Christians. On one occasion, in a Manila pulpit, he devoted two thirds of his sermon to anti-American tirades. He was also responsible for forcing propaganda writings and speeches upon Christian pastors and laymen, and, on the pretext of editing their manuscripts, actually changed their content to outright Japanese propaganda.

But the other members of the religious section were well received and often helpful. On one occasion, after the section was issued uniforms, Fujita met an American missionary on the street. He hailed him and they walked off together. "We got our uniforms this week," Fujita said. "You should see them—braid and brass and a sword that drags on the ground." He grinned. "I look just like a Western Union messenger boy." The conversation revealed something of the seriousness with which Fujita and the others approached their military duties.

Bishop Alejandro spoke highly to me of Chiba. "I never heard him preach anything but the pure gospel," he said, "never an unchristian word against Americans or anyone else." Chiba was largely responsible for the release of missionaries and for saving the American Bible Society as a Filipino institution, a move which provoked the wrath of the army against him, and sent him back to Tokyo in 1942.

Passes which the religious section awarded to Christian pastors were responsible for saving their lives on numerous occasions, I was told. They authorized passage for the clergy at times when the ordinary Japanese guards would have fired first and explained later.

Nevertheless, for all they did to help, the ever-present fact about the missionaries from Japan which the Filipinos could never forget was their alignment to the military occupation of a savage tyrant. Behind them always lurked the shadow of the executioner. As in China, I also heard in the Philippines the final charge against Christians of Japan—that they only diluted the poison, that they never smashed the cup, that they never brought moral judgment to bear upon the basic presuppositions of Japanese empire-building.

There is real gaiety in Manila today. You can feel it in the streets. Through the broken city runs a river of friendship, a bustle of activity, excitement, pride. Traffic never stops on the city streets. People cry out to their neighbors in a comradely way. Joy is in the air and smiles are on the faces. The children play again.

The mood is contagious. It has taken the Christian church by storm. Never have the church's resources for service been fewer. Yet never has its life in the Philippines been more enthusiastically received. In the Knox-Central Methodist Church in Manila it is hard to get the doors locked at night, so abundant are its activities and so numerous the people who throng about it. In one wing of the church a Cordero Memorial Hall has been set up, serving doughnuts and selling souvenirs to passersby, American GI's and Filipinos. On Sundays congregations numbering eight hundred pack the sanctuary and hang out the windows. The Evangelical Federation found the school system for young women pitifully inadequate in postwar Manila, and in the midst of inflation, lack of equipment, and buildings, it established the Bethel Girls' High School in July, 1945, five months after the liberation, the first Protestant high school for girls in the Philippine Islands. Contributions from Protestant laymen and friendly American soldiers put the project over, and today 139 girls are enrolled. Christian youth movements have sprung up with spontaneity and enthusiasm born of long nights of waiting. Recruits to Christian vocations surpass all previous records. At the memorial service for one Christian pastor who was killed during the war, eighteen young people volunteered for full-time Christian service to take the place of their pastor and friend.

Years of adversity did not break the Christian church in the Philippines. They tested it, refined it, deepened its spiritual and ethical sensitivity. The result today is a church which has the blood of the martyrs fresh upon it, a church which has plunged into the busy life of this young Philippine republic with the will to seize a major portion of that life for God and his ways.

XIV........................AFTER THE STORM

"AFTER THE rain the ground becomes solid," runs an old Japanese proverb. Surely the storms have passed over eastern Asia in the past ten years. They have shaken peoples and nations, the earth beneath them, and the heavens above. They have been bloody storms with death and destruction in their wake.

It all began with a curiously faked "incident" on the South Manchurian Railroad in 1931. Koreans would say it began a quarter of a century before that. Japan was spreading out. Her packed islands needed territorial annexations into which her people might overflow. The anachronism of Japan, living in two ages at once, the age of science and the age of feudalism, brought economic and social contradictions to her people which had to resolve themselves in the age-old ways of imperialistic war. Korea, Manchuria, Mongolia, North China, East, Central, and South China, the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, New Guinea, the Solomons, Malaya, French Indo-China, Siam, Burma —from the gates of Pearl Harbor to the Imphal Valley of East India, from the waters of Australia to the Arctic Circle—these were the coveted lands and seas of the Empire of the Rising Sun.

That empire signed its own death certificate aboard a United States battleship anchored in Tokyo Bay on a balmy September day in 1945. The storm was over. And after the rain, the proverb says, the ground becomes solid.

Perhaps it's so. Like an overburdened Chinese coolie, the people of the Orient have put down their load with a sigh of weariness and relief. They are glad it's over. The threat of Japan is no more. The blood of a son felled by Japanese bullets in the malarial jungles of the Salween, the humiliation of a sister raped by Japanese bullies in an alley of Nanking, the imprisonment of a father in a dungeon of Korea, the execution of a husband in a cemetery of Manila—all these have been avenged, the peoples of the Orient are saying. They are finished.

To millions of the Orient's people this is a day of hope. I talked to no one in Japan who did not admit that there was more hope for the nation today than there was in July, 1945. The Koreans are flexing their muscles for a try at self-government, their dream of thirty-five years. The Philippines, the East Indies, British India, all are alive with new activity. After eight long years Old China stands again sovereign over her soil, free to face her problems without a foreign invader sapping her vitality. This much is solid ground that follows after rain.

The occasion for brightest hope in the Orient today is this hope itself. Eastern peoples no longer slumber in fatalistic acceptance of fixed customs and patterns of life. They are aroused to their own future. More earnestly than ever before in their history are they assailing their own problems with a will to learn and improve themselves. Fresh and eager, they will make mistakes, and the energy born of hope will in many cases waste itself in vain efforts and contradictions. But the old mold has been broken, and the new forms are not yet rigid. Today, more than ever before, Christianity has its big opportunity to join the peoples of the Orient in their assault upon the future.

In many ways the Japanese sage is right to say that after rain the ground becomes solid. But in many ways he is not. You don't look far in the Orient today before you see vast festering marshlands that follow after rain, reeking and poisonous with new problems that the rain has brought. Nowhere did the storms leave the path ahead washed and clean. Everywhere the peoples of the East must pick their way from footing to footing most carefully if they are ever able to wade out from the morass which the storm has left behind.

One is not in Japan long today before he senses a strange mood in the people. On the surface they are hospitable, orderly, and amenable to all suggestions from the occupying authority. But beneath the surface lie a profound bewilderment and lostness that are apparent too if one takes more than a fleeting look. The people of Japan, isolated and insular for centuries, have seen their idols crash down around them. They had believed themselves endowed with a manifest destiny in the Orient. This was more than a political slogan; it was a faith of the people. They were a proud people, presumptuous, sure of their way in a modern world. As history proved, they held a false belief. Misguided, they undertook a costly, foolhardy war. More and more evidence is coming to light every day of the stupid way it was waged, strategically and tactically. The Japanese militarists entered the war with a stubborn, face-saving desire to confirm their own inbred miscalculations and misjudgments. They blundered time and again. Not a single high-ranking officer of the Japanese army had ever served as an attaché to a foreign power. They obstinately refused to take the measure of the enemy.

It was a foolish war, foolishly encountered, foolishly waged. The Japanese people are today realizing how stupid they were. It is a profoundly humbling experience for them. Everywhere they are confessing their error. But it is more than repentance toward us, the conquerors. It is a pride-shattering repentance before themselves. And right here is the secret of the mood of emptiness and disillusionment and genuine despair which grips the Japanese people today. Their age-old fetish of superiority, their dream of hegemony in the Orient, their unquestioned ability to wage war, their belief in themselves as a modern, disciplined nation, groomed to conduct itself according to a dignified code of strict morality—all these items of faith are being swept away, leaving a vacuum where they were.

I have seen all these doubts. Good Japanese people stand aghast at the undecorated stories they are now hearing of the inhumanity which followed their armies everywhere they went. These were their own sons. What was wrong? Why did they go to such depths of degeneration and cruelty? Were they improperly trained? And why are they, the Japanese people, only now hearing about these things? Who was lying? Why? Shaken and stunned, the Japanese people are forced into questioning some of the basic presuppositions underneath their practice of nurturing their young. It is not often that history demands such a fundamental self-analysis of a people as is now taking place in Japan.

Even the science of government has not escaped the scourge of questioning and doubt. Are we able to govern ourselves? the Japanese are asking. Politicians misled us, militarists wrote their designs in our blood but without any of our control, the holders of power bulwarked their fortress with their own propaganda, and we, knowing no other, danced to their tune—these are the common confessions among Japanese people today. Consequently they face their day of repair with feelings of guilt, dread, bewilderment.

I spent hours in Japan with university students, frankly and unashamedly playing hooky from their classes. When I asked them about their irresponsibility toward their lessons, they said: "Why go to classes? The professors don't know what to teach. I'm in law. Until the times settle down a bit our law codes are in abeyance. How do we know what legal system we shall have? The professors are waiting. The classes are made up of old men, returned soldiers and officers, anybodies and nobodies. It's not school. You learn nothing. Much better to get out among the American boys, have fun with them, learn their ways, learn English. The best school in Japan today is out on the streets and in the billets and offices of the occupation."

The slowness of Tokyo during the winter of 1945-46 to rebuild its homes and shops was obvious to everyone. It was particularly apparent to me who had just come from Chungking, where I had seen whole sections of that city go up in a roaring fire one night and the homes and shops mushroom on the ashes the next day. The Japanese protested that they could get no materials, could hire no labor. But there was a more underlying reason than these, a reason in the confused and aimless, broken spirit of the Japanese people. Persons with a sure grip on their own futures will find materials, will build homes and shops with their own hands.

Factories were having a hard time getting workers. Production was bogged down in the problems of reconversion, the necessity for supervision and constant negotiations with the occupying authority, the lack of materials, the inflated currency which made the problem of wages and prices unstable, the uncertainty of markets.

All of this disruption of Japanese society, in every walk and every phase, was caused by the knife of defeat which cleaved through accustomed processes of life and separated the people finally and totally from all they had previously believed and acted upon. It was as if the book of their life had been suddenly and irretrievably slammed shut, and they were precipitated into the middle of a new book, the language of which they could not read and the ideas of which they found far beyond their depth. This bewilderment of the people I found the most disturbing attribute of Japan's postwar life. It is a fact; there is no need even to try to fix the blame for it. The most heartening thing in Japan today is that the people have inched forward as well as they have in adjusting themselves to their new book and have kept themselves alive and somewhat hopeful despite the thoroughgoing disruption of their life.

Drop down upon the Oriental scene almost anywhere, and you will again find the ground disturbed by tremendous problems that have survived the war or have been occasioned by it. In Korea there is much to disprove the old remark about the ground hardening after rain. The peace brought a divided occupation policy to Korea that is one of the international tension points in the world today. Instead of being liberated, Korea finds herself cut in two, the 38th parallel bisecting her territory, two nations governed by two totally different sovereignties where before there was one. Lacking any foreseeable solution to this bifurcation, Korean reconstruction and nationalization proceeds by spurts and starts, with all measures of reform only half-measures because of the position of Korea in the game of balance of power between Russia and the United States.

The long-festering sore in China's internal politics erupted into violence before the ink on Japan's surrender documents was dry. Here again the ground refused to become solid when the storm had passed. Held slightly in abeyance so long as the foreign enemy was at China's door, the smoldering nationalist-communist feud flamed up, and months of negotiation produced no quenching of the fire.

The days of grief in east Asia are not yet done. The man who takes hope for the future of the Orient must do it with these unsettled problems in the ledger before him. The man who takes hope for the future of the Christian church in east Asia must also be aware that involved in that future is the task of settling these basically disordering problems in Oriental life. The spiritual rebirth of the Orient cannot be achieved on moods of weariness, disillusionment, and despair among the people, nor where cynical political interests negate the aims of simple justice, nor where tentativeness and waiting rob the people of goals and singleness of purpose.

It takes no prophet to see that communism is rearing its head everywhere in the Orient. With such fields of underprivileged people as the East holds, it is a certain prediction that they are going to turn to communism in greater numbers for the solution of the difficulties which plague their lives. My personal feeling is that this trend is not ideological communism in the Marxian sense, built on an analysis of the unworkability of the capitalist economy. It is rather proletarian unrest arising from the sea of underprivilege which fills the Orient. It is the perfectly natural response of the debt-ridden, the tenants, the farmers, the social outcasts to a promise that holds out hope for them to achieve a greater share of the world's wealth. It is in this sense "bolshevist," as we have used the word to mean "soak the rich" and redistribute wealth and opportunity. Oriental proletarian movements will gravitate toward Russia in so far as that country nurtures their hope and helps them fulfill their dreams. I doubt that Oriental communists have any kinship to Russian nationalism itself, but insofar as that nation furthers their interests they will fall into the Soviet sphere of interest.

I doubt that the Christian church has yet realized how critical is this situation regarding communism in the Orient today. In every country there the church is lined up politically against those who call themselves communists, and I fear it will receive short shrift if the communists establish real sovereignty.

The argument between Christians and communists in the Orient today is not a spiritual argument. It is political. It does not talk about Christianity's fundamental opposition to atheism and a philosophy of scientific materialism. It bases itself on the simple fact that Christianity is identified with classes in the society which stand to suffer if socialization wins the day.

In China Christians have felt just pride in their numbers attached to the Central Government of Chiang Kai-shek. The church's fate in China would seem to be almost one with the fate of the Central Government. While Chinese communists in recent years have not opposed Christians, and have a few in their inner circles, the fact is that the communist movement in China is practically forgotten and ignored by the Christian churches.

In Japan the church has made its strongest appeal in years past to the professional and upper-middle-class groups. It has little following among the farmers and laborers. These latter classes are now putting forth strong expressions of their power, and in almost all political arguments involving them the Christian groups are lined up on the opposite side. The bitterness of anticommunist feeling among Japanese Christians is driving the churches into a position from which it will be more and more difficult for the church to share in possible revolutionary changes of Japanese society.

Likewise in Korea, the Christians are today congregating around the Seoul citadel of American military government. The political picture in Korea is generally summed up in two broad categories, right and left. The rightest parties are the Democratic and Nationalist. The leftist are the People's Republican party and the Communist party. The former two are full of Christians, the products of the great independence movement of twenty-five years ago in Korea, which was led by Christians. There are no Christians in the leftist parties, which leaves a great section of the Korean public untouched by Christianity today.

The identification of the largest Christian organization in the Philippines, the Catholic church, with wealthy property owners, and its own land tenure system, leaves little ground for sympathy with Philippine proletarian movements committed to upset those holdings.

The truth is that most Christian converts in the Orient today are members of a social class that has much to fear from any movements which look bolshevist. Christian missions have done well their job in touching the centers of culture in these Oriental countries. But they should never have allowed themselves to concentrate so exclusively upon those classes in society which omitted farmers and workers. Even now missionary agencies are being briefed that they must not send missionaries to some Oriental countries unless they are insured their maintenance by the United States Army. "No missionary can live in Korea today without rations and supplies from the army," I was told by many persons in Seoul.

This attitude drives the wedge between classes even deeper. The statement is at the outset untrue. Catholic missionaries are now in Korea and living exactly as the people live. It is not comfortable and certainly expensive. But it is being done. The sending of missionaries to Korea in the keep of the army is simply another identification of the church with a social order which, even though good and fairly well accepted by Koreans, may at any moment estrange millions of people.

One of the wisest of Japanese Christians asked me to tell American church people to send their missionaries to Japan "to live exactly as the people live, to share their misery and wretchedness, to include themselves in Japan's prayers of repentance and for redemption." He told me that it would be a colossal mistake to bring permanent missionaries to Japan even in a small way identified with the occupying army.

These paragraphs on the problem of the churches vis-à-vis the communist movements of the Orient are included here because they are a concern of primary importance for the Christians in Asia today. So long as the church is identified with privilege, with foreign national flags, and is timid about basic revolutionary changes which improve the livelihood of Asia's millions, it will lose its appeal to those classes of society which are ripe for communism. The church cannot embrace communism for reasons of its basic faith. But it must meet communism in the contest for human betterment. Continued identification of its interests with classes and power which estrange the masses is equally alien to our basic faith, is unfaithful to our commission, and is strategically foolhardy.

One of the newest developments which has arisen with the war and its outcome in the Orient, a development full of implications for the American missionary movement particularly, is the emergence of the United States as a power in the Orient. In the days before World War II America had a modest imperial outpost in the Philippine Islands and a few marines in China. All that is changed today. America developed a network of involvements in China as the war progressed, humanitarian, military, cultural, political. The Philippines became our bastion, replete with material and troops. The entire Pacific basin is dotted by strong points securely in the hands of the United

States. The Japanese surrender rushed us headlong into the most strenuous obligations of governing a foreign power in our history. There we are today. The most revolutionary change in the Orient today is the ascendance of America as the superior power.

This dominance of America has already produced its effect in international relations where Japan is concerned. We are its sovereign authority. But there are other nations watching. Britain was once a dominant power along the seaboard of Asia fronting the Pacific. China is watching our power pile up. But more important than anything else, the war plunged us northward and westward in the Orient, where today we have a border fronting a power we never were neighbor to before. That power is Russia.

What does all this have to do with the Christian church in Asia? Simply this: A clash of political interests is going to sound in the ears of Oriental peoples in the days to come as it has never sounded before, and prominently involved in that clash are countries whose nationals have been and are the chief Christian missionaries in those countries. And with increasing difficulty those missionaries and the Christian movement itself are going to be able to dissociate themselves from the tangle of history around them for the main job which is theirs, the building of Christian community.

This problem of the relation of missionaries to their own nationalities is going to be of especial importance in Japan. The Japanese attitude toward the United States today is conditioned entirely by the occupation of their country. My prediction is that the present-day congenial relations between occupiers and occupied will not last forever. Japan's lot is going to be hard, and as the people there chafe at the slowness of their progress back to normalcy they are going to look around for somebody to blame. The difficulties which are Japan's in the future may not be of the Allies' making, but the Japanese in search of a scapegoat will not believe that. More and more Japan will interpret its miseries as a product of the occupation, and sentiment will change to hostility and blame toward the Americans in their midst. Missionaries from the United States will be the strongest body of Christian workers from one nation in that country. What, then, will be the Japanese receptivity toward Christianity? Only the sincerest show of good will toward the Japanese people's welfare and the most meticulous objectivity toward the intrigue of nations will make the missionaries' position tenable, and free the Christian evangel to move among the people without the marks of coercion and political power upon it.

The church must keep in a position from which it can judge the political history of the coming years in the Far East. They are years destined to be marked by strong assertions of national power, and a new international war is not an impossibility in a day when the Aleutians are fortified to the teeth and Guam is America's western front door. That the American church is the most aggressive missionary church in the world and the American nation is the most rapidly growing in influence of any nation in the Orient is a coincidence which will put the church to severe testing. The Christian movement must at all times and in all of its practice make clear that it does not depend upon the strong right arm of American protection in the Orient. Continued development of national leadership in the churches of the East and a new effort to realize the creation of organized indigenous churches will help to remove the Christian movement from "sponsorship" by the United States or any other foreign nation.

The church must do more immediately in touching the problems of the people's livelihood. It must not stand aloof from the economic struggles of the people. The ideals of Christianity are second to none in the promise of more abundant living for men in their physical environment as well as their spiritual. It will do the church no good to line up on the opposite side from communism in the political arguments which are even now shaking the Orient if it has nothing to contribute itself for the betterment of living among the masses of the people. The church must throw its influence into social movements which are trying to increase economic productivity, ease the strain of debt upon the underprivileged, reform land tenure, organize workers, and lift the level of public health. The church can also lead the way in missions and ministries to the total life of the people—Christian village centers which include agriculturalists, doctors, engineers, teachers, recreationalists on their staffs, Christian city centers that serve the whole life of the people around them.

The church must do more to bring the people whom it touches into the communion of Christian faith. Call this job evangelistic, if you will. The crying need of the world's peoples is spiritual and moral. The corruption and self-seeking which deaden the efforts of men in their practical affairs everywhere are directly traceable to their emptiness of spirit and confusion of faiths. Christianity has an integrating message to speak to this confusion, a message of a universal God and an ethic of love, a message that the proud must bow the knee in humility if it wants to save itself.

The human family suffered its worst of all wars and today is torn by dissension which ominously portends another for reasons of fundamental belief. There is no common faith among us. This is the iron curtain, the impenetrable screen, for there is no meeting of minds and hearts. The man who has stood in the ashes of Hiroshima knows that the choice today is all or nothing. Either we become a world community or we die. All the machinery at Lake Success, Geneva, in councils of foreign ministers, and in every arena where nations meet is useless without the bond of common faith which underlies it and makes it the instrument of true community.

This is an urgent hour in which Christians live today. And an hour of opportunity.

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